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SUMMARY
This thesis examines the recognition of and resort to practical self-help remedies to
ensure compliance with a construction contract by the parties - this is a consistent
feature of construction law, seen regularly in building and engineering contracts
across jurisdictions.
Accordingly, the thesis investigates the treatment of self-help remedies across three
legal regimes. First under South African law, as a mixed legal system (comprising
elements of both civil and English law), secondly under the law of the United Arab
Emirates, which is a civil law jurisdiction but strongly influenced by the principles of
Islamic Sharia law and, as a third point of evaluation, corresponding provisions of a
standardised construction contract drawn from the FIDIC suite of contracts (a suite
of contracts which is commonly used in the construction industry).
As a point of departure, the availability of the remedy of specific performance under
South African law and the law of the United Arab Emirates is examined. A further
investigation is undertaken to establish whether, the courts in such systems
recognise specific performance and secondly whether a willingness exists to award
specific performance in the context of construction contracts. The thesis then moves
to propose that self-help remedies can serve as substitutes for court awarded
specific performance, but it is important that these remedies are effectively
regulated to achieve a proper balance between the interests of the parties and
underlying considerations of principle and policy.
An enquiry is then conducted into the regulation and treatment of three popular self-
help remedies in construction contracts namely: suspension as a self-help remedy
available to both an employer and a contractor, liens as a self-help remedy available
to a contractor and, liquidated damages as a self-help remedy available to an
employer.
The thesis then concludes that, especially in jurisdictions where there is judicial
reluctance to award specific performance, effectually regulated self-help remedies,
are justifiable and effective motivators to encourage specific performance by a
defaulting party.
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OPSOMMING
Hierdie tesis ondersoek die erkenning en aanwending van praktiese eierigting
remedies om die nakoming van konstruksiekontrakte te bewerkstellig.  Hierdie
werkswyse is ŉ gevestigde verskynsel in die konstruksiereg en ‘n kenmerk van bou-
en ingenieurskontrakte in uiteenlopende jurisdiksies.
Die verskynsel van eierigting remedies word aan die hand van drie regsbedelings
ondersoek, te wete die Suid-Afrikaanse reg as ‘n voorbeeld van ’n gemengde
regstelsel waarin elemente van sowel die romanistiese as die Engelse tradisie na
vore kom, die reg van die Verenigde Arabiese Emirate (VAE) wat getuig van invloed
van die Islamitiese Sharia reg op ‘n romanistiese onderbou.  By wyse van ‘n verdere
verwysingspunt word ag geslaan op relevante bepalings van ‘n gestandardiseerde
konstruksiekontrak, te wete die FIDIC kontraktestel, wat breë erkenning in die
konstruksiebedryf geniet.
As ‘n vertrekpunt word die beskikbaarheid van die daadwerklike vervulling as ‘n
kontraksremedie in die Suid-Afrikaanse en die reg van die VAE ondersoek.
Afgesien van die vraag na die omstandighede waaronder die remedie in die
algemeen beskikbaar is, is die spesifieke vraag na die bereidwilligheid van die howe
om daadwerklike vervulling te gelas ten opsigte van ‘n konstruksiekontrak.  Die tesis
doen aan die hand dat eierigting remedies nuttig aangewend kan word in die plek
van daadwerklike vervulling, maar dat dit noodsaaklik is dat sodanige remedies
behoorlik gereguleer word ten einde ‘n balans tussen die belange van die partye
asook onderliggende beginsels en beleidsoorwegings te bewerkstellig.
Teen hierdie agtergrond word die aandag gevestig op die aanwending van drie
eierigting remedies in die konstruksiebedryf, te wete die moontlikheid om prestasie
op te skort, wat beskikbaar is vir beide partye tot die ooreenkoms, die uitoefening
van ‘n retensiereg, wat beskikbaar is vir ‘n kontrakteur en die insluiting van ‘n
strafbeding in die ooreenkoms as ‘n remedie wat beskikbaar is vir die bou-eienaar.
Die tesis kom tot die slotsom dat, veral in jurisdiksies waarin daar sprake is van
onsekerheid oor die toestaan van daadwerklike vervulling in die algemeen en in die
besonder ook ten opsigte van konstruksiekontrakte, die toevlug tot goed
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gereguleerde eierigting meganismes om nakoming te verseker regverdigbaar en
doeltreffend is.
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1Chapter 1
Introduction
1 1  Self-Help Remedies in the Construction Context
Construction is a global phenomenon.  Although projects differ in complexity and
no one project is identical to the next, the challenges and problems faced on
construction projects, across the world, remain the same.
Parties to a construction contract ultimately want the project to proceed to
completion on the terms and conditions agreed to.  Despite “court ordered” specific
performance being a recognised legal sanction in many jurisdictions, it is not always
the most feasible and effective way to compel compliance with a construction
contract if completion is obstructed by a party’s behaviour.  For example, in South
Africa, despite judicial development indicating the contrary,1 it remains questionable
how prepared South African courts are to order specific performance of a
construction contract (especially against a contractor). Under UAE law, legislated
grounds exist upon which a court may refuse an order for specific performance.2
Accordingly, the courts under both systems are afforded considerable latitude
regarding the availability of the remedy, which gives rise to uncertainty as to
whether a contract will be enforced specifically. This, in addition to considerations
of time and cost (naturally incurred when making an approach to the courts), results
in parties having neither comfort nor guarantee that a request for specific
performance will be acceded to by a court.
A consistent feature of construction law, seen frequently in building and engineering
contracts across various jurisdictions, is the recognition of and resort to practical
remedies to ensure compliance with a contract by the parties. This is because these
remedies are arguably more efficient,3 cost effective, certain and are designed to
compel the other party to do what it has contractually undertaken to do in performing
1 See Chapter 3 – “Specific Performance”.
2 See Chapter 3 – “Specific Performance”.
3 Especially regarding time as construction contracts are highly sensitive to time.
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2its agreed contractual obligations properly; in most instances, it is simply more
onerous and costly for a party to pursue court awarded specific performance than
to invoke these remedies to compel compliance.
In addition, the resort to such practical, self-help remedies to compel specific
performance is often more simple and effective than a reliance on the cumbersome
execution mechanisms supportive of court ordered specific performance.
Self-help remedies can be defined as:4
“legally permissible conduct that individuals undertake absent the compulsion
of law and without assistance of a government official in efforts to prevent or
remedy a civil wrong.”
A resort to self-help and private pressure entails an approach that is contrary to
basic premises of the law of contract and the law in general. Contractual
mechanisms authorising self-help, although agreed to, are accordingly often
regarded as contra bonos mores and contrary to public policy, and without any legal
effect.5 Therefore, even in legal systems which recognise self-help remedies, their
regulation with a view to achieving a proper balance between the interests of the
parties and the reconciliation of underlying considerations of principle and policy is
imperative.6 Furthermore, to the extent that these mechanisms serve as substitutes
4 See MP Gergen “A Theory of Self-Help Remedies in Contract” (2009) 89 B.U.L Rev. 1397 1397,
who refers to Douglas I. Brandon et al, “Self-Help: Extrajudicial Rights, Privileges and Remedies
in Contemporary American Society” (1984) 37 V and L. Rev. 845, 850. See also Anonymous
“Self-Help Remedies and Due Process” (2012) 48 St John’s Law Review 661 673 - 674. It is
important to note that all self-help remedies are not necessarily used solely in the context of
and, for the purpose of, encouraging specific performance - certain self-help remedies (for
example cancellation), may serve different purposes.
5 GF Lubbe and CM Murray Farlam and Hathaway: Contract Cases, Materials and Commentary
3 ed (1998) 341. Underlying policy considerations such as the need to avoid a “breach of the
peace” as a result of a party taking the law into his own hands in order to advance his
contractual interests, in effect becoming a judge in his own case, require that a party, despite
any agreement to the contrary, should in principle defer to the courts to compel the fulfilment of
its interests.
6 See Anonymous (2012) 48 St John’s Law Review 673 - 674 where the author evaluates self-
help remedies in a myriad of scenarios with a focus on enforcement and protection of the
interests of the parties. For example, the author asserts that in commercial transactions, policy
considerations favour the preservation of self-help remedies, but such an approach is not so
readily acceptable in instances where significant property interests are at stake. It is noted that
a blanket approach to self-help remedies cannot be applied. See also Gergen (2009) B.U.L
Rev. 1399 – 1401 where the author makes two key observations in respect of self-help
remedies; the first observation is that a party may withhold/refuse performance to avoid
incurring a loss which may not be adequately covered by damages, even if the defaulting party
suffers a disproportionate loss. The second is that in instances where withholding performance
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3for court awarded specific performance, it is essential that they are effectually
regulated in order that they may effectively fulfil this function.
Suspension,7 liens8, and liquidated damages9 are prime examples of self-help
remedies to which an aggrieved party to a construction contract may resort to
ensure compliance with the contract by a defaulting party. These three remedies
are popular, used with a fair amount of regularity by parties and, are (on most
occasions) effective in compelling contractual adherence by a defaulting party.
From a theoretical perspective, these remedies are to some extent anomalous and
problematic. To some degree, all of them involve a resort to self-help in order to
ensure the realisation of a party’s private contractual rights. This “self-help” element
is most obvious in the case of suspension and liens, which entail a party exerting
pressure on a counterpart to extract performance without the intervention of a court.
In the instance of liquidated damages, this same pressure exists (especially in
jurisdictions where punitive measures are permissible), but is more indirect. On the
conclusion of a contract, parties agree upon a sanction (usually in the form of a
predetermined sum of money) which will apply automatically in the case of breach.
In addition, a punitive liquidated damages provision is in itself problematic for
would cause significant loss, the parties are encouraged to each perform and resolve their
differences in court; this must be compared with instances where withholding performance
would not cause significant loss. In such instances, the law encourages parties to mutually
attempt to resolve the dispute, through the withholding of performance, before approaching the
courts. However, self-help remedies may also evade logical economic considerations resulting
in economic waste – this also serves as an important consideration, but may be countered as
self-help remedies do not deprive parties of their right to refer a dispute to the courts.
7 In a construction context, suspension operates by denying a contractor an entitlement to
payment until it has completed the relevant works. In contrast, should an employer fail to make
timeous payment, the contractor may suspend performance of the works, which will, in all
likelihood, result in a delay to completion of the works; motivating the employer to make
payment.  See below, Chapter 4 – “Suspension as a Self-Help Remedy”.
8 A contractor is able to exercise a lien, as a right of retention, over works or services performed
for which it has not received due remuneration.  The lawful exercise of a lien is imperative in all
jurisdictions and should the exercise of this right be unlawful, an aggrieved contractor may be
in breach of contract or face allegations of trespassing. See below, Chapter 5 – “Liens and
Liquidated Damages”.
9 The contractual mechanism entitling an employer to levy liquidated damages against a
contractor is used regularly in the construction industry. An employer is entitled to impose a
predetermined and agreed sum of money on a contractor should a contractor not complete the
works by a fixed date or in instances where the works fail to comply with specified performance
criteria. Liquidated damages clauses are therefore highly effective in compelling a contractor
not only to deliver what it has undertaken to do but, in many instances, to also do so timeously.
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defaulting party.
It is therefore essential that when a party applies a self-help remedy to compel
specific performance by a non-conforming party, the remedy is applied in the best
possible manner and that an accidental repudiation of the contract by the innocent
party is avoided. It is therefore proposed to investigate the effectiveness of these
mechanisms, the permissible parameters of self-help, the requirements for the
lawful application of these remedies and their proper regulation in achieving a vital
balance between the interests of the parties to a contract.
1 2 A Comparative Perspective
Because systems embedded in diverse traditions might be thought to approach the
problems attendant on these self-help remedies, which have a bearing on
fundamental theoretical issues, in different ways, it is proposed to adopt a
comparative approach to investigate how they are treated and regulated.
The thesis will accordingly investigate the treatment of suspension, liens and
liquidated damages under South African law, as a mixed legal system (comprising
elements of both civil and English law), with the law of the United Arab Emirates
(“UAE law”), which is a civil law jurisdiction, but is strongly influenced by the
principles of Islamic Sharia law.  As a counterpoint, it is further proposed to evaluate
the approach of these systems by reference to the corresponding provisions (or
lack thereof) of the so-called Red Book10 (“Red Book”), a standardised construction
contract drawn from the FIDIC11 suite of contracts which is regularly resorted to in
the construction industry.  These legal regimes shall be evaluated to investigate
whether, if at all, the character of, requirements and, mechanisms of application of
10 The colour of the cover page of the contract.
11 The International Federation of Consulting Engineers (in French the Fédération Internationale
des Ingénieurs-Conseils – hence the acronym FIDIC) produces the FIDIC suite of contracts.
France, Belgium and Switzerland founded FIDIC in 1913 with other members only joining more
than 30 years later (the United Kingdom joined in 1949, the United States in 1958 and many of
the other countries only joined as late as the 1970s). Today, FIDIC has approximately 102
members. See C Wade “The FIDIC Contracts and Current Trends” (06-07-2006) Society of
Construction Law https://www.scl.hk/file/paper/SCLHK044.pdf (accessed 04-10-2018) and
FIDIC’s website http://fidic.org/ (accessed 02 October 2018).
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approach.
The United Arab Emirates (“UAE”) is a federal country comprising of seven
Emirates.12 In addition, free zones have been established and exist in the various
Emirates. The oldest and most prominent free zone was established in Dubai and
is known as the Dubai International Financial Centre (the “DIFC”). The DIFC is
governed by many of its own laws13 and has an independent judicial system which
is largely based on common law principles. The federal legal system is largely
based on the civil law model. Islamic Sharia, is the primary (but not the exclusive)
source of legislation and the UAE draws on principles derived from the Islamic
Sharia, together with the laws of other Arab countries; in particular Egypt.14
The laws in the UAE are codified and are in Arabic. A primary source of legislation
is Federal Law No. 5 of 1985 (Code of Civil Transactions) (“Civil Code”). In addition,
decisions of higher courts may be referred to and may have persuasive value, but
the law in the UAE does not recognise prior precedents as formally binding.  The
resultant discretion of the judge hearing a matter gives rise to considerable
uncertainty.
The UAE (and especially Dubai), is a growing country, in a continuing state of
development and continues to experience high volumes of construction work.
However, the UAE, as a country, was only formally founded in 1971, with many of
the core codes which underpin the legal structures only being introduced in the late
1980’s.
In contrast, South African law, has had opportunity to develop over a much longer
period of time. South African Private Law is based on Roman Dutch law with English
influence. Apart from legislative interventions in particular areas, it is still largely
uncodified, with the principles of Contract Law, for instance, in the main, being
12 Dubai, Abu Dhabi, Ajman, Fujairah, Ras Al Khaimah, Sharjah and Umm Al Quwain.
13 The dissertation will only address laws applicable to mainland UAE and not the laws applicable
in the Free Zones.
14 M Grose Construction Law in the United Arab Emirates and the Gulf (2016) 5.
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of binding precedent and lower courts are bound by the decisions of higher courts.16
The development of the law by the courts is therefore not unfettered.  The courts
are furthermore empowered to and, have an obligation to develop the law in line
with the Constitution and, in particular the Bill of Rights; “every court, tribunal or
forum must promote the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights.”17 The
Constitution is accordingly the key source of the values which now shape the
development of South African law.
The relationship between parties to a construction contract is governed by the
principles of the law of contract of South African law and the provisions of the UAE
Civil Code respectively. To avoid potentially adverse consequences through the
automatic application of the general law and, for the purposes of certainty, parties
often contract out of these default provisions.18
A varied range of standardised contractual forms have developed with a view to
encapsulating practices in the construction industry and, in respect of contracts of
international scope, endeavouring to fuse the approaches of different systems into
a unified form. These contractual prototypes are (more often than not) utilised by
parties when concluding a construction contract.19 Whilst parties are not obliged by
15 See generally, F Du Bois “Introduction: History, System and Sources” in CG Van der Merwe &
JE Du Plessis (eds) Introduction to the Law of South Africa (2004) 1 40.
16 See JE Du Plessis “South Africa” in JM Smits (ed) Elgar Encyclopaedia of South African Law
(2012) 814 816-817, Du Bois “Introduction: History, System and Sources” in: Introduction to the
Law of South Africa 40 and R Zimmermann and D Visser “Introduction: South African Law as a
Mixed Legal System” in R Zimmermann and D Visser (eds) Southern Cross: Civil Law and
Common Law in South Africa (1996) 1 9.
17 Section 39 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, read with sections 8 and
173; cf Du Bois “Introduction: History, System and Sources” in Introduction to the Law of South
Africa 41.
18 Provided that these provisions are not mandatory.
19 See PM Nienaber “Construction Contracts” in WA Joubert & JA Faris LAWSA  9 3rd ed (2014)
para 1: “A large body of legal understanding, sometimes referred to as ‘construction law’, has
developed concerning the interpretation and application of construction contracts…This branch
of the law of contract has generated standardised concepts due to the almost universal use of
standard or ‘stock’ form contracts (see…Concrete Construction Ltd v S Keidan & Co Ltd 1955
4 SA 315 (A) 318) and the globalisation of the construction industry generally…” See also M
Beletskaya Development of the Contractual Remedies in International Trade: Comparative
Analysis and Example if Implementation in Standard Construction Contracts LLM thesis
Helsinki University (2014) 98–104, where the author discusses various different types of
standardised construction contract prototypes.
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advantages.21 The provisions of these standardised contracts can furthermore often
be amended by the parties to reflect particular individual aspects of their relationship
or to address specific legal requirements bespoke to certain jurisdictions.22
One of the most prevalent and commonly used forms of contract used for
construction projects is published by FIDIC. FIDIC publishes a suite of contracts to
suit the different requirements of different construction projects. Arguably, in
industry, the most frequently used contract can be found in the 1999 suite; the FIDIC
“Conditions of Contract for Construction”, which is colloquially known as the FIDIC
“Red Book”.23
The FIDIC suite of contracts reflects the views prevalent in and solutions favoured
by the broader construction industry.  It seeks to promote best industry practice
(including the fair allocation of risk on construction projects) internationally and is
unhindered by the dictates and influences of a single national legal system.24 In
20 M Latham Constructing the Team (1994) 5.21.
21 T Shnookal & D Charrett “Standard Form Contracting; The Role for FIDIC Contracts
Domestically and Internationally” (19-06-2010) Society of Construction Law
http://208.76.83.195/~mtecccom/wp-content/uploads/2010/06/Shnookal_Toby.pdf (accessed
04-10-2018) where the authors identify key advantages associated with standard form
contracts namely: 1) Familiarity with the contractual provisions leads to efficiency and
improvement in communication, which in turn results to better contract administration. 2) Due
to familiarity with the contract there is no need to undertake comprehensive legal reviews nor
draft contracts from scratch, therefore, there is a reduction in the time and cost of tendering. 3)
Parties are provided with an impartial starting point for further negotiations. 4) Fewer
misunderstandings arise between the parties and accordingly fewer disputes. 5) There may be
a reduction in the tender price as contractors are not required to price unfamiliar additional risks.
22 FIDIC allows for amendment of the General Conditions of Contract by way of Particular
Conditions, with the Particular Conditions taking precedence over the General Conditions in
instances of conflict between the General Conditions and the Particular Conditions. See cl 1.5
[Priority of Documents] of the Red Book.
23 There are various revisions of FIDIC Conditions of Contract with the first edition of the Red
Book being published in 1957 and the fourth (and final edition) being published in 1987. In 1999
a “new” Red Book was published and was marked as a “first edition” (the reason for marking
the version published in 1999 as a “first edition” was because it could not be regarded as a
direct update of the 1987 version) and, in late 2017, a second edition of the 1999 Red Book
was published. Any references in this paper to the “Red Book” are to the First Edition published
in 1999 as this remains, at present, the most commonly used contract in industry. It is also
noted that the 2017 publication contains no changes which would materially affect conclusions
reached in this dissertation.
24 Standing committees and ad hoc task groups are responsible for FIDIC’s activities and, in
particular, it is usually the Contracts Committee who takes responsibility (without remuneration)
for producing the standard FIDIC forms. Lawyers and independent consulting engineers, from
both common law and civil law jurisdictions, with experience in international construction, draft
and update the contract suite with such drafts also being reviewed by people and organisations
in a variety of jurisdictions. The FIDIC suite of contracts has therefore not been developed for
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position. Arguably this may have been purposefully done by drafters due to the
difficulty in harmonising the divergent approaches adopted by various legal
systems25 or, as a means to allow the governing national legal system (or
understanding by the parties) to dictate the position. Alternatively, this may also just
be a shortcoming and failure in the drafting.
The proposed investigation will explore whether, and if so how, the character of, the
requirements for and mechanisms of application of the self-help remedies referred
to vary across jurisdictions informed by such different legal traditions such as those
of South Africa and the UAE and how these approaches compare, if at all, to that
of the international construction industry as exemplified by the FIDIC Red Book.
It may therefore be beneficial to draw comparison across these different
approaches, which ultimately all aim to achieve some form of regulation of the
aforementioned identified self-help remedies.
This will be especially significant for the future development of the law of the UAE
as the UAE continues to experience rapid growth and high volumes of construction.
However, many aspects of the law are less mature than other jurisdictions, giving
rise to uncertainty which could be addressed by academic commentary.
1 3 The Scheme of Treatment – An Outline of the Study
Chapter 2 begins by examining the relationship between the general principles of
contract law and the law regarding specific contracts. The chapter then moves to
consider construction contracts under the South African Common law (locatio
any particular legal system nor jurisdiction and the general conditions may need to be modified
for use in certain jurisdictions. See C Wade “The FIDIC Contracts and Current Trends” Society
of Construction Law and T Shnookal & D Charrett “Standard Form Contracting; The Role for
FIDIC Contracts Domestically and Internationally” Society of Construction Law.
25 See U Mattei “The Comparative Law and Economics of Penalty Clauses in Contracts” (1998)
Hastings International and Comparative Law Review 884 901 where the author refers to similar
difficulties found by promotors of the Project on the “Common Core of European Private Law”
in instances where there is simply no “common core to codify or restate in certain areas of the
law” with genuine divergence in a number of areas. Comparable problems were also
experienced in respect of the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale
of Goods. See B Nicholas “The Vienna Convention on International Sales Law” (1989) 105 LQR
201 201-207 and CF Hugo “The United Nations Convention on the International Sale of Goods:
Its Scope of Application from a South African Perspective” (1999) 11 SA Merc LJ 1.
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performance under South African and UAE law, together with the availability and
the willingness of courts in the respective jurisdictions to award specific
performance in the event of non-performance of a construction contract. Chapters
4 and 5 will consider the treatment in these systems of self-help remedies of
suspension, liens, and liquidated damages available to an innocent party in a
construction contract to compel its defaulting counterpart to perform what it has
undertaken to do, with reference (where applicable) to the provisions of the Red
Book. The final chapter will summarise the conclusions drawn in each chapter and
make suggestions for possible improvement and modification of the state of affairs
under the respective systems.
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Chapter 2
The Construction Contract under UAE Law and South African Law: An
Overview
2 1 Introduction
A construction contract is a specific form of contract characterised by particular
features which, if present in an agreement,26 will result in it being classified as a
construction contract. Construction contracts are subject to the general principles
of contract law (including the requirements for validity).
Although there is no formal distinction under South African law between ordinary
and commercial contracts, construction contracts can for the most part, be viewed
as commercial contracts.27 Under UAE law, despite the existence of commercial
codes, these codes only serve as an important secondary source as none of the
provisions are solely directed at construction contracts. The nature of the
transaction is imperative in determining whether a contract is an “ordinary” contract
or a “commercial” contract.28
26 It is important to note such features can be termed essentialia. Essentialia do not
express requirements for the validity of a contract but are essential for classifying a contract as
belonging to a specific class of contract. See LF van Huyssteen, MFB Reinecke & GF Lubbe
Contract: General Principles 5th ed (2016) 276.
27 Nienaber “Construction Contracts” LAWSA 9 para 2. See also McEwan J in Smith v Mouton
1977 (3) SA 9 47. However, reference must also be made to the Housing Consumers Protection
Measures Act 95 of 1998 which arguably implies a distinction between commercial and
consumer construction contracts. The Housing Consumers Protection Measures Act was
enacted to protect housing consumers (a person in the process of acquiring or who has
acquired a home) from unscrupulous building contractors. The Act provides for the
establishment of a Council called the National Home Builders Registration Council (NHBRC) a
statutory body which functions to regulate the home building industry and to protect housing
consumers. It also extensively prescribes protective measures for the housing consumer,
including warranties which, by virtue of the Act, are “statutory naturalia” and cannot be
excluded. GF Lubbe “Law of Purchase and Sale” 1998 Annual Survey of South African Law
208 210 – 212 and CG Van der Merwe & JM Pienaar “Law of Property (Including Real Security)”
1998 Annual Survey of South African Law 284 287.
28 When establishing if the contract is “commercial” or “ordinary”, the nature of the transaction
plays a key role. A construction contract is asserted to be a civil transaction, as an employer is
more often than not viewed as a consumer and not a business (but this is largely dependent on
the facts of each transaction) -  see Grose Construction Law in the United Arab Emirates and
the Gulf 15. See also Dubai Court of Cassation 349/2002. Note that in the event of conflict, the
provisions of the commercial code will take preference over the provisions of the Civil Code.
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In the UAE, a construction contract is titled a “muqawala” and there are special
statutory requirements applicable to such contracts. These requirements, can be
found in the Civil Code and these provisions, specifically applicable to construction
contracts, mark such contracts as a nominate or special contracts.29 Therefore a
muqawala will be subject to the provisions in the Civil Code which govern contracts
generally as well as the provisions governing muqawala.30 The same is true under
the  law of South Africa, where a construction contract is categorised as a locatio
conductio operis, but is still subject to the general principles of contract.31
The respective legal systems also presume that certain special legal
consequences32 applicable to a muqawala or locatio conductio operis will apply
unless the parties have agreed otherwise.33 Therefore, when negotiating a
construction contract, the parties need to be aware that eventualities not provided
for in their agreement will be regulated by terms and consequences implied into
their relationship by law.
As construction contracts, as specific contracts, are also governed by the general
principles of contract law, it will be helpful to (very briefly) identify the requirements
for the conclusion of a valid contract under both the law of South Africa and the Civil
Code, before moving to discuss the construction contract under the respective
systems.
29 Grose Construction Law in the United Arab Emirates and the Gulf 14.
30 Article 128(1) of the Civil Code says: “The general provisions contained in this Part shall apply
to nominate and innominate contracts.” See also Grose Construction Law in the United Arab
Emirates and the Gulf 14.
31 See, e.g., McEwan J in Smith v Mouton 1977 (3) SA 9 47 where it was held: "It should be
stated first that there is no special law different from the law relating generally to contracts and
their interpretation that applies to building contracts and to architects’ certificates issued under
them.”
32 Such terms and consequences are describable as naturalia and “which are as a rule, attached
by the law (hence ex lege terms) to every contract of a particular class. Naturalia help to
determine the rights and duties of contracting parties and the effects and consequences of their
contracts.” Van Huyssteen et al Contract: General Principles 276.
33 These additional terms are called incidentalia or accidentalia. “[C]ontractants often have special
requirements for which the essentialia and naturalia of the contract do not provide, or for which
the naturalia do provide, but in a manner different from that which the contractants would prefer.
In such circumstances contractants may, in principle, insert additional (supplementary) terms
to achieve their common goal. Such additional terms are called incidentalia or accidentalia.”
See Van Huyssteen et al Contract: General Principles 277. See also E Finsen Building
Contract: A Commentary on the JBCC Agreements 2 ed (2006) 2.
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As a starting point, a commonly accepted definition of “contract” is the following:
“An agreement enforceable at law. An essential feature of contract is a promise
by one party to another to do, or forbear from doing, certain specified acts. The
offer of a promise becomes a promise by acceptance. Contract is that species
of agreement whereby a legal obligation is constituted and defined between
the parties to it.”34
2 2 South African Law
Under South African law the requirements for the conclusion of contract are:35
1. Consensus – agreement or a meeting of the minds between the contractants
must be reached;36
2. Capacity – the parties to the contract must be competent to contract;37
3. Formalities – there may be formalities imposed by statute38 or by the parties
themselves;39
4. Legality – the agreement may not be unlawful, i.e. contra bona mores or against
public policy;40
5. Possibility – the obligations created must be objectively possible - capable of
being performed when the contract is concluded;41
6. Certainty – the content of the agreement must be definite or ascertainable.42
34 M Woodley Osborn’s Concise Law Dictionary 12 ed (2013).
35 D Hutchison “The Nature and Basis of Contract” in D Hutchison & CJ Pretorius (eds) The Law
of Contract in South Africa (2017) 3 6; P Ramsden Mckenzie’s Law of Building and Engineering
Contract and Arbitration 7 ed (2014) 7. See also Finsen Building Contract 1.
36 Van Huyssteen et al Contract: General Principles 52.
37 B Kuschke “Contractual Capacity” in D Hutchison & CJ Pretorius (eds) The Law of Contract in
South Africa 153 154.
38 For example, the Alienation of Land Act, 68 of 1981 prescribes writing as a formality for
alienations of land.  See T Floyd “Formalities” in D Hutchison, & CJ Pretorius (eds) The Law of
Contract in South Africa 163 165.
39 For example, see Ramsden Law of Building and Engineering Contract and Arbitration 11 and
Van Huyssteen et al Contract: General Principles 146 – A pre-existing contract between the
parties may prescribe compliance with certain formalities for the existence of a valid contract.
However, in some instances, parties who reduce a document to writing may do so for evidential
purposes rather than to impose formalities.
40 Floyd “Legality” in The Law of Contract in South Africa 173 181.
41 Van Huyssteen et al Contract: General Principles 181. See also JE du Plessis “Possibility and
Certainty” in D Hutchison, & CJ Pretorius (eds) The Law of Contract in South Africa 213 213.
42 Du Plessis “Possibility and Certainty” in The Law of Contract in South Africa 218.
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Therefore, consensus is indispensable; parties need to reach agreement with
regard to the “essential elements” of the contract. Possibility, certainty and legality,
together with contractual competence are also vital to valid contract conclusion and,
in addition, certain formalities may also need to be adhered to.
South African law, classifies a construction contract as a contract for the letting and
hiring of work, i.e. a locatio conductio operis.43 Such contracts belong to the class
locatio conductio operis faciendi.44 A locatio conductio operis as an entire45 contract
is subject to the general principles of contract and may be concluded in the same
way that any other ordinary contract is concluded.  When forming a locatio
conductio operis, the parties may negotiate directly or through a tender procedure.46
Although there are in general no additional prescribed contract formalities, such as
a reduction to writing that have to be complied with;47  a locatio conductio operis is
invariably recorded in a standardised written document. Usually the agreement will
consist of “a series of cross-linked and complementary documents, mostly with their
own mechanisms for establishing an order of precedence and for resolving
ambiguities and internal discrepancies.”48
43 Finsen Building Contract 16. See also Sifris en ’n Ander NNO v Vermeulen Broers 1974 (2)
SA 218 (T).
44 Nienaber “Construction Contracts” LAWSA 9 para 1.
45 Alternatively, a “synallagmatic, reciprocal or bilateral” contract: Finsen Building Contract 16.
46 Ramsden Mckenzie’s Law of Building and Engineering Contract and Arbitration 3. In some
instances (and almost certainly in projects involving organs of state) it is legislated that a
prescribed tender process is performed before a contract is awarded. See in this regard the
Preferential Procurement Policy Framework Act 5 of 2000, Public Finance Management Act 1
of 1999 and, the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000, section 217 of Constitution
of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 and Van Huyssteen et al Contract: General Principles 89.
See also Joubert Galpin Searle v Road Accident Fund 2014 (4) SA 148 (ECP) 68 where the
following was confirmed: “(a) the decision to award a tender is an administrative action and the
PAJA therefore applies; (b) generally speaking, once a contract has been entered into following
the award of a tender, the law of contract applies; (c) but a contract entered into contrary to
prescribed tender processes is invalid; and (d) consequently, ‘even if no contract is entered
into, all steps taken in accordance with a process which does not comply with the prescribed
tender process are also invalid.’”
47 Nienaber “Construction Contracts” LAWSA 9 para 4. The Housing Consumers Protection
Measures Act, provides at section 13 that the home builder is to ensure that agreements for
the construction or sale of a home are to be in writing and signed; failure to do so, will not result
in the agreement being invalid but may result in the home builder being unable to rely on certain
protective measures (such as the right of the home builder to demand a deposit – section 13(7)).
See Lubbe 1998 Annual Survey of South African Law 211.
48 Nienaber “Construction Contracts” LAWSA 9 para 8. See also Finsen Building Contract 7.
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The contract of locatio conductio operis was described in the following way in Smit
v Workmen’s Compensation Commissioner:49
“Locatio conductio operis (faciendi), i.e. the letting and hiring of a particular
piece of work or job to be done as a whole (opus faciendum). This was a
consensual contract whereby the workman as employee or hirer (conductor or
redemptor operis) undertook to perform or execute a particular piece of work
or job as a whole (opus faciendum) for the employer as letter or lessor (locator
operis) in consideration of a fixed money payment (merces).”
The “immediate” parties to a construction contract therefore, are the employer
(locator) and the contractor (conductor).50 Zimmermann describes this relationship
in the following way:
“One person undertakes to perform or execute a particular piece of work, and
he promises to produce a certain specified result. This person is called the
conductor (operis). The person commissioning the enterprise (the customer) is
the locator: he places the work to be done.” 51
Therefore, under a locatio conductio operis, the primary obligation of the contractor
is to complete and handover the agreed works.52 In exchange for this undertaking,
the primary obligation of the employer is to pay the contractor the agreed
remuneration for such works.53
The classification of an agreement as a locatio conductio operis is consequent upon
the essentialia54 of the contract being present in a particular case and this enables
49 1979 (1) SA 51 (A) 154.
50 Nienaber “Construction Contracts” LAWSA 9 para 3. See also Zimmermann The Law of
Obligations Roman Foundations of the Civilian Tradition 393 – 394.  Nienaber “Construction
Contracts” LAWSA 9 para 3 goes onto describe parties such as the engineer, architect and
quantity surveyor as intermediate parties, as they are not party to the construction contract itself
but “fulfil vital inter-party functions even in the day-to-day operations of the project.” Note that
the contract between a contractor and a subcontractor may also be classified as a locatio
conductio operis with the contractor, in the subcontract relationship technically becoming the
“employer” and the subcontractor becoming the “contractor” but for ease, parties are not
referred to as such. See Finsen Building Contract 29.
51 Zimmermann The Law of Obligations Roman Foundations of the Civilian Tradition 393.
52 Nienaber “Construction Contracts” LAWSA 9 para 9. See also Finsen Building  Contract 1.
53 Should there be no agreement regarding remuneration, the contractor is entitled to be paid a
reasonable amount and the onus lies with the plaintiff to prove that there was no agreement –
see H Daniels Beck’s Theory and Principles of Pleadings in Civil Actions 6 ed (2002) 13.57.
See also Nienaber “Construction Contracts” LAWSA 9 para 9.
54 Lubbe & Murray Farlam and Hathaway: Contract: Cases, Materials and Commentary 283.
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a distinction between this contract type55 and other specific contracts.56
A locatio conductio operis is an “entire” or synallagmatic contract.57   Because the
performances are undertaken in exchange for one another, they are reciprocally
linked to one another. Unlike, for example, a contract of sale which calls for
simultaneous performance by the parties, the locatio conductio operis is a typical
example where one party, i.e. the contractor, is required to perform his complete
obligation before the other party, the employer, is required to perform his side of the
bargain.58 The contractor is accordingly not entitled to payment until it has
completed the works59 (unless of course, there is an agreement to the contrary). It
is important to note, however, that industry norms dictate that, due to the great
expense of constructing and for cash flow purposes, it is not viable for a contractor
only to receive payment upon the discharge of all its obligations. It is accordingly
common practice to contract out of60 such strenuous payment provisions by
providing for interim payments61 and, in many instances, even for an advanced
payment by the employer to the contractor.62
Agreement on the essential elements is sufficient to constitute a construction
contract and will result in the relationship of the parties being supplemented by
55 The conventional form of a construction contract is whereby the contractor supplies all
necessary material and labour to execute the works in accordance with the design and
specifications provided by the employer. However, in many instances the calculation of the
contract price payable in exchange for the execution of the works may vary - popular examples
include (amongst others) payment by way of lump sum, lump sum with a bill of quantities, lump
sum based on a provisional bill of quantities or a cost-plus contract. In some instances, the
construction contract may be a labour only contract whereby the contractor only supplies labour,
using the materials supplied by the employer. However, in other instances, the contractor is
responsible not only for the construction of the works but for producing the design of the works
as well - see Finsen Building Contract 19 – 28.
56 See e.g. Smit v Workmen’s Compensation Commissioner 1979 (1) SA 51 (A) 61 where the
distinction between the key legal characteristics of the locatio conductio operarum and the
locatio conductio operis were drawn. See also Zimmermann The Law of Obligations Roman
Foundations of the Civilian Tradition 394 – 397.
57 Finsen Building Contract 16. See also B K Tooling (Edms) Bpk v Scope Precision Engineering
(Edms) Bpk 1979 (1) SA 391 (A); Zimmermann The Law of Obligations Roman Foundations
of the Civilian Tradition 393.
58 Finsen Building Contract 17.
59 17.
60 For example, the Red Book at Cl 14 makes provision for interim payments.
61 Finsen Building Contract 2.
62 Interim Payments are actually advance payments on the sum that will fall due on completion –
see Thomas Construction (Pty) Ltd (in liquidation) v Grafton Furniture Manufacturers (Pty) Ltd
1988 (2) SA 546 (A) and Chapter 4 “Suspension as a Self-Help Remedy”.
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rights, duties and further legal consequences, which attach to the agreement as so-
called naturalia by virtue of its classification as a locatio conductio operis.63
However, in practice the naturalia of a contract of locatio conductio operis are
extensively adjusted by the parties (incidentalia or accidentalia) as many of these
naturalia do not adequately address the issues that arise in respect of modern day
construction projects.64 This is particularly evident in instances where parties rely
and conclude construction contracts wholly based on standardised documentation
such as the Red Book. Examples in the discussions below illustrate the interplay
between naturalia and incidental terms which results in a deviation from the default
rights, duties and consequences typical of the contract.
As the contractor is not an employee of the employer but an independent
contractor,65 it may perform its core obligation, namely the execution of the works
in any manner66 it deems fit, provided the works are complete by the agreed time.67
Should there be no agreed date for completion, the contractor will be obliged to
complete the works within a “reasonable” time with due regard to the nature of the
works and the surrounding circumstances.68
The contractor is not obliged to complete the works himself69 and may ordinarily
63 Nienaber “Construction Contracts” LAWSA 9 para 9; Lubbe & Murray Farlam and Hathaway:
Contract: Cases, Materials and Commentary 283.
64 Finsen Building Contract 18. Also see Finsen at 2 “Building contracts usually contain a large
number of terms to avoid the rules of the common law that the parties consider impractical or
inconvenient for their purpose, to suit their convenience and to ensure that the contract is
business like and efficient.”
65 See Finsen Building Contract 17, SA Van der Merwe A Comparative Evaluation of the Judicial
Discretion to Refuse Specific Performance LLD thesis Stellenbosch University (2014) 194 -
195, Ramsden McKenzie’s Law of Building and Engineering Contract and Arbitration 49 and
Nienaber “Construction Contracts” LAWSA 9 para 1.
66 Subject of course to any contractual provisions to the contrary. Finsen Building Contract 17.
See also Zimmermann The Law of Obligations Roman Foundations of the Civilian Tradition 394
– “The decisive feature of all these transactions is that the customer was not interested in the
services or labour as such, but in the product or result of such labour…The conductor was
responsible for producing the result; how he did this was (usually) up to him.”
67 Nienaber “Construction Contracts” LAWSA 9 para 35.
68 Ramsden McKenzie’s Law of Building and Engineering Contract and Arbitration 177 and
Nienaber “Construction Contracts” LAWSA 9 para 35.
69 Unless there is an agreement to the contrary (it is common for a contract contain a clause
requiring consent from the employer before a subcontractor is appointed) or if the works are of
such a highly personal nature, that the intended result can only be achieved if the contractor
performs personally (for example in instances of design). See Zimmermann The Law of
Obligations Roman Foundations of the Civilian Tradition 397 (“Artists for instance, may often
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subcontract the works to a third.70 However, the contractor remains responsible to
the employer and no contractual nexus is created between the employer and the
subcontractor.71
It is implied by law that the contractor must execute the works in a “proper and
workmanlike manner” and materials used by the contractor must be “of sound
quality and fit for their designated purpose”.72 Should the contractor fail to meet
these objectives, it will be obliged to make good at its own cost.73
The contractor bears the risk for damage to or loss of the works until completion is
reached and the works are delivered to the employer.74  And, regarding liability for
defects, the contractor is held liable for loss or damage to the works due to defective
workmanship.75 This liability extends over the lifetime of the works.76 However,
parties are not prohibited by law77 to contractually limit the defects liability period
and often do so.78
have to perform in person, even where that is not expressly stipulated (as was in the case of
Albrecht Durer, who undertook to paint the middle section of the Heller altarpiece himself, ‘and
no other human being than myself shall paint one stroke of it’: Rudolf Huebener, A History of
Germanic Private Law (1918). p.555).” Nienaber “Construction Contracts” LAWSA 9 para 82.
70 Smit v Workmen’s Compensation 1979 (1) SA 51 (A), Finsen Building Contract 17 and Nienaber
“Construction Contracts” LAWSA 9 para 82.
71 Due to the large scale and complexity of many construction contracts, it is almost inevitable that
subcontractors will be appointed and in many instances the employer may reserve the right to
elect (or to be part of the selection process) subcontractors. See Ramsden McKenzie’s Law of
Building and Engineering Contract and Arbitration 167. See also Zimmermann The Law of
Obligations Roman Foundations of the Civilian Tradition 397 and Nienaber “Construction
Contracts” LAWSA 9 para 83 – 84.
72 Nienaber “Construction Contracts” LAWSA 9 para 42.
73 Finsen Building Contract 17.
74 Nienaber “Construction Contracts” LAWSA 9 para 51. See also Finsen Building Contract 17. In
some instances, the parties may agree that certain portions of the work may be “taken over” by
the employer prior to completion of the works as a whole. It is common that in such instances,
the risk for that particular portion of work will pass to the employer whilst the risk for the
remainder of the works remains with the contractor.
75 See Zimmermann The Law of Obligations Roman Foundations of the Civilian Tradition 397 “he
was taken to have guaranteed, by implication, that he possessed the skills necessary for the
job he had undertaken. After all, he had made himself contractually responsible for the finished
product and thus endangered a reasonable expectation in the person his customer that he was
competent to perform or execute such opus faciendum.” See also Nienaber “Construction
Contracts” LAWSA 9 para 78.
76 Finsen Building Contract 17 and Nienaber “Construction Contracts” LAWSA 9 para 60.
77 This is unlike the Civil Code where parties under Article 882 are prohibited from contracting out
of decennial liability.
78 This is known as the “Defects Notification Period” under the Red Book.
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There are no specific provisions applicable to the termination of a locatio conductio
operis and construction contracts may accordingly be terminated in the same
manner as any other contract.79
2 3 UAE Law
Articles 125 – 129 and Articles 199 – 206 of the Civil Code relate specifically to
conclusion of valid contracts in the UAE. Article 209 of the Civil Code describes a
valid contract to be:
“…a contract which is lawful in its essence and description, being made by a
competent person in respect of a subject matter properly falling within the ambit
of a contract, having an existing, valid and lawful purpose and in proper form,
and unaccompanied by any vitiating condition.”
Article 13080 of the Civil Code identifies that offer and acceptance81 are essential to
contract conclusion82 and Article 129 sets out the “necessary elements” for the
conclusion of a valid83 contract;84
“The necessary elements for the making of a contract are:
a) that the two parties to the contract should agree upon the essential
elements;
b) the subject matter85 of the contract must be something which is
possible and defined or capable of being defined and permissible to
be dealt in; and
c) there must be lawful purpose86 for the obligations arising out of the
contract.”
79 Nienaber “Construction Contracts” LAWSA 9 para 116.
80 Article 130 says: “A contract shall be made by virtue solely of the confluence of offer and
acceptance, subject to the specific provisions laid down for the making of the contract by law.”
See also Article 125 of the Civil Code.
81 O Eltom The Emirates Law in Practice: Case Law Study, 100 Legal Issues; with a Special Focus
on the Emirate of Dubai (2009) 24, the author makes the point that offer and acceptance do not
need to be contained in the same or a single document.
82 See also Article 125 of the Civil Code. It is important to note that intention may be express or
implied – See Eltom The Emirates Law in Practice 23.
83 Conversely Article 201 describes a “void” contract as “one which is unlawful in essence and
form, lacking the elements of a contract or defective in its subject matter or purpose or form as
laid down by the law for the making of a contract…”.
84 A MacCuish & N Newdigate “Back to Basics – The Construction and Engineering Contract” (14-
05-17) Mondaq
http://www.mondaq.com/x/591360/Building+Construction/Back+To+Basics+The+Construction
+Engineering+Contract (accessed 03-07-17).
85 See also Articles 199, 200, 202,203 and 204 of the Civil Code regarding “subject matter”.
86 See also Article 207 which provides (in part) that the purpose of the contract must be “existent,
valid and permitted, and not contrary to public order or morals” and Article 208(1) which
provides that a contract shall be void “if it does not contain a lawful benefit to both contracting
parties”.
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Consensus, i.e. agreement on the essential elements,87 possibility of performance,
identity and certainty regarding the subject matter together with a lawful purpose
are therefore key for the valid conclusion of a contract. Dubai Court of Cassation
Judgment 255/200788 neatly summarised these requirements and held as follows:
“In order for there to be a contract the law requires that there must be a coming
together of offer and acceptance, and that they be linked and that they coincide
in such a way that the effect is established over the thing contracted for, and
that it gives rise to an obligation on each of the parties with regard to the other.
There must be mutual consent by both parties over the basic elements of the
obligation and over the other lawful conditions that are regarded as basic. The
subject matter of the contract must be something that is possible and specified,
or capable of being ascertained and permissible to deal in.”
Under UAE law, a construction contract is titled “muqawala”. Chapter 3 of the Civil
Code governs “Contracts of Work” and Part 1 of this chapter is titled “Muqawala
(contract to make a thing or to perform a task)”.89
Article 872 to Article 896 of the Civil Code set out the provisions which are
specifically applicable to Muqawala. Section 1 of Part 1 contains Articles 872 – 874
with Article 872 of the Civil Code defining a “muqawala” as the following:
“a contract whereby one of the parties thereto undertakes to make a thing or to
perform work in consideration which the other party undertakes to provide.”
It is important to note that these provisions are not restricted solely to the
relationship between contractors and employers but extend to designers (such as
engineers and architects) and subcontractors.90
Article 873 goes on to detail the definition provided in Article 872 and provides that
a muqawala can take on various forms, by giving a few examples:91
87 See also Article 141 of the Civil Code.
88 27 January 2008.
89 Muqawala must be distinguished from Contracts of Employment. Contracts of Employment are
governed by other articles under the Civil Code namely, Articles 897 – 923.
90 MacCuish & Newdigate “Back to Basics – The Construction and Engineering Contract” Mondaq.
91 For example, a muqawala can be a straight build contract or even a pure labour contract,
whereby all materials are free issue materials and the contractor needs only to supply labour
or, merely to co-ordinate. Alternatively, the contract may be a design and build or turnkey
contract whereby the contractor undertakes all risk and responsibility to execute and complete
the works (including design responsibility) - MacCuish & Newdigate “Back to Basics – The
Construction and Engineering Contract” Mondaq.
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“(1)  The agreement in a muqawala contract may be restricted to the
contractor undertaking to provide the work on condition that the
employer provides the material to be used, or that the contractor makes
use of them in carrying out his work.
(2)  It shall also be permissible for the contractor to provide the materials
and the work.”
In addition, Article 874 of the Civil Code importantly provides the following:
“In a muqawala contract, there must be a description of the subject matter of
the contract, and particulars must be given of the type and amount thereof, the
manner of performance and the period over which it is to be performed, and
the consideration must be specified.”
Therefore, it is significant that the following are observed;
- the subject matter and type of contract must be adequately described. It is very
important that the scope of works are sufficiently detailed.  What needs to be
contained in the scope of works will largely be determined by the type and
complexity of the project.92
- the manner of performance must be specified;93
- a time for completion must be specified;94 and
- the consideration for the work to be performed must be specified.95
In some instances, under UAE law, it is a requirement that the particular contract is
reduced to and concluded in writing - this is not the case for a muqawala.96
Nonetheless, it is the industry norm to capture construction contracts in some form
of writing. Some construction contracts may be overly detailed and others may
contain very little to no detail – merely setting out the bare minimum.  A written
memorial providing a detailed record of the agreement is important to provide the
92 MacCuish & Newdigate “Back to Basics – The Construction and Engineering Contract” Mondaq.
93 See for example Article 877 of the Civil Code. Parties can of course also agree a certain
standard and quality of performance (materials and workmanship) and the contractor will be
held to this standard.
94 The Civil Code does not specify how the time for completion must be specified and it is unclear
whether a time frame as opposed to a specified time for completion will suffice. For example,
instead of inserting a specific completion date into the conditions of contract, would it be in order
if a contract specified that the project must reach completion within x days/months.
95 It appears failure to include such detail will not be fatal to the classification or validity of the
muqawala as Article 888 provides “the contractor will be entitled to fair remuneration, together
with the value of the materials he has provided as required by the work.”
96 Grose Construction Law in the United Arab Emirates and the Gulf 32.
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parties with contractual certainty and guidance when executing the works and
overcoming inevitable hurdles, which will be faced during the contract term.97
Section 2 of Part 1 is titled “Effects of Muqawala” and prescribes the obligations of
both the employer and the contractor, describing (amongst other things) the manner
in which the work is to be performed, the remedies available to the employer in
instances where defective work98 is tendered by the contractor, delivery of the
works once completed, the manner and timing of payment99 and remedies available
to the contractor in instances of non-payment.
Articles 880 – 883 in Section 2 are applicable to architects and engineers (as well
as contractors), holding such parties liable to the employer for a period of 10 years
(or even longer should the parties so agree), in instances where the works totally
or partially collapse or where a defect which threatens the stability or safety of the
works manifests itself.100
Section 3 of Part 1 starts at Article 890 and is headed “Subcontracting”. This section
allows for the contractor to subcontract a part or the whole of the works (provided
that there is no express prohibition in the contract) to a third party (subcontractor).
97 MacCuish & Newdigate “Back to Basics – The Construction and Engineering Contract”
Mondaq.
98 The Civil Code distinguishes between instances where the defective works are remediable and
instances where it is impossible to rectify the defective works.
99 Article 885 of the Civil Code says that the employer’s obligation to pay, and the contractor’s
entitlement to receive payment for the works, arises only upon delivery of the property.
100 This liability even extends to instances where the defect/collapse arises out of a defect in the
land itself or where the employer consented to the construction of the defective works – see
Article 880(2) of the Civil Code. Article 882 of the Civil Code makes Article 880 - 881 mandatory
provisions of law and parties to a construction contract are expressly forbidden from contracting
out of the obligations imposed by them by terms which purport to limit liability in such instances.
Under Article 882, any agreement which purports to limit or exclude liability will be regarded as
void. However, a notable problem which may arise is the solvency of the contractor or architect.
Whilst such party may liable under the Civil Code, such articles will only serve a purpose if a
contractor or architect is able to meet this liability financially. Furthermore, the insurance
provisions contained in the Civil Code are at best, basic and unsuitable to effectively manage
the unique and intrinsic risks arising out of construction contracts, which require the application
of sophisticated and industry specific insurance principles - Anonymous “Construction Law In
UAE: A Distinct Body” (01-11-13) Law Teacher https://www.lawteacher.net/free-law-
essays/contract-law/construction-law-in-uae-a-distinct-body-contract-law-essay.php?cref=1
(accessed 02-07-17).
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Article 890(2) however confirms that, as is expected, the contractor remains
responsible to the employer for work performed by the subcontractor.101
Section 4 of Part 1 provides for instances in which construction contracts may be
terminated and provides that such contracts may only be terminated when:
1. The agreed work has been completed;
2. The construction contract is cancelled by:
a. Consent;
b. An order of the court.102
In circumstances where performance is prevented, either party may require that the
contract be cancelled or terminated. Should performance be prevented due to a
cause that is no fault of the contractor, the contractor will be entitled to be paid the
value of work completed and expenses incurred. Article 896 makes provision for
the consequences of the death of a contractor.
2 4 Comparison
Whilst the definition of the locatio conductio operis and a muqawala are not entirely
congruent, relevant parallels can, for comparison purposes, most certainly be
drawn. Both UAE law and South African law recognise that these contracts are
subject to the general principles of contract law including validity requirements such
as consensus, possibility of performance and lawfulness.103
Both systems also do not require, as a formality, that contracts be reduced to
101 Article 891 endorses the concept of privity of contract and confirms that the subcontractor will
not have a direct claim for payment against the employer except in instances where the
contractor has assigned such payment rights to the subcontractor.
102 Note that these termination provisions are specifically applicable to muqawala.
103 Interestingly, Article 141 of the Civil Code says parties need only to agree on the essential
elements of the obligation for valid contract conclusion and, matters of detail can be agreed
upon at a later date. This is in contrast to South African law, where, in general such an
arrangement may be viewed as unenforceable as “an agreement to agree”. However, in light
of certain court decisions (see for example Van Aardt v Galway 2012 (2) SA 312 (SCA) 16 -
17), this approach has become qualified and, “legal consequences may attach to partial
consensus...the mere fact that an agreement envisages the execution of a formal contract
document at a later stage as a memorial of the transaction does not imply that the agreement
is void as an agreement to agree.” See Van Huyssteen et al Contract: General Principles 220
& 222. Arguably, there is also a possibility that, whilst negotiations continue on unresolved
matters, a partial agreement may become binding on the parties - see Van Huyssteen et al
Contract: General Principles 59.
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writing, despite the industry norm in both jurisdictions, for parties to do so. Subject
to few mandatory provisions under the Civil Code, parties under both systems enjoy
a fair degree of latitude to contract out of terms implied ex lege.
Both systems recognise these contracts as reciprocal and under both systems, a
contractor’s entitlement to receive payment arises only upon completion of the
works, unless there is agreement to the contrary. Both systems recognise and allow
for subcontracting. Unlike under UAE law, under South African law there is no
specific mandatory provision for decennial liability. In contrast, a contractor will be
held liable for the lifetime of the works for any defects which may manifest.
However, parties are entitled to contract out of such liability (decennial or otherwise)
by making the defects liability period much shorter. Under both systems, the
contractor bears the risk until the works are complete and the employer has
accepted delivery.104
It is also notable to highlight that under South African law, a contract of locatio
conductio operis is terminated in the same manner as an ordinary contract.105 Such
cancellation on account of breach occurs extra judicially, and parties approach the
courts to enforce the consequences ensuing because of such cancellation.
However, under UAE law such contracts can only be terminated when the agreed
work has been completed or where the muqawala is cancelled by consent106 or, by
104 See Article 884 of the Civil Code.
105 For example, by mutual agreement, a discharge of mutual obligations by performance,
operation of law (e.g. supervening impossibility) or by means of a unilateral act in the case of
voidable contracts and a breach of contract. In instances where this cancellation is on account
of breach, this right can only lawfully be exercised when “the default of the other party is of a
particular serious nature and goes to the ‘root’ of the contract”. Swartz and Son (Pty) Ltd v
Wolmaransstad Town Council 1960 (2) SA 1 T. The meaning of “serious” is contentious; subject
to debate and conflicting approaches. See for example Strachan v Prinsloo 1925 TPD 7090
and Young v Land Values Ltd 1924 WLD 216 where it was held cognisance must be given to
the value that the innocent party placed on a particular term of the contract, and whether that
innocent party would have entered into the contract if it had foreseen the eventual
malperformance.  See also Singh v McCarthy Ltd t/a McIntosh Motors 2000(4) SA 795 SCA, it
was held that the breach needs to be so serious that it would only be fair to allow the innocent
party to resile and undo all the consequences of the contract. See T Naude “Termination of
Obligations” in D Hutchison & CJ Pretorius (eds) The Law of Contract in South Africa 387 387.
106 To avoid obtaining a court order, most parties include cancellation provisions in the muqawala
and, in addition, specifically include a waiver that a court order is not necessary to effect
termination. Grose Construction Law in the United Arab Emirates and the Gulf 186.
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an order of the court.107
Under South African law, a contractor is obliged to execute the works in a “proper
and workmanlike manner” and materials used by the contractor must be “of sound
quality and fit for their designated purpose”.108 This is in contrast to UAE law where
a contractor is obliged to complete the works in accordance with the conditions of
the agreed contract.
Therefore, despite differences in approach and the existence of interesting
anomalies, sufficient parallels can be drawn between the approach to the locatio
conductio operis under South African law and the approach to muqawala under
UAE law to make a comparative analysis of the treatment of self-help remedies (as
a way to compel specific performance), a meaningful exercise.
2 5  Conclusion
Construction contracts under both UAE law and South African law are subject to
the same general underlying principles of contract law. Under South African law,
apart from the notions of consensuality and reliance, freedom and the sanctity of
contract, good faith and privity of contract have been portrayed as cornerstones of
the law of contract.109 Similarly consensuality, freedom, privity and sanctity of
contract are recognised and upheld under UAE law and, as far as is possible, the
courts will give due regard to these cornerstones of contract.
Under UAE law, freedom and sanctity of contract is recognised in Article 265(1) of
the Civil Code.110 This Article says:
“If the wording of a contract is clear it may not be departed from by way of
interpretation to ascertain the intention of the parties.”
In addition, Article 267 of the Civil Code says:
107 See Article 892 of the Civil Code.
108 See notes 72 and 93.
109 Van Huyssteen Contract: General Principles 10; Hutchison “The nature and basis of contract”
in The Law of Contract in South Africa 21-33.
110 Also see for example, Article 267 of the Civil Code which says: “if the contract is valid and
binding, it shall not be permissible for either of the contracting parties to resile from it, or to vary
or cancel it, save by mutual consent or an order of the court, or under a provision of the law.”
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“if the contract is valid and binding, it shall not be permissible for either of the
contracting parties to resile from it, or to vary or cancel it, save by mutual
consent or an order of the court, or under a provision of the law.”
Under South African law, individuals also enjoy the autonomy to freely enter into
contracts with whom they wish and on agreed consensual terms of contract (subject
to societal values).111 In such instances, the principle of pacta servanda sunt
requires the enforcement of such contractual obligations - a consequence of this
autonomy is that the contractant must accept responsibility for its actions.112
The notion or principle of good faith is relevant to both jurisdictions. There is a good
faith requirement contained in Article 246 of the Civil Code relevant to (especially
the performance stage) all contracts.113 This is one of the marked differences
between civil law and common law systems.114 Article 246 says:
“The contract must be performed in accordance with its contents, and in a
manner consistent with the requirements of good faith.”
There is no prescriptive description of good faith and the courts will deliberate each
matter on a case-by-case basis. This lack of certainty may make some uneasy, but
it is this very lack of definition which allows the courts to balance the rights of the
parties and to achieve justice between them, on an objective standard, outside of
the contract, precedent and legislation.115
Although good faith has historical roots in South African law, the precise nature,
scope and application of good faith “as an independent principle of the law of
contract is … a thorny issue.”116 What is clear is that, at least in the view of the
Supreme Court of Appeal, there is no general duty of good faith in South African
law.117   As a result good faith does not provide an independent basis for striking
111 Van Huyssteen Contract: General Principles 11.
112 11.
113 Especially the execution/performance stage of the contract.
114 Grose Construction Law in the United Arab Emirates and the Gulf 49. Grose continues to say:
“In the latter [common law systems], a duty of good faith has no overarching role and indeed,
only a limited role outside a specific statutory or contractual context.”
115 Grose Construction Law in the United Arab Emirates and the Gulf 50. Guidance can be found
at Article 106 of the Civil Code “The Abuse of Rights” which provides for instances when the
exercise of a right may be regarded as unlawful; these instances may be taken into account
when considering whether an action absences good faith.
116 Van Huyssteen et al Contract: General Principles 14.
117 Brisley v Drotsky 2002 (4) SA 1 (SCA); Afrox Healthcare Bpk v Strydom 2002 (6) SA 21 (SCA);
South African Forestry Co Ltd v York Timbers Ltd 2005 (3) SA 323(SCA); Bredenkamp v
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down contractual terms or interfering in the enforcement of a contract.118  Good
faith, as a underlying value of the law of contract, informs legal rules and concepts.
As a result, good faith plays an important role in determining whether a contract (or
contractual provision) is contrary to public policy or not.119 In this regard, it is not
clear whether the operation of good faith can result in the development of novel
naturalia into construction contracts or provide a basis for the importation of a tacit
term into a particular transaction is not altogether clear,120 but this falls outside the
scope of this enquiry.121
Good faith, consensuality, privity, sanctity and freedom of contract are the
cornerstone of any developed system of contract law. These underpin the right of
an aggrieved party to demand specific performance by a defaulting party and, such
principles should be at the forefront of any judicial decision regarding an award for
specific performance.   To this we will now turn to specific performance in the
context of construction contracts.
Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd 2010 (4) SA 468 (SCA); Potgieter v Potgieter NO 2012 (1)
SA 637 (SCA).
118 Van Huyssteen et al Contract: General Principles 30.
119 Brisley v Drotsky 2002 (4) SA 1 (SCA) at 15; South African Forestry Co Ltd v York Timbers Ltd
2005 (3) SA 323 (SCA) 27.
120 See for example South African Forestry Co Ltd v York Timbers Ltd 2005 (3) SA 323 (SCA).
121 The resolution of the apparent differences of opinion between the Supreme Court of
Appeal and the Constitutional Court - which is seemingly willing to afford the standard of good
faith a more direct legal operation, also falls outside the scope of this enquiry, but in this regard,
see for example: Brisley v Drotsky 2002 (4) SA 1 (SCA) 11 - 24, South African Forestry Co Ltd
v York Timbers Ltd 2005 (3) SA 323 (SCA) 169, Barkhuizen v Napier 2007(5) SA 323 (CC) 70
-73, Everfresh Market Virginia (Pty) Ltd v Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd 2012 (1) SA 256 (CC)
22. See also Van Huyssteen et al Contract: General Principles 34.
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Chapter 3
Specific Performance
3 1  Introduction
Specific performance - performance in forma specifica - is a remedy used for breach
of contract which, with the assistance and backing of the court, seeks to compel a
defaulting party to complete its obligations agreed under the contract; it is
performance of that on which the parties to the contract have agreed.122  The
purpose of this remedy is to “give the plaintiff exactly what has been agreed upon,
thereby avoiding any difficulties with calculating the worth of performance or
assessing available alternatives.”123
Whether an order for specific performance is available as a remedy, and the ease
with which an aggrieved party will obtain it, are largely dependent on the legal
jurisdiction in which the claim is brought. Three approaches can be discerned in this
regard. The first is to recognise specific performance as the primary remedy for
breach of contract, subject to certain exceptions. A second approach is to
acknowledge specific performance as a discretionary remedy that is available only
in exceptional circumstances. A final variant is a hybrid approach which
amalgamates elements of the first two approaches.124
Locatio conductio operis is subject to the general principles of contract law, and
hence also to the principles regarding specific performance.125 This dissertation is
concerned with self-help mechanisms in the context of the construction relationship.
A first question relates to the question why an aggrieved party may find it to be in
its own interests, to deploy its own mechanisms to coax a defaulting party to comply
122 Van Huyssteen et al Contract: General Principles 367. The remedy of specific performance is,
in most instances a two step approach: the first step is for the innocent party to obtain a court
order directing the defaulting party to perform and, the second step entails executionary
measures compelling performance from the defaulting party in instances where there is failure
to comply with the court order.
123 A Beck “The Coming of Age of Specific Performance” (1987) 20 CILSA 190. See also
Beletskaya Development of the Contractual Remedies 39 – 40 regarding the advantages and
disadvantages of specific performance.
124 Van der Merwe A Comparative Evaluation 2.
125 195.
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with its performance obligations under a contract.126  To this end it is necessary to
first examine the availability of specific performance as a general remedy under
UAE law and South African law and more particularly the willingness of courts to
order specific performance in respect of construction contracts.
3 2 Specific Performance as a Remedy in South African Law
 3 2 1 A Hybrid Approach
The approach of the South African courts to specific performance has evolved over
a period of time, with influences from external jurisdictions; it is, both less clear and
more complicated than that of the UAE.
The approach to an order for specific performance under South African law can be
defined as a hybrid one; demonstrating the Roman Dutch law approach where a
plaintiff is entitled, as a primary remedy, to an order for specific performance127 but,
recognising at the same time that this right is not absolute and subject to the
discretion of the court; indicating an English Common Law influence.128 In summary,
under South African law, [t]here is an automatic right to claim, but no automatic right
to receive specific performance.129
The existence of this remedy and the corresponding right of the plaintiff to elect to
claim specific performance as a primary remedy (as recognised by Roman Dutch
law) was recognised from early on in South African law130 and was famously
articulated in Cohen v Shires McHattie and King131 by Kotzé CJ where the following
was held:
“By the well-established practice of South Africa, agreeing with the Roman
Dutch Law, suits for specific performance are matters of daily occurrence.”
126 In legal systems adopting the second approach, the need to resort to self-help remedies to
compel specific performance is more easily understood than in systems which adopt the first
(or even the third) approach.
127 Note that according to early Roman law, specific performance was not available to an aggrieved
contractant and the defaulting party could only be ordered to pay a sum of money, confining
the remedy to damages – Beck (1987) CILSA 191.
128 H Dondorp “Decreeing Specific Performance: A (Roman) Dutch Legacy” (2010) 16 Fundamina:
A Journal of Legal History 40.
129 Beck (1987) CILSA 195.
130 Van Huyssteen et al Contract: General Principles 369.
131 1882 1 SAR 41.
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This was confirmed by Innes J in Farmers’ Co-operative Society (Reg) v Berry:132
“Prima facie every party to a binding agreement who is ready to carry out his
own obligation under it has a right to demand from the other party , so far as it
is possible a performance of his undertaking in terms of the contract.”133
This exemplifies the well-known maxim of pacta sunt servanda, which is given due
regard in South African law and which provides that contracts freely entered into
must be upheld and honoured.134 An aggrieved party is therefore well within its
rights to insist on performance by the defaulting party, provided that it is prepared
and ready to perform its own reciprocal obligations.135
In the flagship decision of Haynes v Kingwilliamstown Municipality136 (“Haynes”) De
Villiers AJA confirmed the right of the aggrieved party to claim specific performance
as a primary remedy, but emphasised that this right was not unqualified, but was
subject to the discretion of the court:
“It is equally settled law with us that although the Court will as far as possible
give effect to the Plaintiff’s choice to claim specific performance it has a
discretion in a fitting case to refuse to decree specific performance and leave
the plaintiff to claim and prove his id quod interest.”
In respect of this discretion, AJA De Villiers AJA went on to say:
“The discretion which a Court enjoys although it must be exercised judicially is
not confined to specific types of cases, nor is it circumscribed by rigid rules.
Each case must be judged in light of its own circumstances.”137
3 2 2 The Crystallisation Problem
The introduction of a discretionary element regarding the availability of specific
performance in South African law is derived from English law, where, in contrast to
Roman Dutch law, there is reluctance to compel specific performance of contractual
132 1912 AD 343.
133 350. See also Haynes v Kingwilliamstown Municipality 1951 (2) SA 371 (A)) where it was
confirmed at 378 “that in our law a plaintiff has the right of election whether to hold defendant
to his contract and claim performance by him of precisely what he had bound himself to do, or
to claim damages for the breach. (Cohen v Shires, McHattie and King 1882 1 SAR 41)”.
134 Van der Merwe A Comparative Evaluation 4.
135 Van Huyssteen et al Contract: General Principles 374. Note, as a consequence, that a
defaulting party does therefore not have the right to elect to pay damages in lieu of performing
what it has contractually undertaken to do. See BK Tooling (Edms) Bpk v Scope Precision
Engineering (Edms) Bpk 1979 1 SA 391 (A) 433 “Die skuldenaar is nie geregtig om ter eie
keuse skadevergoeding as surrogaat van die prestasie aan te bied”.
136 1951 (2) SA 371 (A) 378.
137 Haynes v Kingwilliamstown Municipality 1951 (2) SA 371 (A) 378.
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obligations where payment of damages would suffice. An order for specific
performance is an exceptional remedy awarded only in instances where it would be
equitable to do so.138
“In like manner the Common Law of England made no attempt actually to
enforce the performance of contract but gave to the injured party only the right
to satisfaction for non-performance.”139
The approach of the English Common Law heavily influenced the application of the
approach under Roman Dutch law, largely qualifying the plaintiff’s right to an order
for specific performance as a primary remedy. The right to specific performance
was to be subject to the discretion of the court (which discretion was recognised
from early on).140 The English influence went further, however, in so far as a
tendency developed for courts to refuse to make an order for specific performance
in particular situations.141
As a result, the following position, as precisely summarised by Cockrell, was
reached:142
“The Roman-Dutch right to specific performance, affirmed as part of modern
South African law, was effectively negated by the courts’ subsequent
endorsement of crystallised instances – borrowed from English Law – in which
specific performance should be refused.”
The conflict between the approach under Roman Dutch law and English law and
the resultant tendency for the closing off of the court’s discretion was addressed in
Haynes. Here the court affirmed a move away from the rigid rules (stemming from
English law) which had become unofficially and strictly applicable in particular
138 Van Huyssteen et al Contract: General Principles 370.
139 Sir Edward Fry, quoted in Beck (1987) CILSA 191. See also Van der Merwe A Comparative
Evaluation 3: “The essence of the modern common law doctrine is thus that failure to
perform/breach of contract will be compensated with the value of the expectancy that was
created by the promise of the other party (i.e. expectation damages); only when awarding
damages is inadequate will it be in the discretion of the court to grant specific performance”.
140 For example, in Shakinovsky v Lawson and Smulowitz 1904 TS 362 330 Innes CJ held: “a
plaintiff has always the right to claim specific performance of which the defendant has refused
to carry out, but it is in the discretion of the court either to grant such an order or not.”
141 Van Huyssteen et al Contract: General Principles 369. See also Beck (1987) CILSA 192 where
certain categories are listed with the comment that if a “contract fell within one of these
categories the outcome of a claim for specific performance could be predicted with
 reasonable accuracy.”
142 A Cockrell “Breach of contract” in: R Zimmermann & D Visser (eds) Southern Cross: Civil Law
and Common Law in South Africa (1996) 303 329; cf Van der Merwe A Comparative Evaluation
9.
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instances when an aggrieved party approached the court for specific performance.
Unfortunately, the court in Haynes was not completely effective in addressing this
tension. It largely negated its attempted clarification by listing examples where this
discretion to refuse specific performance had been exercised in the past:
“As examples of the grounds on which the Courts have exercised their
discretion in refusing to order specific performance, although performance was
not impossible may be mentioned: (a) where damages would adequately
compensate the plaintiff; (b) where it would be difficult for the Court to enforce
its decree (c) where the thing claimed can be readily bought anywhere; (d)
where specific performance entails rendering services of a personal nature. To
these may be added examples given by Wessels on Contract (vol 2, s3119) of
good and sufficient grounds for refusing the decree, (e) where it would operate
unreasonably hardly on the defendant, or where the agreement giving rise to
the claim is unreasonable, or where the decree would produce injustice, or
would be inequitable under all the circumstances.”143
The listed circumstances were largely remnants of the rigid circumstantial rules
applied by the English courts; many of which had already proven to be illogical,144
but they again became grounds for the refusal of specific performance in
subsequent decisions145 - thus negating the attempt to re-establish the judicial
discretion. This formulaic application of what was supposed to be factors relevant
to the exercise of the judicial discretion did not escape criticism from the Appellate
Division,146 but until Benson v SA Mutual Life Assurance Society147 (“Benson”) there
was, for a long period of time, unfortunately no single decision which provided clarity
on the matter.
3 2 3 The Discretionary Approach Restored: Benson
The discretionary approach of South African law was confirmed in the current
leading decision of the Appellate Division in Benson, with the court also confirming
the observation of the maxim pacta sunt servanda – an obligation should be able to
143 Haynes v Kingwilliamstown Municipality 1951 (2) SA 371 (A) 378-379. These circumstances
can be divided roughly into two categories: the first concerns practical considerations relating
to the supervision of performance and the enforcement of contracts involving personal services
and the second relates to the “function of contractual remedies in the economic system” - Lubbe
& Murray Farlam and Hathaway: Contract: Cases, Materials and Commentary 542.
144 Beck (1987) CILSA 197.
145 See for example Beck (1987) CILSA 197 - 198.
146 199. See e.g. the remarks of Jansen JA in Isep Structural Engineering and Plating (Pty) Ltd v
Inland Exploration Co Pty Ltd 1981 (4) SA 1 (A) and Van Heerden AJA 913C in Associated
South African Bakeries (Pty) Ltd v Oryx & Vereinigte Backereien (Pty) Ltd 1982 (3) SA 893 (A).
147 1986 (1) SA 776 (A).
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be enforced on the terms agreed148 and, importantly, as decided in previous
decisions,149 emphasised the right150 of an aggrieved party to elect whether to
demand performance or sue for damages.151
Most importantly, the judgment in Benson confirmed the court’s discretion as
paramount when deciding whether to make an award of specific performance. In
addressing the reconciliation of the right to specific performance with the notion of
a judicial discretion to derogate from it, Hefer JA portrayed the right as the
cornerstone of our law and went on to say:
“Once that is realised, it seems clear, both logically and a matter of principle,
that any curtailment of the Court’s discretion inevitably entails an erosion of the
plaintiff’s right to performance, and that there can be no rule, whether it be
flexible or inflexible, as to the way in which the discretion is to be exercised
which does not affect the Plaintiffs right in some way or another…no rules can
be prescribed to regulate the exercise of the Court’s discretion.”152
However, the court also stressed that this discretion is a judicial discretion and is
not completely unfettered; it must, in the words of the court not “be exercised
capriciously, nor upon a wrong principle.”153 The discretion, it was held:154
“is aimed at preventing injustice for cases do arise where justice demands that
a plaintiff be denied his right to performance – and the basic principle thus is
that the order which the Court makes, should not produce an unjust result which
will be the case e.g. if, in the particular circumstances, the order will operate
unduly harshly to the defendant.”
This means that equitable155 and policy considerations156 are highly relevant to its
exercise.
148 Beck (1987) CILSA 206. See also Botha v Rich NO 2014 (4) SA 124 (CC) 141 where Nkabinde
J held that “The starting point is that at common law a contracting party is entitled to specific
performance in respect of any contractual right.”
149 The court made reference to Cohen v Shires, McHattie and King 1882 1 SAR 41, Thompson v
Pullinger 1 OR 298 at 301, Woods v Walters 1921 AD 303 309, Shill v Milner 1937 AD 101 109
and, more recently BK Tooling (Edms) Bpk v Scope Precision Engineering (Edms) Bpk 1979
(1) SA 392 433.
150 See in this regard: G Lubbe “Contractual Derogation and the Discretion to refuse an Order for
Specific Performance” in G Glover (ed) Essays in Honour of AJ Kerr (2006) 77 84.
151 Benson v SA Mutual Life Assurance Society 1986 (1) SA 776 (A) 782.
152 782 – 783.
153 783.
154 783.
155 Haynes v Kingwilliamstown Municipality 1951 (2) SA 371 (A). See also Wessels & Roberts The
Law of Contract in South Africa 831 para 3119 who refer to instances where an order for specific
performance would result in injustice or would be inequitable under all circumstances.
156 Van Huyssteen et al Contract: General Principles 370.
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That an order of specific performance would bring undue hardship on the defaulting
party157 is accordingly often at the forefront of an argument for the refusal of an
award for specific performance.158 The facts of Haynes are also a good example of
where should the court have awarded specific performance, an unjust result would
have been brought about.159  The fact that the agreement giving rise to the claim is
unreasonable,160 might also move a court to exercise its discretion in favour of the
defendant.  These considerations must, however, be balanced with the rights of the
aggrieved party to receive the performance which the defaulting party has
contractually undertaken to perform.161
Apart from considerations of hardship, policy considerations regarding the
prevention of economic waste require that an order for specific performance be
refused in instances of impossibility. In Benson162 the court held:
“Furthermore, the Court will not decree specific performance where
performance has become impossible. Here a distinction must be drawn
between the case where impossibility extinguishes the obligation and the case
where performance is impossible but the debtor is still contractually bound. It
is only the latter type of case that is relevant in the present context, for in the
former the creditor clearly has no remedy at all”.
157 Wessels & Roberts The Law of Contract in South Africa para 3119.
158 An example of this can be seen in the case of City of London v Nash Eng. Rep 859 (1747); the
defendant had constructed two new buildings and repaired others (instead of replacing the old
buildings with newly constructed buildings as per the agreement), the court did not make an
order for specific performance as such an order, to tear down repaired buildings and replace
them with newly constructed buildings, would result in an undue hardship for the defendant - G
Lennard “Specific Performance of Construction Contracts – Archaic Principles Preclude
Necessary Reform” (1972) 47 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1025 1034.
159 Briefly, the facts were as follows: The Municipality of Kingwilliamstown had entered into an
agreement with Haynes to release (daily) a pre-agreed amount of water to Haynes. The
Municipality defaulted under the agreement and released less water than what was obliged
under the agreement; this was due to an unprecedented drought. However, if the municipality
complied with what was required under the agreement and released the amount of water which
was agreed, it would have resulted in great hardship, danger to the health of the community
and disruption to the town. The Appellate Division upheld the decision of the court a quo
agreeing that in such instances, it was just for the court to exercise judicial discretion and to
refuse an order for specific performance.
160 Wessels & Roberts The Law of Contract in South Africa para 3119.
161 See Edrei Investments 9 Ltd v Dis-chem Pharmacies (Pty) Ltd 2012 (2) SA 553 (ECP) where it
was held “The respondent contends that it is trading continually at a loss and accordingly an
interdict [compelling specific performance] would operate too harshly against it…it appears that
the contract which it has concluded is not as lucrative as it had intended. That occurs frequently
in business, but it does not entitle the respondent to walk away from its contractual obligations.
To refuse an interdict would render nugatory the applicants right to elect to hold the respondent
to its contract. It would effectively grant the Respondent the right to choose whether to pay
damages or to honour its contractual obligations.”
162 1986 (1) SA 776 (A) 783 - 784.
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Such impossibility must, however, be a “true” impossibility, albeit of a subjective
nature: mere inconvenience to the defaulting party will be insufficient.163 Related to
the case of impossibility of performance in this sense, are instances of so-called
hardship breach, where a denial of specific performance would require the plaintiff
restricted to a claim for damages to mitigate loss by buying substitute goods
available elsewhere.164 Specific performance will on the grounds of policy
underlying the paritas creditorum rule also not be granted where the debtor is
insolvent.165
The principal implication of the judgment in the Benson case is the rejection of the
tendency of the courts to refuse orders for specific performance as a matter of
course in a number of crystallised instances.  One such “rule” that has been rejected
is the longstanding conception that specific performance should be denied if
monetary compensation in the form of damages166 would adequately compensate
the aggrieved party.167 In construction contracts, for example, it is commonly
asserted that an aggrieved party, upon receiving damages could easily contract
with a third to perform the construction work.168 However, the fact that the aggrieved
party is requesting, in the first instance, specific performance, insinuates that a
claim for damages is an inadequate remedy169 and this rule was therefore expressly
(and rightfully) rejected in Benson:170
163 Lubbe “Contractual Derogation” in Essays in Honour of AJ Kerr 5.
164 See generally Lubbe & Murray Farlam and Hathaway: Contract: Cases, Materials and
Commentary 549.
165 Benson v SA Mutual Life Assurance Society 1986 (1) SA 776 (A) 783; Administrator, Natal v
Magill, Grant & Nell (Pty) Ltd (In Liquidation) 1969 (1) SA 660 (A).
166 See Van Huyssteen et al Contract: General Principles 368 on the distinction between an award
or damages that compensates the aggrieved party for loss suffered as a result of a breach and
an award of the objective value of the performance as a surrogate for an outstanding
performance
167 See for example, Thompson v Pullinger 1894 1OR 298.
168 Another reason is because “expanding the availability of specific performance would create
opportunities for promisees to exploit promisors by threatening to compel, or actually
compelling, performance, without furthering the compensation goal” – A Schwartz “The Case
for Specific Performance” (1979) 1118 Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository
Scholarship Series Faculty Scholarship Series 274.
169 Schwartz (1979) Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository Scholarship Series 277. An
aggrieved party cannot rest assured that it will receive damages in an adequate sum in lieu of
specific performance. This is compounded by the fact that it is extremely difficult to accurately
quantify such damages under a construction contract and the aggrieved party may well be
better off deploying self-help remedies to urge the defaulting party to perform as agreed.
170 This was confirmed in Santos Professional Football Club (Pty) Ltd v Igesund 2003 (5) SA 73
(C) and Nationwide Airlines (Pty) Ltd v Roediger 2008 1 SA 293 (W).
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“The most important rule from which many of the others were derived, was that
specific performance would not be granted where the plaintiff could be
compensated adequately by damages…There is no need nor reason for this
process to continue.”
A resort to specific performance in instances where the order will require the
performance of services of a personal nature,171  has traditionally been met with
scepticism by the courts.  In Troskie v Van der Walt,172 for instance, it was held:
“no court, for example, can force a singer to sing or an artist to paint a picture
because these tasks require the application of highly personal skills” (211 F-I).”
Nevertheless, even in the period before Benson’s case, the law reports reveal an
tendency towards a more flexible approach.  An order for specific performance of
an employment contract against an employer (i.e. the reinstatement of an
employee) was confirmed in National Union of Textile Workers v Stag Packings
(Pty) Ltd.173 There has be an indication in case law that courts, in exercising judicial
discretion, may (as so entitled) refuse to make an order for specific performance.174
However, in line with legislation,175 it is becoming more of a trend for courts (in
particular the labour courts) to recognise the right of an employee to remain
employed.176
Alternatively, an order compelling specific performance by an employee under a
contract of employment has been a hotly debated topic after the landmark decision
171 As would be the case under a contract of employment (locatio conductio operarum). See Van
der Merwe A Comparative Evaluation of the Judicial Discretion to Refuse Specific Performance
163.  On the distinction between locatio conductio operis and locatio conductio operarum, see
the discussion in Chapter 2 – “The Construction Contract under UAE law and South African law
in context: an overview”.
172 1994 (3) SA 545 (O). See also Lumley v Wagner (1852) 1 De GM & G 604 and Roberts
Construction Co Ltd v Verhoef 1952 (2) SA 300 (W). Parallels can be drawn with a construction
context, in, for example, instances of design where the aggrieved party has elected a particular
architect or engineer to design a certain element of a project or particular works. It is imperative,
due to the creative element that is unique to a particular individual, that that particular elected
individual performs the design element as there is no other who can perform the required design
to the same degree and in the same manner.
173 1982 (4) SA 151 (T) the court held that there was no reason why the general rule that an
innocent party could elect to hold a defaulting party to its contract could not also be applicable
to employment contracts.
174 See for example Seloadi v Sun International (Bophuthatswana) Ltd 1993 (2) SA 174 (BG) 186I-
190E and Masetlha v President of the Republic of South Africa 2008 (1) SA 566 (CC) where
the court, in exercising its judicial discretion refused to make an order for specific performance.
175 This is in line with labour legislation namely the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 at section 193
and the Basic Conditions of Employment Act 75 of 1997 at section 77A(e) - Van der Merwe A
Comparative Evaluation 177.
176 Van der Merwe A Comparative Evaluation 177.
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given by a full bench of the Cape Provincial Division in Santos Professional Football
Club (Pty) Ltd v Igesund (“Santos”)177 where a football coach was ordered to
complete his fixed term contract as head coach. This was the first case where an
order for specific performance was granted against an employee178 and this
decision was subsequently confirmed in Nationwide Airlines (Pty) Ltd v Roediger179
where it was held that:
“[I]t is apparent that it is a misconception to say without qualification that
specific performance of an employment agreement will never be permitted.
There are numerous situations, where specific performance may be ordered
where various factors may play a determining role in coming to such a
decision… The general rule should still be that where a party wrongfully
breaches a contract, it should entitle the innocent party to enforce the contract
and, that should no less be so even in employment contracts. After all as the
authorities have laid down, each case must be decided on its own facts.”
A third instance in which our courts have in the past tended to refuse orders for
specific performance was where the execution of the order for specific performance
would supposedly prove difficult for the court.180  This ground is especially prevalent
in construction contracts, and will be considered in more detail in the following
section.
In respect of The Benson judgment generally, it is clear that it has  provided much
needed clarity in confirming a move away from the rigid application of the law by
the courts when considering an order for specific performance, making it clear that
while a right to specific performance is the basic premise of our law, this is subject
to a judicial discretion whether to make an order for specific performance.  In
principle this approach applies to every situation, irrespective of the type of contract
that is before the court. The court in Benson also confirmed that the circumscribed
rules founded in English law were at most to be regarded as factors relevant to the
exercise of the discretion and as such, could no longer be accorded an elevated
177   2003 (5) SA 73 (C).
178 T Naude “Specific Performance Against an Employee Santos Professional Football Club (Pty)
Ltd v Igesund” (2003) 120 SALJ 269 269. This decision was contrary to the longstanding view
(in South Africa and in many other jurisdictions) that an order for specific performance should
not be made against an employee. There is a view that such orders are tantamount to slavery
as the personal freedom of the employee is compromised.
179 2008 (1) SA 293 (W) 19 21.
180 See the reference to this tendency in ISEP Structural Engineering and Plating (Pty) Ltd v Inland
Exploration Co (Pty) Ltd 1981 (4) SA 1 (A) 5.
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status and be regarded as prescriptive when a court was exercising discretion
surrounding the grant or refusal of an order for specific performance.181
Furthermore, despite this clear and progressive judgment, the judgment is not
beyond criticism and it has been predicted that the attempt to restore the hybrid
approach is doomed to failure:182
“[d]espite trying to re-establish the Roman–Dutch position, the court has simply
perpetuated the internal incoherence in this area of the law, occasioned by the
fusion of the remedy from two dissimilar systems of law.”
Nonetheless, whatever the fate183 might be of Benson in the long term, for present
purposes, the concern is the impact of the judgment on the approach in the context
of construction contracts and, the incentive for the use of self-help remedies (dealt
with in the next section) to compel specific performance.
3 2 4 The Position in respect of Construction Contracts
There is an ancient rule (Rule 233) found in the Code of Hammurabi (circa 2250
B.C.) which says:
“If a builder has built a house for someone and has not made its foundations firm, and a
wall falls, that builder out of his own money shall make that wall firm”.184
This is unfortunately no longer the starting point and there has been a shift in
thought in many jurisdictions around specific performance as a primary remedy. Sir
Guenter Treitel185 says the following about the remedy of specific performance:
“First, the enforced performance may be regarded as an undue interference
with the personal freedom of the debtor. This is particularly true where
performance can only be rendered by the debtor personally; but even where
this is not the case enforced performance is often felt to be too strong a
measure when the creditor could for most practical purposes be put into almost
a good position by an award of a sum of money. Enforced performance might,
moreover, cause hardship to the debtor which would not be occasioned by an
181 Benson v SA Mutual Life Assurance Society 1986 (1) SA 776 (A) 785 “and so it came about
that English cases came to be followed somewhat indiscriminately … There is neither need nor
reason for this process to continue … This does obviously not imply that … factors which other
Courts have considered to be obstacles or possible obstacles in the way of granting an order
for specific performance now cease to be pertinent. On the contrary, they remain relevant
factors which are to be considered on the same basis as any other relevant fact is to be
considered”.
182 See Cockrell “Breach of contract” in Southern Cross: Civil Law and Common Law in South
Africa 330; Lubbe “Contractual Derogation” in Essays in Honour of AJ Kerr 19.
183 Lubbe “Contractual Derogation” in Essays in Honour of AJ Kerr 24.
184 H Oleck “Specific Performance of Builders Contracts” (1952) 21 Fordham Law Review 156 156.
185 GH Treitel Remedies for breach of contract: A Comparative Account 1st ed (1988) 47.
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award of money, particularly where such an award would be subject to a
reduction under mitigation rules. Secondly, enforced performance may be
thought to impose strains on the machinery of law enforcement which are too
severe when balanced against the benefit derived by the creditor from enforced
performance.”
The above reasons, reflecting the approach of English law,  have especially become
entrenched when an award for specific performance is considered in the context of
construction contracts.186 In particular, there seems to be three identifiable and
prominent reasons, which have evolved and developed over time, why courts (in all
jurisdictions) are reluctant to order specific performance in construction
contracts.187 These reasons can be characterised as follows:
“First, damages may be an adequate remedy if another builder can be engaged
to do the work. Secondly, the contract may be too vague to be specifically
enforced if it fails to describe the work to be done with sufficient certainty. And,
thirdly, specific enforcement may require more supervision than the court is
willing to provide.”188
Adequacy of damages,189 is a primary reason why some courts remain hesitant to
make an award for specific performance in construction contracts; if the aggrieved
party is compensated with a suitable award of damages, the aggrieved party can
easily approach a third party to perform promised works.190
This reasoning does not come without criticism; the very fact that the aggrieved
party has requested the court to order specific performance indicates that an award
for damages would be an inadequate remedy in the circumstances.191 Further, as
discussed below, the expense, time and resources to source and contract with a
186 Nienaber “Construction Contracts” LAWSA 9 para 63.
187 See Ranch International Pipelines (Transvaal) Ltd v LMG Construction City (Pty) Ltd
1984 (3) SA 861 W 865 and the references to the New Zealand case of Mayfield Holdings
Ltd v Moana Reef Ltd [1973] 1 NZLR 309.
188 H Beale “Specific Performance and Injunction” in H Beale (various eds) Chitty on Contracts
(2015) 27-001 27-032.
189 Traditionally a principle stemming from English law, but which has been assimilated into many
other jurisdictions.
190 J Bailey Construction Law (2011) 6.03.
191 See Schwartz (1979) Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository Scholarship Series 277:
“…why courts should permit promisees to elect routinely the remedy of specific performance is
that promisees possess better information than courts as to both the adequacy of damages and
the difficulties of coercing performance. Promisees know better than courts whether the
damages a court is likely to award would be adequate because promisees are more familiar
with the costs that breach imposes on them. In addition, promisees generally know more about
their promisors than do courts; thus they are in a better position to predict whether specific
performance decrees would induce their promisors to render satisfactory performance.”
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new contractor are extensive and very difficult, nor are damages always effectively
quantified to reimburse the aggrieved party for all the expense it may face, both
directly and indirectly, when appointing a new contractor.
Another supposed reason why there is a reluctance by some courts to make an
order for specific performance is the difficulty of supervision. The court does not
have the technical expertise nor resources to supervise the execution of the works,
nor is the court able to confirm that the work has been performed in accordance
with the requirements of the construction contract. This factor is compounded by
the fact that should a party wilfully fail to comply with an order for specific
performance, the defaulting party may well face criminal prosecution for contempt
of court.192
“If the Court did decree specific performance, it would have to punish for
contempt of court if the work were not properly performed, and this would
involve direct superintendence of the work by an officer of the court, a
proceeding for which manifestly a court of law is not suited.”193
The phenomenon of supervision stems from English law when English Chancellors
were trying to establish the separate jurisdiction of Chancery; in order to uphold the
dignity of the court, they avoided making any orders which they were not certain
they would be able to enforce.194 Consequently, the courts avoided making orders
for affirmative action beyond a single act,195 and if performance required detailed
acts of a continuing nature, then supervision was required. The effect of this was
as follows:
“This idea had two consequences: because the court sought to avoid prolonged
supervision which its ordinary means and instrumentalities might not be able to
carry out, it became prejudiced against the idea of specific performance of
construction contracts. In addition, a prejudice developed against all affirmative
decrees involving more than a single, simple act, and at the same time the court
tended to prefer negative decrees wherever possible.”196
192 Lubbe & Murray Farlam and Hathaway: Contract: Cases, Materials and Commentary 542. See
also Van der Westhuizen v Velenski (1898) 15 SC 237 and Putco Ltd v TV and Radio
Guarantee Co (Pty) Ltd 1985 (4) SA 809 (A).
193 Wessels & Roberts The Law of Contract in South Africa para 3124.
194 Oleck (1952) Fordham Law Review 156. See also R Pound “The Progress of Law and Equity”
(1920) 33 Harv. L. Rev. 420 434.
195 Lennard (1972) Notre Dame L. Rev. 1027 and, see also Bakersfield Country Club v. Pacific
Water Co.192 Cal. App. 2d 528, 13 Cal. Rptr.573 (1961).
196 Oleck (1952) Fordham Law Review 156 and, as discussed in more detail below, English courts
do not usually award specific performance where damages would be adequate; this is
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This concept that specific performance should not be ordered in instances where
enforceability will prove difficult for the court, has been maintained for several years
by courts and writers alike in South Africa.197 Wessels198 says the following:
“Where the court cannot ensure performance, it will not decree specific
performance. A contract which requires constant supervision, or where the
duties to be performed are continuous, is not such a contract as the court will
order to be specifically performed…Thus, the court will not decree specific
performance of a building contract or of a contract to do work or labour.”199
This resulted in an approach whereby performance was to be detailed and agreed
by the parties and a court was merely required to supervise each detail without
departing from what had been agreed.200
This emphasis on supervision was reproved in South Africa in the prominent case
of Ranch International Pipelines (Transvaal) Ltd v LMG Construction City (Pty)
Ltd201 at 880202 where the facts were briefly as follow: Ranch entered into a contract
to construct a pipeline and in turn engaged LMG Construction as a subcontractor
on the project. Ranch alleged that the subcontract had been terminated and brought
an application to expel LMG from the site and to restrain LMG from entering again.
LMG in turn brought a counter application for an urgent interdict interdicting VM (the
newly appointed subcontractor in place of LMG) from performing the subcontract
especially with regard to construction contracts. However, in Wolverhampton Corporation V
Emmons [1901] 1 KB 515, the court identified that specific performance may be awarded in
construction contracts in instances where three conditions are satisfied: “(1) the claimant has a
substantial interest such that damages would not compensate them; (2) the defendant is in
possession of the land so that the claimant cannot do the work; and (3) the work is adequately
particularised”. See J Uff Construction law 10 ed (2009) 221. See also Carpenters Estate Ltd v
Davies [1940] 1 Al E.R. 13; V Ramsey & S Furst Keating on Construction Contracts 9 ed (2012)
357 and Pound (1920) Harv. L. Rev. 434; See also the recent (and rare) decision by the English
High Court in Airport Industrial GP Ltd and Airport Industrial Nominees Ltd v Heathrow Airport
Ltd and AP16 Ltd [2015] EWHC 3753 (Ch) where the court made an order for the specific
performance obligations under a construction contract in advance of the completion date.
197 Lubbe & Murray Farlam and Hathaway: Contract: Cases, Materials and Commentary 545.
198 Wessels & Roberts The Law of Contract in South Africa para 3124.
199 See also Nisenbaum and Nisenbaum v Express Buildings Ltd 1953 (1) SA 246 (W) 249 where
De Villiers J held: “The judgment in [Marais v Cloete 1945 EDL 238] seems to indicate, as I
have stated, that as a general rule in disputes between landlord and tenant as to the repair of
buildings, or neglect to repair or failure to carry out some structural alterations, the court will not
order specific performance because it is a difficult matter for the court to supervise and see that
its order is carried out, and as a question whether there has been specific performance of the
court’s order was difficult to determine, it would be difficult to enforce it”.
200 Pound (1919) Harv. L. Rev 434.
201 1984 (3) SA 861 (W).
202 See also ISEP Structural Engineering and Plating (Pty) Ltd v Inland Exploration Co (Pty) Ltd
1981 (4) SA 1 (A) 5.
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works and Ranch from interfering with LMG’s right to complete the subcontract
works. The counter-application was successful.
Coetzee J famously held the following on the point of supervision:203
“In the process of deciding whether specific performance should be refused…a
few general observations about building contracts may first be made. The
Court’s difficulty of supervising the performance is traditionally in the forefront
of the objection to such an order…I wonder if this difficulty is not grossly over-
emphasised. Is it not imaginary rather than real? I could not find a case on
record where such difficulty actually arose in practice and which had to dealt
with by the Court after an order to perform a building contract had been made.
Why should there be any difficulty? What is the need of supervision anyway?
Does the Court ever supervise the execution of its judgments? Surely not.
Orders ad factum praestandum are made all the time. There is no supervision
thereof and no intervention by the Sheriff. If there is an intentional refusal to
perform, contempt proceedings may follow. Why should different
considerations apply to building contracts? Accurate performance of them with
the requisite skill or workmanship is irrelevant in this context.”
Coetzee J further clarified the point that as the order for specific performance and
accordingly the judgment do not replace the obligations under the construction
contract, there is no new difficulty in establishing whether these contractual
obligations have been sufficiently met:204
“The judgment creditor will surely cancel the contract when it is unintentionally
incorrectly performed. The judgment does not replace the contract. After all,
this risk, as well as that of not succeeding in contempt proceedings, the owner
took when he asked the court for this order. It is his affair. If the owner has
elected to claim this remedy and he is prepared to take these risks, why, one
may ask, should it lie, as a matter of logic, in the mouth of the defaulting builder
to advance any reason connected with the quality of his performance or his
general unwillingness, as a basis for avoiding an order compelling him to
perform his bargain.”205
203 See also Mayfield Holdings Ltd v Moana Reef Ltd [1973] 1 NZLR 309 at 321/2 (quoted in Ranch
International Pipelines (Transvaal) Ltd v LMG Construction City (Pty) Ltd 1984 (3) SA 861 (W)
868 where it was held: There has, I think, been a tendency to discount the second reason [the
difficulty of supervision of a detailed building project] as an independent ground for refusing
specific performance of a building contract, the view being taken that in the case of modern
contracts the details of the structure are specified in detail and may be the subject of effective
although inconvenient supervision…”
204 Whilst extremely helpful, this judgment has not resolved the matter in its entirety under South
African law and further intervention by the courts on this topic is still required – Van der Merwe
A Comparative Evaluation 198. See also Sokoloff v Harriman Estates Development Corp 2001
NY Int. 97.
205 Ranch International Pipelines (Transvaal) Ltd v LMG Construction City (Pty) Ltd 1984 (3) SA
861 (W) 881.
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The same reasoning can be viewed from another angle206 and this suffices as the
third primary reason why courts remain hesitant to make an order for specific
performance, namely the court’s reluctance stems from the vagueness and
imprecision surrounding the contractual obligations of the parties207 - “one of the
stock objections in construction contracts is want of sufficient certainty.”208
Due to this imprecision, the court may (undesirably) be forced to substitute its own
judgment for that of the parties,209 or the aggrieved party may argue that the
defaulting party has failed to comply with its contractual obligations and, in turn, the
defaulting party will argue compliance with its obligations under the contract and
accordingly compliance with the order for specific performance; as a result further
unnecessary and unwanted disputes may arise between the parties.210
It is suggested that a way around this, would be for a court to take into account “the
question whether fair evaluation of the work and, consequently, satisfactory
fulfilment of the contract is possible.”211 It is therefore suggested that firstly the
relationship between the parties is taken in to account and secondly, whether
evaluation of the performance by the defaulting party is (objectively) possible – if
for an example, it is possible and the parties agree that an objective third party
professional will evaluate whether the performance is contractually compliant then,
this will dispel any arguments of non-performance.212
In actual fact, the three grounds as key reasons for the reluctance of the court to
make an award for specific performance can be dispelled; minimum supervision (if
any) is required by the court, damages rarely adequately compensate the aggrieved
party and if contractual obligations are uncertain, mechanisms exist to avoid
dispute.
206 Van der Merwe Comparative Evaluation 196.
207 RH Christie & GB Bradfield Christie’s the Law of Contract in South Africa 7 ed (2016) 552. See
also Wessels & Roberts The Law of Contract in South Africa para 3117ff; Barker v Beckett &
Co Ltd 1911 TPD 151 164.
208 Pound (1920) Harv. L. Rev. 433.
209 Lennard (1972) Notre Dame L. Rev. 1026.
210 Lubbe & Murray Farlam and Hathaway: Contract: Cases, Materials and Commentary 546.
211 546.
212 546.
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Perhaps it can be said that a court’s reluctance to order specific performance, does
not actually stem from any of the above reasons – the primary reason is an
unwillingness to deviate from the well-trodden path of precedent.213
Nonetheless, this discretion, as a subjective variable, still gives rise to uncertainty
and an aggrieved party cannot have absolute certainty that it will be awarded
specific performance. For example, Nienaber says the following:
“The contractor’s breach may entitle the employer to a decree of specific
performance”.
This statement is then qualified with the following:
“Such an order will usually but not necessarily be refused when it requires the
execution of work” (my emphasis).
Consequently, an aggrieved party may be wise to avoid approaching a court for
assistance, but instead decide to deploy alternative tactics to compel the defaulting
party to perform.
Thus, despite the ruling in Benson, this dichotomy serves as a contributing factor
for an aggrieved party to pursue self-help remedies to compel specific performance,
despite a clear judicial ruling that its’ election for specific performance as a primary
remedy will be given due regard.
Therefore, an aggrieved party who wishes to compel specific performance from a
defaulting contractant is, in many instances, indirectly influenced by these
aforementioned circumstances; anticipating that should a court be approached for
an order of specific performance where any the aforementioned circumstances
exist, the likelihood of such a request being refused and substituted by way of a
damages award is probable. This makes reliance on self-help remedies to compel
specific performance in such instances attractive to an aggrieved party.
213 Lennard (1972) Notre Dame L. Rev. 1027.
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3 3 The Approach to Specific Performance as a Remedy in the UAE
3 3 1  How Specific Performance is defined under UAE Law (as a Civil Law
System)
The approach taken in many prominent civil law jurisdictions214 is the first approach
- namely that specific performance is a primary remedy subject to certain
exceptions. A party is obliged to perform its obligations under a contract and should
a party fail to do so (in breach of the contract), the aggrieved party will have the
right, as first course of action, to obtain an order compelling the defaulting party to
perform and fulfil its obligations under the contract.215
In the UAE, and under the Civil Code, specific performance is confirmed as the
primary remedy in instances of breach of contract.
Specific performance (also known as “performance by compulsion”) should, in the
first instance, be ordered for the performance of contractual obligations. The
position in the UAE, and indeed in many civil law jurisdictions, is that damages, in
lieu of specific performance, should only be awarded in instances where specific
performance is not possible; Article 380(1) of the Civil Code provides as follows:
“(1) An obligor shall, after being given notice, be compelled to discharge his
obligation by way of specific performance, if that is possible.”216
The preference for the execution of an agreement, over substitution with alternative
remedies) is in line with Sharia law which has an aversion to anything “speculative”
or “intangible”.217 Further, it is common cause that under UAE law neither of the
parties can unilaterally elect to substitute such performance with an alternative form
of performance:218
214 See for example Dutch and German law jurisdictions: Van der Merwe A Comparative Evaluation
17.
215 Van der Merwe A Comparative Evaluation 3.
216 In Abu Dhabi Court of Cassation 1452/2009, the learned judge made reference to the
explanatory memorandum of the Civil Transaction Law (at page 384) which says the following:
“If the performance of the obligation is possible, the obligor shall have the right to offer
performance thereof and such performance may not be replaced by compensation (i.e. taking
consideration) without the mutual consent of the parties, because compensation against
specific performance may not be regarded as an optional or alternate obligation...”
217 Grose Construction Law in the United Arab Emirates and the Gulf 202.
218 This extends to compensation and a party cannot unilaterally elect to substitute performance
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“The obligor has the duty to tender performance exactly, and the obligee has
the duty to accept such performance. The obligor does not have the right to
tender cash as an alternative, so long as specific performance remains
feasible.”219
3 3 2 Circumstances when an Award of Specific Performance may be
Departed from under UAE Law220
3 3 2 1 Impossibility
A court may only depart from an award of specific performance in certain and
prescribed circumstances. The “possibility” or “tenability” of the performance is one
of the key factors in determining whether an alternative to specific performance is
permissible. This is confirmed by Article 386 as read with Article 380(1) of the Civil
Code, which states:
“If it is impossible for an obligor to give specific performance of an obligation,
he shall be ordered to pay compensation for non-performance of his obligation,
unless it is proved that the impossibility of performance arose out of an external
cause in which (the obligor) played no part. The same shall apply in the event
that the obligor defaults in the performance of his obligation (my emphasis).”
Islamic jurisprudence dictates that if an obligation becomes impossible, a substitute
must be offered.221 This is subject to the exception that if the impossibility has arisen
out of a cause in which the obligor played no part, then the obligor is exempt from
with compensation; compensation is therefore not a voluntary alternative obligation for the
obligor nor remedy for the obligee. Note however, parties may elect to substitute such
performance by agreement - See J Whelan UAE Civil Code and Ministry of Justice Commentary
(2010) 2:0558.
219 Whelan UAE Civil Code and Ministry of Justice Commentary 2:0558.
220 In Abu Dhabi Court of Cassation 987/Judicial Year 3 it was held that “The subject matter of the
obligation will remain in place, namely the specific thing that the obligor has to do, and the other
part of it is the compensation laid down by the law in lieu of it. It follows from that that if the
obligee has demanded specific performance and it is established before the judge that that is
not possible or would oppressive to the obligor, then the court will do no wrong in awarding
compensation. That will not be regarded as a judgment for something that was not applied for
by the party, because there is a presumption in an application for specific performance that it
implies within itself an application for compensation in the event that specific performance is
not possible”.
221 Whelan UAE Civil Code and Ministry of Justice Commentary 2:0558. See also Dubai Court of
Cassation 76/2009 where it was held: “Under Articles 385 and 386 of the Civil Code, if special
performance of an obligation is impossible the judge may order the obligor to pay compensation
for non-performance”.
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performing or providing a substitute. This concept originates from the Shari’ah rule
that “God imposes upon no person more than that person can do”.222
The concept of “possibility of performance” is difficult to delineate. When does
performance become impossible? In some instances (such as force majeure)
impossibility of performance is easy to discern, but in other instances, it is not as
clear. For example, if time is a factor for performance and such time has passed,
would such performance be considered impossible? In such instances, the UAE
Civil Code Ministry of Justice Commentary asserts that for as long as the
circumstances permit, specific performance may be tendered. If however
circumstances no longer permit due to the passing of time, then the obligation will
be regarded as impossible.223
Determining “possibility” of performance is not straightforward. As there is
uncertainty surrounding what “possible” performance actually is and such
determination is subject to the (somewhat) subjective opinion of the court, an
aggrieved party has no guarantee that a court will decide that the performance in
question is, “possible”. The aggrieved party is therefore subject to what the court
may deem “possible”. This uncertainty can be seen as one of the many reasons
why a party would avoid protracted litigation to compel specific performance.224
222 Whelan UAE Civil Code and Ministry of Justice Commentary 2:0569. This was confirmed in
Union Supreme Court decision 349/Judicial Year 24 351 where it was held that: “If the
performance of the obligation in specie is impossible by reason of an extraneous cause in which
the obligor played no part, then there will be no specific performance or compensatory
performance, and the obligation will be set aside on the grounds of impossibility”.
223 For the purposes of avoiding such instances and for the purposes of promoting certainty,
Whelan UAE Civil Code and Ministry of Justice Commentary 2:0558 refers to the method set
out in Article 250 of the German Civil Code and advises that there is no reason why the
provisions of Article 250 should not be adopted by the UAE courts in determining “possibility”.
Article 250 of the German Civil Code says: “The obligee may specify a reasonable period of
time for the person liable in damages to undertake restoration and declare that he will reject
restoration after the period of time ends. After the end of the period of time the obligee may
demand damages in money, if restoration does not occur in good time; the claim to restoration
is excluded.” Therefore, the aggrieved party would be able to specify a specific period of time
in which the defaulting party is entitled tender proper performance; failure to perform within this
time period would give rise to the right for the aggrieved party to reject any specific performance
tendered and to claim damages in money.
224 On impossibility, see further, JS McLennan “Specific Performance and impossibility of
performance of contracts” (2001) 118 SALJ 245.
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3 3 2 2 Judicial Discretion - Instances where a Court may Order an
Alternative to Specific Performance Despite Specific Performance
Remaining Possible
Articles 380 (2) and 385 of the Civil Code go onto provide instances in which a judge
may order an alternative to specific performance despite such performance
remaining possible.
3 3 2 2 1 Oppressive Performance – Article 380(2)
Article 380(2) of the Civil Code provides that in instances where specific
performance is too onerous and oppressive for the obligor, then a monetary
substitution, as an alternative to performance may be ordered. Article 380(2) says:
 “Provided that if specific performance would be oppressive for the obligor, the
judge may, upon the application of the obligor, restrict the right of the obligee
to a monetary substitute unless that would cause him serious loss.”
Pursuant to this Article, substitution of specific performance with a monetary
substitute is conditional on the following:
(a) Application, by the obligor, must be made under this Article 380(2);
(b) Specific performance must be oppressive for the obligor; and
(c) The aggrieved party must not face serious loss should its right to specific
performance be limited to a monetary substitute.
The first condition, namely application by the obligor is fairly straightforward, the
second and third conditions are however more precarious, requiring a balancing act
by the court between the interests of the obligor and the obligee.
As a starting point, the court would need to consider if an order for specific
performance would be oppressive for the obligor. However, a succinct definition of
what would constitute “oppressive” is not clear and is subject to the interpretation
of the court; the court would also need to consider that what may be oppressive for
one obligor may not necessarily be oppressive for another obligor. There is
therefore no uniform definition of “oppressive” and the courts would need to apply
this standard on a case to case basis, taking into account the personal
circumstances of each obligor.
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In addition, the court is obliged to consider the interests of the obligee before making
any award for monetary compensation in the place of an order for specific
performance; it cannot only consider the interests of the obligor. This raises the
equally difficult analysis of what would constitute “serious loss” for the obligee and
the court would need to perform this analysis on a case by case basis.
Guidance is offered by the UAE Civil Code and Ministry of Justice Commentary
which says that the obligor must not suffer “excessive hardship”225 which is
disproportionate to the loss that the obligee would suffer in instances where the
obligor failed to tender specific performance. The commentary gives the following
example:
“An example of that is where an owner builds a building contrary to an
agreement not to build, which very frequently happens. In such a case, the
judge must strike a balance between the interests of the persons concerned,
and must avoid placing excessive sacrifices upon the obligor in order to avert
a light loss to the obligee.”
Therefore, whilst Article 380(2) does provide criteria to assist the court when making
a decision to award specific performance or a monetary alternative, the criteria are
fairly vague and difficult to apply. When an obligee makes an application to court to
compel specific performance, the obligee faces the risk that the obligor will bring an
application in terms of Article 380(2) to counter this request; this may result in the
court limiting the obligee’s right to a monetary substitution.
Therefore, when making such a request, the obligee would need to consider
whether a request for specific performance would be oppressive for the obligor; this
information is not likely to be easily obtainable and the obligee would need to take
the risk that an order for specific performance would not be oppressive for the
obligor. Further, the obligee needs to bear in mind that the court is applying a fairly
subjective test in establishing the balance between the obligor and obligee’s rights
and subjectivity does not lead to certainty.
Ultimately it is likely to be in the obligee’s interests to compel specific performance
through self-help remedies because by approaching the courts, the obligee runs
225 See Whelan UAE Civil Code and Ministry of Justice Commentary 2:0558.
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the risk that a request for specific performance may be refused and that the
obligee’s remedial rights will be limited to damages.
3 3 2 2 2 Refusal by the Obligor to Perform
Article 385 provides for two scenarios. The first is in an instance where specific
performance has taken place, but the obligee has still suffered loss and the second
is where an obligor merely refuses to perform. In both instances, a judge may award
compensation to the obligee taking into account the prejudice suffered by the
obligee and the unreasonableness of the obligor. Article 385 says:
“If specific performance has taken place, or if the obligor persists in refusing
performance, the judge shall determine the amount of compensation to be paid
by the obligor, having regard therein to the prejudice suffered by the obligee
and the unreasonableness of the attitude of the obligor.”
Whilst Article 385 provides a helpful mechanism for an obligee to recover
compensation for loss suffered as a result of the refusal of the obligor to perform or
in instances where specific performance has been tendered by the obligor but the
obligee has still suffered loss,226 it does not assist the obligee in compelling specific
performance from the obligor; therefore, the obligee would be better off deploying
self-help remedies in instances where an obligor refuses to perform.
3 3 2 3 Alternatives to Specific Performance by the Obligor
Should a defaulting obligor fail to perform, and should the obligee decide not to
approach the court for an order of specific performance, the obligee is equipped
with the mechanism contained in Article 381(2) of the Civil Code which provides a
way for the obligee to undertake performance itself. Article 381(2) says:
“Article 381(2): If the obligor does not perform the act, the obligee may seek
the leave of the judge to perform it (himself) and he may also perform it (himself)
without leave under compelling necessity, and in both cases the performance
shall be the expense of the obligor (debtor).”
With this mechanism, the obligee will still need to approach the court for leave to
perform the obligation itself; unless in instances of compelling necessity.227 This
would once again utilise valuable time and resources of the obligee. Further, Article
226 The award of compensation in addition to an award for specific performance is not unusual in
most jurisdictions.
227 What constitutes compelling necessity is subject to the opinion of the court.
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381(2) is of the same flavour as Article 380(2); providing for similar, if not the same
relief contained in Article 380(2); the obligee will be awarded a monetary substitute
in the place of an order for specific performance. However, in this instance, a
monetary substitute may not be adequate and, the “expense” of carrying out the
performance may be wider than monetary substitution (for example the obligee may
incur additional expense in instructing a third to do the work).
Another drawback of Article 381(2) is that the obligee is not actually obtaining the
performance that it is seeking: the obligee would need to be inclined to perform the
obligation itself (finding itself back at square one) or, find a third party to perform.
Article 381(2), may prove helpful to assist an obligee who is seeking compensation
as opposed to specific performance in instances where an obligor fails to perform,
but it provides no assistance to an obligee who is looking to enforce its right to
specific performance.
3 4 Comparison
Under both UAE and South African law, specific performance is recognised as an
important remedy for breach of contract. Under UAE law, specific performance is
regarded as a primary remedy for breach of contract and, damages, in lieu of
specific performance are only awarded in prescribed instances. This is in contrast
to South African law, where a hybrid approach is followed - specific performance is
recognised as a primary remedy, subject to judicial discretion, but an aggrieved
party has, in the first instance, the right to exercise an election between specific
performance and a claim for damages.228
228  A distinction must be drawn between “damages” as payment for loss actually suffered and
“damages” as a true surrogate for performance. More often than not damages are awarded in
conjunction with specific performance as an order for specific performance usually comes after
the due date when the tendered performance was due under the contract. Van Huyssteen et al
Contract: General Principles 368. See also Ramsden Mckenzie’s Law of Building and
Engineering Contracts and Arbitration 87. This is in contrast to UAE law: in instances where
performance is not possible (Article 386 of the Civil Code) or where the obligor is refusing to
perform (Article 385 of the Civil Code), the obligee will be entitled to damages; compensation
for loss suffered. This is compounded by the wording of Article 385 which (not unusually) allows
for compensation to be awarded in conjunction with specific performance; bringing the position
of the aggrieved party closer to the position that the aggrieved party would have been in had
the contract been properly fulfilled. Therefore, it appears that the court will only have the power
to order true damages under Article 385 and Article 386 in instances where there has already
been specific performance or in instances where the defaulting party is refusing to perform. In
instances arising under Article 380(2), the recompense awarded to the obligee under Article
380(2) is restricted to a “monetary substitute” (in comparison to Article 385 and 386 where the
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Despite the legal systems adopting different approaches to an award for specific
performance, parallels can be drawn between these systems. For example, in
instances of impossibility, a court under both UAE law and South African law may
depart from an award of specific performance. This permitted departure gives rise
to the same challenges under both systems and, both systems are tasked with
defining what would constitute impossibility,229 balancing the rights of the aggrieved
party and the defaulting party. Such uncertainty would most certainly be a motivator
under both systems for an aggrieved party to compel specific performance through
self-help remedies.
The Civil Code sets out defined and legislated circumstances in which a court may
depart from specific performance as a primary remedy. This is in contrast to South
African law where, in instances where an aggrieved party has chosen to demand
performance as opposed to sue for damages, the courts are afforded a judicial
discretion “not confined to specific types of cases, nor…circumscribed by rigid
rules.”230 This discretion is however not unfettered, but subject to equity and policy
considerations.
As confirmed in case law, such equitable and policy considerations are not refined
to a numerus clausus nor do they constitute obligatory grounds on which specific
performance is to be refused. They serve merely as factors, which can to be taken
into account by a court when exercising its discretion.  Similarities can be drawn
between these considerations and the legislated departure grounds under UAE law.
For example, in instances where specific performance may operate unduly harshly
on the defaulting party, an order for specific performance may be departed from.
Under South African law, the court may on its own volition, elect to take such a
awardable recompense to the obligee is “compensation”). This implies that under Article 380(2),
the rights of the aggrieved party are restricted to a “monetary substitute” and not to damages
as payment for loss actually suffered. This may be merely due to a difference in translation as
the Arabic for monetary substitute is “يدﻘﻧ لﯾدﺑ” and “ضﯾوَْﻌﺗ” for compensation. Anonymous
“Arabic Translation” Britannica English http://arabic.britannicaenglish.com/en/ (accessed 09-
01-2018).
229 Note above discussion at n162 – 164.
230 Haynes v Kingwilliamstown Municipality 1951 (2) SA 371 (A) 371.
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consideration into account. However, under UAE law, the defaulting party would
need to apply to the court in terms of Article 380(2).
Article 380(2) however provides more clarity and guidance for parties setting out
two conditions, which must be met before an order for specific performance, may
be departed from. These conditions involve a balancing act by the court and, whilst
still not completely satisfactory as these conditions ultimately require the
consideration of subjective factors, a yardstick for “undue hardship” has been
identified and parties are provided with some guidance regarding the grounds on
which the judicial determination will be made.
Another parallel can be drawn in instances where an order for specific performance
will amount to an order for performance of a personal nature. Where personal
intervention is required for specific performance it is extremely difficult, if not
impossible, for a court to enforce personal performance by a defaulting party.
Under South African law, despite a recent judgment231 that an order for specific
performance under contracts of this type should not be distinguished from an order
for specific performance under any other type of contract, it is likely that the nature
of such contracts will still be taken into account by the courts when exercising
judicial discretion.
Under UAE law, Professor Al Sanhuri232 asserts that if the execution of specific
performance involves personal involvement by the obligor, then such performance
should be regarded as impossible233 and that specific performance should only be
ordered in circumstances where no personal intervention from the obligor is
necessary:234
231 Nationwide Airlines (Pty) Ltd v Roediger 2008 (1) SA 293 (W).
232 See Grose Construction Law in the United Arab Emirates and the Gulf 202.
233 This suggestion places more emphasis on this ground than under South African law where the
personal intervention of the obligor is to be merely be considered as one of the factors when a
court exercises discretion on whether to make an order for specific performance or not.
234 Grose Construction Law in the United Arab Emirates and the Gulf 202. Limited protection is
then provided to the aggrieved party by Article 381 (1) of the Civil Code which states that “if the
subject matter of the right is an act which, by its nature or by virtue of a contractual provision,
the obligor must perform personally, the obligee may reject performance thereof by another
person.”  However, this only protects the aggrieved party in instances where performance is so
personal that it is required that the obligor himself performs but instead a third tenders
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“Specific performance is regarded as impossible if executing the same requires
the personal involvement of the obligor who is not willing to interfere. However,
in respect of obligations such as transferring a right in rem or any obligations
relating to something in which a judge’s order may be enforced by way of direct
performance of the obligation such as in case of a promise to sell, specific
performance is possible by operation of law or by the court judgment.”
This suggestion places more emphasis on this circumstance than under South
African law where the personal intervention of the defaulting party is merely a factor
taken into account by the court. Nonetheless, it is close to impossible for a court to
compel an individual to personally perform and under both legal systems, an
aggrieved party would arguably be better placed to compel specific performance
through self-help remedies.
Parallels can be drawn between the two systems and it is indicative that whilst
specific performance is most certainly recognised as a principal remedy in both
systems, a certain degree of latitude does exist through legislated grounds or
judicial discretion. An aggrieved party is not guaranteed an award of specific
performance and this will serve as a motivator for an aggrieved party to deploy its
own self-help remedies to encourage specific performance by a defaulting party.
Whatever the means (either through the courts or through its own self-help
mechanisms), it remains to the advantage of the aggrieved party to seek specific
performance from the defaulting party. Primary reasons for this include (amongst
other things) cost, time and efficiency. This makes specific performance a key
remedy for any aggrieved party in a construction contract.  If an aggrieved party is
unable to compel specific performance (either through the courts or through its own
means) from the defaulting party (and even if awarded damages), the aggrieved
party will still be left with a partially completed project. This leads to many
complications and hurdles.
First, the aggrieved party will need to value the works which had been performed to
the date of the breach. This task is not always straightforward, and the aggrieved
party may be forced to appoint an independent valuator to perform this task. The
aggrieved party and the defaulting party may then face further conflict over the true
performance; it does not provide a means for the aggrieved party to compel personal
performance by the obligor.
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value of the partially executed works, which will in turn complicate the quantification
of damages.
In instances of an aggrieved employer, the aggrieved employer will then need to
enter into a new construction contract with a new contractor. However, before doing
so, the aggrieved employer must have absolute certainty over its relationship with
the defaulting party. Should the appointment of a new contractor be made
prematurely (before, for example, termination of the defaulting party’s employment
under the construction contract), the aggrieved employer may be accused of
repudiating the construction contract with the defaulting party as the act of
appointing a new contractor to perform the same scope of works indicates an
intention to no longer be bound by the construction contract. The defaulting party
will then be able to accept the repudiation, cancel the construction contract and
claim damages. Therefore, the aggrieved employer may have to wait a long period
of time before it can proceed to lawfully appoint a new contractor - this means even
more of delay in completing the already delayed works.
Further, the selection and appointment process of a substitute contractor is never
simple – in most instances, it is a protracted and carefully monitored procedure. In
many jurisdictions, it may even be legislated that the full tender process be
repeated.
To further complicate matters, a new contractor will, in all likelihood, be hesitant to
take over and continue work on partially executed works. The substitute contractor
may not accept this risk or may price for this risk in its contract price – it is unlikely
that this will be a small sum! This will in turn complicate and escalate insurance
costs. Complications may also arise in recouping any advance payments made by
the aggrieved employer to the defaulting party at the commencement of the project
if this advanced payment has not yet been recouped in full.
This leads onto the point of defects and who carries the responsibility for their
rectification. The new contractor will be able to price for the rectification of patent
defects in its contract price (which can be claimed as damages from the defaulting
party), but such defects will need to be quantified; this provides further grounds for
dispute. The real problem comes with the discovery of latent defects as such
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defects may only manifest once a period of time has passed. Who would carry the
risk for the potential manifestation of latent defects? Would the new contactor price
for and the aggrieved party pay for possible latent defects?
On most projects and especially on complex projects, the contractor does not
perform all the works itself and in all likelihood would enter into subcontracts with a
myriad of subcontractors (and potentially consultants especially if the project
includes a design element). This raises questions over these relationships; it is likely
that the aggrieved employer would like the subcontractors and design consultants
to continue with work which they have started.
However, can the aggrieved employer deal with such subcontractors directly? It is
unlikely that the subcontractors will be co-operative if they have not been paid to
date by the defaulting contractor. Some subcontracts contain fairly detailed
assignment and novation clauses which oblige subcontractors to enter into direct
contracts with the aggrieved party – others are not so straightforward. If the
subcontract agreement does not contain any assignment or novation provisions, a
subcontractor can refuse to continue the subcontract works or if they agree to
continue with the subcontract works, the bargaining position will be unbalanced and
the subcontractor will be able to close to “name its price” to complete the
subcontract works.
This situation goes further – if the defaulting party is a sub-sub-contractor, the sub-
contractor will not have the luxury of time to carefully select or pursue an order of
specific performance through the courts as the contractor will, in all likelihood, have
the right to levy liquidated damages should the sub-contractor fail to meet the
agreed completion date.
Illustrative of these problems, Oleck235 gives the example of the house boom after
World War II where housing developments bourgeoned. Each “development”
required a number of private building contracts; the majority of which were entered
into by buyers with limited financial resources. Unsurprisingly, the number of
235 Oleck (1952) Fordham Law Review 160.
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disputes surrounding these construction contracts also mushroomed, however the
courts were inclined to make an order for damages. This was very unhelpful as:
“[t]here can be very little doubt that a veteran of World War II, in the years
immediately following the war’s end, had relatively little interest in the remedy
of damages when, for any reason, his builder failed to complete and deliver the
house the veteran needed. He needed a home, not a lawsuit.”236
For many aggrieved parties to a construction contract, the disadvantages of
appointing a new contractor far outweigh the disadvantage of compelling a
disgruntled defaulting party to comply with its obligations under a construction
contract through self-help remedies; in fact, it may prove far more commercially
sensible, cost and time effective to do so.
3 5  Conclusion
Despite specific performance being recognised as the key remedy for breach of
contract in both South Africa and the UAE, an aggrieved party is not guaranteed an
award for specific performance. Under South African law, the courts are afforded a
judicial discretion which gives rise to a large degree of uncertainty and, under UAE
law, specific legislated instances exist which authorise departure from an award of
specific performance.
Therefore, it stands to reason that, together with more certainty of the outcome, it
will be far more efficient for an aggrieved party to compel the defaulting party to
comply with its contractual obligations through self-help remedies.
236 160.
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Chapter 4
Suspension as a Self-Help Remedy
4 1  Introduction
Suspension by a party of its performance under a contract is a temporary remedy
anticipating the resumption of performance237 once the underlying lawful cause of
the suspension, usually a breach of contract by the other party, falls away. In the
majority of construction projects, timeous completion in accordance with
contractually stipulated dates is imperative to avoid a multiplicity of consequences.
Therefore, should an innocent party lawfully suspend, the potential consequences
suffered by the defaulting party may be disastrous.  This compels the defaulting
party to perform its side of the bargain and accordingly encourages compliance with
the agreement.  In a construction contract, suspension may be a key self-help
remedy available to an innocent party to compel performance by a defaulting party.
Whilst suspension may prove to be an effective remedy, it entails risks for the
innocent party who must ensure that it does not suspend its obligations under the
contract without lawful justification. Should an innocent party erroneously suspend
its performance, it may unintentionally find itself in breach of the contract. In certain
jurisdictions, this will entitle the initially defaulting party to cancel the contract and
claim damages.238 An example of this would be where a contractor has suspended
its performance on account of non-payment by the employer. Should it later be
proven that the non-payment was justified, the contractor would have suspended
without cause and may be liable for breach of contract.239
It is also imperative that the consequences of a suspension are addressed in the
237 Grose Construction Law in the United Arab Emirates and the Gulf 175.
238 J Bailey, M Turrini & Kariem Mariey “The Risk of Suspension under Construction Contracts”
(04-01-2017) White & Case https://www.whitecase.com/publications/alert/risks-suspension-
under-construction-contracts#accessed (accessed 07-09-2017) and for example, see the
recent cases quoted - Wesiak v D&R Constructions (Aust) Pty Ltd [2016] NSWCA 353 and
Ipson Renovations Ltd v The Incorporated Owners of Connie Towers [2016] HKCFI 2117.
239 M Curtis “Adjudication” in A Bartlett et al (eds) Emden's Construction Law by Crown Office
Chambers (2011) 24.141. Curtis elaborates on this potential risk in the context of adjudications,
where, for example, an adjudicator has  determined that the non-payment by the employer
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contract. This is to ensure inter alia, that time does not become “at large”,240 that
the innocent party is compensated correctly and adequately for loss incurred as a
result of the suspension and that the contract regulates a resumption of
performance in a satisfactory manner.
This chapter will consider the self-help remedy of suspension, which may be
available to both a contractor and an employer, under South African law, the UAE
Civil Code and under the Red Book, as means to compel specific performance by
a defaulting contractant.
4 2 Suspension under South African Law
4 2 1  The Exceptio Non Adimpleti Contractus
Under South African law, the so-called exceptio non adimpleti contractus
(“exceptio”)241 is an extra-judicial defence which allows a party to lawfully withhold
its performance and in essence “suspend” the contract until the other party has
performed fully or tendered proper performance.242 By withholding its own
performance, a party is accordingly able to secure counter-performance from the
other party.243 This remedy stems from the principle of “reciprocity” which applies
to “reciprocal contracts”, i.e. contracts characterised by  obligations which are
causally related to each other.244
was not justified and a contractor suspends in accordance with this decision, but the decision
is overturned in subsequent arbitration or litigation proceedings so that the non-payment
becomes justified and the suspension unjustified, raising the question whether the suspension
of work was wrongful or justified by virtue of the adjudicator’s binding albeit not final decision.
See also Article 29(1) of the Construction Industry Payment and Adjudication Act 2012, Laws
of Malaysia Act 746 (CIPAA) which specifically provides that should an employer fail to pay in
accordance with an adjudicator’s decision, the contractor has a legislated right to suspend.
240 K Pickavance Construction Law and Management (2007) 407.
defines “time at large” as follows: “The underlying principle is that if the employer himself delays
completion…he loses the right to insist on completion by the agreed date. The rationale is that
he should not be able to insist on timely performance where he himself is responsible for the
default.” Therefore, to avoid this, it is essential that in an instance where default by the employer
is the cause of the suspension, a mechanism exists which entitles the contractor an extension
of the time for completion.
241 Known in the French as exception d’inexecution – Grose Construction Law in the United Arab
Emirates and the Gulf 175.
242 According to Nienaber “Construction Contracts” LAWSA 9 para 76 the defence “is
 essentially a dilatory one designed to compel counter performance” cf Van Huyssteen et al
Contract: General Principles 376.
243 Van Huyssteen et al Contract: General Principles 374.
244 374.
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Authoritative guidance on the core principles and application of exceptio are found
in the leading case of BK Tooling (Edms) Bpk v Scope Precision Engineering
(Edms) Bpk,245 where five core principles governing this defence were summarised
as follows:
1. If there is no contrary intention by the parties, the principle of reciprocity applies,
by operation of law, to most of the established specific contracts.  In other
bilateral contracts where obligations are created for both parties, it is a question
of interpretation whether the obligations are so closely linked as to render the
principle of reciprocity applicable;246
2. Should the contract contain provisions determining the sequence of
performance, then these will apply;247
3. The exceptio is only available as a defence until performance is actually made
(i.e. the exceptio is a dilatory defence of a temporary nature);248
4. A party’s performance may be withheld until counter performance is fully made
(i.e. the exceptio is an absolute defence).  This ensures its efficacy as a self-
help remedy to compel specific performance);249
5. The onus lies with the plaintiff to prove that it has performed its obligations when
exceptio is raised against it.250
The principle of reciprocity applies where obligations are created in exchange for
one another – i.e. a party will undertake to tender performance only because the
other party undertakes to tender performance in return.251 Reciprocal obligations
245 1979 (1) SA 391 (A).
246 418.
247 418.
248 418.
249 419.
250 419.
251 It must also be noted that the exceptio is subject to the de minimis non curat lex rule. See BK
Tooling (Edms) Bpk v Scope Precision Engineering (Edms) Bpk 1979 (1) SA 391 (A) 420, cf
Nienaber “Construction Contracts” LAWSA 9 para 78.
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are therefore dependent on one another with the consequence, inter alia, that
neither party can enforce performance by the other party unless that party has
already performed properly or is able to and ready to perform.252  Therefore, due to
the interrelationship between these obligations, the innocent party has a right to
withhold its own performance until the other party has performed in full or tendered
to do so - making the exceptio an absolute defence.253 Performance may, however,
only be withheld as long as performance by a plaintiff is outstanding or, if tendered,
it is defective or incomplete. If proper performance is tendered, the basis of this
defence will fall away.254 The exceptio accordingly, is a temporary defence.
Before the exceptio can be relied on by a party, regard must be had to the interplay
between the principle of reciprocity and the sequence of performance under the
contract.255  Under reciprocal contracts, it is a general rule that parties are required
to perform pari passu (simultaneously) unless it is otherwise agreed or the naturalia
of the contract determine a different sequence for performance.256  If a party is
obliged to perform first, it cannot withhold its own performance based on the
suspicion that the other party may not tender timeous or proper performance, even
if reasonable grounds exist to support this suspicion.257
As a manifestation of locatio conductio operis, construction contracts are
recognised as “reciprocal”, “synallagmatic” or “entire contracts”.258 Locatio
conductio operis is also an exception to the general rule that parties are required to
perform simultaneously. The contractor is required to perform first and completely.
Only once the contractor has discharged his obligation to perform and has tendered
proper and complete performance of the works, will it be entitled to legitimately
252 S Eiselen “Remedies for Breach” in D Hutchison & CJ Pretorious (eds) The Law of Contract in
South Africa (2009) 321 330.
253 BK Tooling (Edms) Bpk v Scope Precision Engineering (Edms) Bpk 1979 (1) SA 391 (A) 420.
254 Van Huyssteen et al Contract: General Principles 377.
255 Eiselen “Remedies for Breach” in The Law of Contract in South Africa 315.
256 315.
257 Van Huyssteen et al Contract: General Principles 375.
258 BK Tooling (Edms) Bpk v Scope Precision Engineering (Edms) Bpk 1979 (1) SA 391 (A) 418;
Finsen Building Contract 16.  Finsen makes reference to Wessels & Roberts The Law of
Contract in South Africa para 1612 – “a contract is said to be entire when the complete fulfilment
of the promise by either party is a condition precedent to the right to call for the fulfilment of the
promise by the other”; cf Ramsden Mckenzie’s Law of Building and Engineering Contracts and
Arbitration 221.
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claim performance (in the form of compensation) from the employer for the work
performed.259
Finsen260 confirms a building contract as an example of a reciprocal agreement
which requires performances to be sequential rather than simultaneous in the sense
that:
“…one party performs his  complete obligation  before  the  other  is required
to perform  his  side  of the bargain  - the contractor  builds,  and when the work
is complete,  the employer  is obliged  to pay  for it. ... It therefore follows  that,
unless  the parties  have  agreed  to vary the  common  law, the contractor  has
to perform entirely  before  he becomes  entitled  to payment  by the employer.”
4 2 2  The Contractor’s Right to suspend
4 2 2 1 The Contractor’s Right to Suspend based on the Exceptio
A contractor will not be entitled to payment (interim261 or otherwise) until it has
completed the work in its entirety; a contractor who claims payment before it has
fully completed the works, will find his claim is countered by the exceptio.262 This
was confirmed in the leading case of Thomas Construction (Pty) Ltd (in liquidation)
v Grafton Furniture Manufacturers (Pty) Ltd263 (“Thomas Construction”) where
Nienaber J approved this view with reference to Simmons NO v Bantoesake
Administrasieraad264 where it was held:
“Die kontrak is die bekende locatio conductio operis waarby normaalweg die
vergoeding verskuldig en betaalbaar raak by voltooiing van die werk as dit as
een werkstuk aanbestee is. Voor voltooiing sou die kontrakteur wat vergoeding
eis afgeweer kan word met die exceptio non adimpleti contractus.”
Therefore, in the absence of legislation or a contractual right to suspension, a
259 Thompson v Scholtz 1999 (1) SA 232 (SCA) 18; Nienaber “Construction Contracts” LAWSA 9
para 76; Finsen Building Contract 17.
260 Finsen Building Contract 16.
261 “Interim” and “progress” are used interchangeably in this chapter.
262 Finsen says the employer may respond to a contractor’s request for payment in the following
way: “Regardless what I may eventually be obliged to pay you, I am not obliged to pay you one
cent until you have finished your work.” Finsen Building Contract at 17 See also DC Robertson
When Clients Do Not Pay: A Critical Analysis of the Legal Remedies Available to the South
African Building and Civil Engineering Contractors and Consultants MSc thesis University of
Pretoria (2010) 20.
263 1986 (4) SA 510 (N) 516.
264 1979 (1) SA 940 (T) 946.
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contractor will only be entitled to payment for the works once the works have been
performed properly and completely.265  As a corollary, a contractor is not entitled to
rely on the exceptio in order to suspend performance of the works, on account of
non-payment by the employer.
However, in industry (primarily because of considerations of cash flow)266 it is
unlikely to be viable for a contractor only to receive payment upon the discharge of
all its obligations.267 Therefore, it is common practice to contract out of this
strenuous payment regime of the Common Law through the introduction of interim
payment provisions by means of interim payment certificates.268
Contractual provisions of this kind have become a standard feature in almost all
construction contracts and their function was succinctly explained in Thomas
Construction:269
“…payment only becomes due on completion of the work. But contractors
265 See also C Binnington “Contractors in Suspense about Failure to Make Payment” (19-07-17)
BCA http://www.bca.co.za/article/article-44-contractors-in-suspense-about-failures-to-make-
payment (accessed 15-08-2016).
266 It is highly unlikely and unrealistic to assume that the cash flow of any contractor will be sufficient
to finance the construction of a project from start to finish without any financial compensation
from the employer. This was discussed by Nienaber J in Thomas Construction (Pty) Ltd (in
liquidation) v Grafton Furniture Manufacturers (Pty) Ltd 1988 (2) SA 546 (A) 516. Furthermore,
should a contractor be in the (unlikely) position that it is able to do so, it is imperative that it
obtains a payment guarantee from the employer in case the employer is unable or unwilling to
pay at completion.
267 See also Robertson When Clients Do Not Pay 21.
268 Even though the exact procedure for the issue of an interim payment certificate will invariably
vary between different contracts, it is fairly common practice for the contractor to submit a
valuation of the works to a specific date and, based on this the engineer or employer’s agent
will then prepare and issue an interim payment certificate. The contents of an interim payment
certificate will also vary based on bespoke contractual requirements, but it can usually be
expected that the certificate will reflect (inter alia) the value of the works claimed, the value of
materials both on and off the site, a security adjustment (for example if retention is applicable),
an advance payment deduction (if applicable), any adjustments to the contract price (for
example by way of variation orders etc), penalty deductions and so forth. Once signed and
issued, the amount in the interim payment certificate will, pursuant to an undertaking contained
in the contract by the employer to pay certified amounts, fall due for payment within the
timeframe stipulated in the contract.
269 Thomas Construction (Pty) Ltd (in liquidation) v Grafton Furniture Manufacturers (Pty) Ltd 1986
(4) SA 510 (N) 363. The facts of the case were (briefly) as follows: The Respondent (“the
employer”) had entered into two building and construction contracts (“contracts”) with the
Appellant (“the contractor”). The contractor defaulted on the contracts and went into liquidation.
Accordingly, the employer cancelled these contracts. However, prior to cancellation of the
contracts, a series of interim payment certificates had been issued under the contracts and the
liquidators of the contractor sought payment of these (through provisional sentence against the
employer). The employer relied on a clause in the contract, which said: “until after completion
of the works…no payment shall be made…under this contract”, and refused, on this basis, to
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cannot work without working capital. Hence the expedient of progress
payments, roughly commensurate with the values of work and material on
hand, to enable the contractor to finance the work for which on completion he
would have been paid.”
Therefore, an amount certified in the payment certificate does not represent
payment for a completed portion of the work – such an amount it is purely an
estimate of the value of work done and materials on site to date and can be adjusted
in further certificates to correct earlier errors.270 Accordingly, any contractually
agreed interim payments are merely advances and “prepayments” on the eventual
contract sum.
“If the sum certified is merely an advance on an eventual contract sum, and if
it is subject to adjustment as the work progresses, it follows that the overall
principle remains undisturbed that payment ultimately depends on the delivery
of a finished product of work…The notion of an advance on a contract sum,
while not a loan in the true sense, does presuppose a contract sum that will
eventually become due on the completion of the work…”271
This was confirmed in the Supreme Court of Appeal case of Martin Harris & Seuns
OVS (Edms) Bpk v Qwa Qwa Regeringsdiens; Qwa Qwa Regeringsdiens v Martin
Harris & Seuns OVS (Edms) Bpk272 where Nienaber JA held:273
“The mere completion of a specific subdivision of the work does not entitle the
contractor to payment therefor. Only upon completion of the work as a whole
will the contractor be entitled to payment. In the meantime, the issuing of
progress certificates is merely a contractual mechanism or method to place the
contractor in a position to finance the continuation and completion of his work.
The issuing of a progress certificate by an architect is normally (but depending
on the provisions of the agreement) but not essentially a condition for the
contractor to receive payment before final completion of the work as a whole.
Without that he has no right to payment and any claim could be met with the
make payment. The contractor averred that the interim payment certificates provided it with a
“self sufficient cause of action without need to go beyond the certificates or to rely on contract
under which certificates [were] issued.” The matter later went on appeal - Thomas Construction
(Pty) Ltd (in liquidation) v Grafton Furniture Manufacturers (Pty) Ltd 1988 (2) SA 546 (A).
270 See also Thomas Construction (Pty) Ltd (in liquidation) v Grafton Furniture Manufacturers (Pty)
Ltd 1986 (4) SA 510 (N) 516 “The sum certified is not regarded as compensation for a
completed segment of work. The interim certificate, through the medium of which the progress
payment is effected, represents only an approximate and proportional value of the work done
and materials on site at a specified date…The sum certified is provisional and remains subject
to adjustment and re-adjustment in subsequent certificates…to correct earlier errors and to
allow for more accurate measuring.” This pronouncement was confirmed on appeal in Thomas
Construction (Pty) Ltd (in liquidation) v Grafton Furniture Manufacturers (Pty) Ltd 1988 (2) SA
546 (A) 238. See also Robertson When Clients Do Not Pay 21.
271 Thomas Construction (Pty) Ltd (in liquidation) v Grafton Furniture Manufacturers (Pty) Ltd 1986
(4) SA 510 (N) 365: “The sum certified is not regarded as compensation for a completed
segment of work.” See also Finsen Building Contract 165.
272 2000 (3) SA 339 SCA.
273 Ramsden Mckenzie’s Law of Building and Engineering Contracts and Arbitration 222.
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defence exceptio non adimpleti contractus…Prescription of a claim for payment
of that portion of work which does not appear in any certificate runs at the
earliest from the work as a whole is completed.”
In light of this, the question arises as to the purpose and strength of an interim
payment certificate. Can a contractor bring a claim for payment against an employer
based solely on an interim payment certificate?
Nienaber J, in Thomas Construction held that a payment certificate issued by an
authorised agent creates:
“a debt due and as such a distinct cause of action…The certificate is ostensibly
self-sufficient, and a plaintiff does not have to travel beyond its terms in order
to establish a right of action.”274
Further, it was held that:275
“Provided that it is conceived as a true payment certificate…the amount
certified becomes due and enforceable at the expiry of the stipulated period.
And, since it is only a progress payment, effected while the contract is in the
process of being implemented, and since the certificate is in an apparently self-
contained cause of action, the contractor does not have to allege or prove, as
a precondition for his claim, that he has completed all outstanding work under
the contract…The right which is embodied in the certificate has accrued and is
due and enforceable without regard to the executory part of the contract.”
A contractor can therefore, rely solely on this payment certificate as a cause of
action276  provided the contractor expresses a “willingness and an ability to
complete the remainder of the works.”277
Apart from the possibility of suing on an interim payment certificate should an
274 Thomas Construction (Pty) Ltd (in liquidation) v Grafton Furniture Manufacturers (Pty) Ltd 1986
(4) SA 510 (N) 361, confirmed on appeal in Thomas Construction (Pty) Ltd (in liquidation) v
Grafton Furniture Manufacturers (Pty) Ltd 1988 (2) SA 546 (A) 237 and in SA Builders and
Contractors v Langeler 1952 (3) SA 837 (N) at 842 F-H and Mouton v Smith 1977 (3) SA 1 (A)
at 5 C-G.
275 Thomas Construction (Pty) Ltd (in liquidation) v Grafton Furniture Manufacturers (Pty) Ltd 1986
(4) SA 510 (N) 362.
276 See Lubbe & Murray Farlam & Hathway Contract Cases, Materials and Commentary 734 and
Adams v SA Motor Industry Employers Association 1981 (3) SA 1189 (A). See also Robertson
who says: “Failing payment, the contractor may sue the employer on the strength of the
certificate and the strength of the certificate alone”  - Robertson When Clients Do Not Pay 21
and Thomas Construction (Pty) Ltd (in liquidation) v Grafton Furniture Manufacturers (Pty) Ltd
1986 (4) SA 510 (N) 515 where it was held that: “The building contract, in particular, does not
form part of the plaintiff’s cause of action...”
277 Nienaber “Construction Contracts” LAWSA 9 para 364 “It is therefore fair to say that payment
in an interim certificate is counter-balanced not only by the work that the contractor has done
and on which the amount certified is broadly based, but also by his willingness and ability to
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employer fail to timeously pay the certified amount; the question arises whether a
contractor is in such a case entitled (absent any contractual rights) to suspend the
works in order to exact payment.278
As a starting point, it cannot be alleged that an interim payment serves as payment
for a completed portion of the works.279 The answer to the question is largely
dependent on the legal nature of an arrangement for interim payment certificates
and particularly the fact that interim payments are regarded as “advance payments
on the eventual contract sum”.
As discussed above, proper and complete performance of the works (as a whole)
is reciprocal to payment of the (full) contract sum. As an interim payment is merely
an advance on the final sum, the requirements for the exercise of exceptio are
arguably not met in the postulated case.
Firstly, it would seem that the interposition of an interim certificate does not disturb
the sequence of performance under the contract.  Performance under the contract
by the employer (namely its obligation to pay the full contract sum), will only become
due (and payable) once the contractor has discharged its reciprocal obligation –
namely delivery of the works in a proper and complete form.280
Secondly, the employer’s obligation under the certificate to make an interim
payment is in any event arguably not reciprocal to the completion of the whole of
the works by the contractor; the reciprocity of obligations lies in entire performance
of the works and payment of the contract price in full. The contractor’s undertaking
complete the remainder of the works…Such willingness and ability may not be a formal
precondition for payment which has to be alleged and proved by the contractor as part of his
cause of action founded on an interim certificate…”
278 Under UK Law, such a right does not exist and Curtis “Payment” in Emden's Construction Law
by Crown Office Chambers 145 says: “At common law, where the employer fails to make
payment in full and on time, the contractor has no right to suspend work. The contractor may
either proceed with the work or, where appropriate, terminate the contract. The immediate
course of suspending work until payment is made is only available (1) where there is express
provision in the contract to that effect, or (2) where the unpaid party is entitled to rely on the
statutory right of suspension introduced by HGCRA.” This was confirmed in Lubenham
Fidelities & Investment Co Ltd v South Pembrokeshire District Council & Anor (1986) 33 BLR
39; Channel Tunnel v Balfour Beatty (1992) QB 656.
279 See n270 above.
280 Cf Valasek v Consolidated Frame Cotton Corporation Ltd 1983 (1) SA 694 (N) 698.
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to complete the works was not given in exchange for the employer’s undertaking to
pay the amount specified in an interim certificate.
It therefore cannot be said that the contractor’s right to be paid under an interim
payment certificate is reciprocal to its obligation to tender complete and proper
performance of the works. The requirements for exceptio are accordingly not
satisfied and, a contractor does not have the remedial right (in the absence of
contractual or legislated provisions) to suspend its obligation to perform the
remainder of the works premised on non-payment of an interim payment certificate
by the employer.
Should a contractor suspend progress of the works premised on the non-payment
of an interim payment certificate, it is likely that the employer might allege that the
contractor has repudiated the contract,281 and may proceed to cancel the contract
and claim damages from the contractor. Subject to the development discussed
under the following section, a contractor is therefore well advised to rely instead on
other remedies (such as instituting a claim in the courts)282 in instances where an
employer fails to pay an interim payment certificate.
4 2 2 2 The Contractor’s Right to Suspend based on the Construction
Industry Development Regulations
The newly proposed amendments to the Construction Industry Development Board
Regulations283 (“CIDB Regulations”) create a statutory right for the lawful
suspension of the performance of works by the contractor should the employer fail
281 It is common for construction contracts to require the Contractor to execute the works with due
diligence – by suspending the performance of the works without justification, it is arguable that
the contractor is also in breach of this particular contractual duty.
282 As an interim payment certificate is regarded as a liquid document, a court order can be
obtained by way of a provisional sentence summons based on the strength of the certificate
alone. Finsen Building Contract 171.
283 Department of Public Works, Amendment of Regulations Issued in Terms of the Construction
Industry Development Board Act, 2000 (Act No. 38 of 2000) – published in Government Gazette
number 38822, Notice 482 of 29 May 2015. For similar measures elsewhere, see: United
Kingdom: Local Democratic Economic Development and Construction Act 2009 (LDEDCA),
which, at Part 8, amends the Housing Grants Construction and Regeneration Act at Section
112 (the CIDB Regulations are very closely worded on the unamended version of Section 112
of the Housing Grants Construction and Regeneration Act), Malaysia: CIPAA at Section 29,
Australia: Building and Construction Industry (Security of Payments) Act 2009 at Division 4.3,
Section 29 and New Zealand: Construction Contracts Act 2002 at Section 24(A).
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to make a timeous progress payment.284
Article 26F says:
“(1) Where payment due under a contract is not paid in full by the date for
payment and no effective notice to withhold payment has been given, the
person to whom the payment is due has the right without prejudice to any
other right or remedy) to suspend performance of his or her obligations
under that contract.
(2) The right to suspend performance may not be exercised without first giving
the party in default at least seven days’ notice of intention to suspend
performance, stating the ground or grounds on which it is intended to
suspend performance.
(3)  The right to suspend performance ceases when the party in default makes
payment in full of the amount referred to in the notice in terms of sub
regulation (2).
(4)  Any period during which performance is suspended in pursuance of the
right conferred by this regulation is disregarded in computing any
contractual time limit, or the time taken, by the party exercising the right or
by a third party, to complete any work directly or indirectly affected by the
exercise of the right.”
Sub-Regulation 26F(1) amends the position under the Common Law and effectively
creates a statutory right for suspension by a contractor provided that:
1. Payment due under a contract is not paid in full by the date for payment and;
2. No effective notice to withhold payment285 has been given by the employer.
A contractor will therefore be entitled to a statutory right to suspend the progress of
284 Known colloquially as “Prompt Payment” regulations.
285 See Article 26E regarding a “Notice of intention to withhold payment” which says the following:
“(1)  A party to a contract may not withhold payment or part of that payment, unless he or
she has given an effective notice of intention to withhold that payment, or part of that
payment.
(2) A party to contract may not withhold payment in terms of that contract unless there is
a reasonable ground in terms of the contract on which that withholding of payment is
justified.
(3) The notice referred to in subregulation (1) is considered to be a notice of intention to
withhold payment if it complies with the provisions of this Regulation.
(4) To be effective, such a notice must
(a) specify the amount proposed to be withheld and the ground for withholding
payment; or
(b) if there is more than one ground, specify each ground and the amount
attributable to that ground;
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the works founded on failure by an employer to pay an interim payment.
Sub-Regulation 26F(2) provides the procedure, imperative to be followed before a
contractor may lawfully suspend the works and requires that the contractor gives
seven days’ notice to the party in default of its intention to suspend the performance.
This Article also stipulates that the notice is to include the ground(s) upon which the
suspension is based. Failure to comply with Sub-Regulation 26F(2) will arguably
result in any suspension being regarded as unjustified - constituting a breach by the
contractor. Furthermore should the cause of the suspension fall away, the right to
suspend will fall away (Sub-Regulation 26F(3)) obliging the contractor to resume
performance of the works286 in order to avoid breaching the contract.
Sub-Regulation 26F(4) looks to deal with the consequences stemming from the
suspension and appears to provide that such suspension will place a moratorium
on the running of the time for completion by stipulating that “any period during which
performance is suspended in pursuance of the right is [to be] disregarded [when]
computing any contractual time limit.” This is an attempt to simulate an extension
(c) be given in accordance with Regulation 261; and
(d) be given within five days from the date of receipt of the invoice or tax invoice.
(5) If the contractor, service provider or supplier is not satisfied with the reasons provided
by the client or employer for withholding payment, or where the contractor, service
provider or supplier is of the opinion that the client or employer has not complied with
these Regulations, that contractor, service provider or supplier must declare a dispute
in terms of the contract and must refer that dispute for adjudication.
(6) Where a dispute is referred to an adjudicator, a client or employer may not withhold
payment
(a) where a dispute relates to a technical or legal matter, for the part of the works,
deliverables or goods that is not in dispute, even though the works,
deliverables or goods form part of a unit within a works schedule;
(b) where the dispute relates to the invoice or tax invoice, for the part of the invoice
that is not in dispute.
(7) Where an adjudicator decides that an amount must be paid in part or in full, that amount
must be so paid within ten days of the decision of the adjudicator.
286 Depending on the nature and length of the suspension, a contractor may have demobilised,
removed resources etc and accordingly may not be able to resume work immediately should
the cause of the suspension fall away. In all likelihood a contractor will require time to
remobilise. It is questionable therefore whether a contractor will immediately fall into default as
the cause of suspension falls away – a contractor should be entitled to a reasonable time to
remobilise and restart the execution of the works. See in contrast the CIPAA, which makes
provision for the resumption of works. Article 29(4) of the CIPAA says: “[The contractor] shall
resume performance or the rate of progress of performance of the construction work or
construction consultancy services under a construction contract in accordance with the contract
within ten working days after having been paid the adjudicated amount or an amount as may
be determined by arbitration or the court pursuant to subsection 37(1).”
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
69
of time entitlement and the benefits ensuing from such an extension of time.
This Sub-Regulation will absolve a contractor from the imposition of any contractual
penalties but is inadequate to effectively deal with the remaining consequences of
a suspension. For example, there is no mention of the entitlement to the costs of
the suspension; presumably such costs will be for the employer as its non-payment
is the cause of the suspension, but the Regulations do not clearly provide for this.
It is also not clear how will such costs be computed, whether the contractor will be
entitled to profit and whether the potential costs for demobilisation and re-
mobilisation are to be taken into account.287
The introduction of “prompt payment” regulations would most certainly be a positive
and progressive step in the industry, providing much needed support and protection
to smaller contractors, suppliers and service providers. Whilst the Regulations could
benefit from more detail, especially regarding the inevitable consequences of
suspension, their introduction would be a welcome improvement of the current
position.
4 2 3 The Employer’s Right to Suspend Payment to the Contractor
4 2 3 1 The Employer’s Right to Suspend Payment based on the Exceptio
As indicated above, the employer’s obligation to pay for the works, is reciprocal to
the contractor’s obligation to tender complete and properly executed works. The
sequence of performance under the contract of locatio conductio operis requires
that the contractor first tenders complete and proper performance before the
employer is obliged to perform. Therefore, should the contractor fail to perform at
all or tender what amounts to a malperformance (for example by delivering works
287 See for example Article 29(4) of the CIPAA which makes some provision for the consequences
of such suspension. Article 29(4) says: “The party who exercises his right under subsection (3)
- Is not in breach of contract;
- Is entitled to a fair and reasonable extension of time to complete his obligations
under the contract;
- Is entitled to recover any loss and expenses incurred as a result of the suspension
or reduction in the rate of progress of performance from the other party…”
See also LDEDCA – the LDEDCA has amended Section 112 of the HGCRA providing a
contractor with an entitlement to costs for the period of suspension. See Section 112(3A).
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not in accordance with contract specifications),288 the employer is afforded the right
to withhold or suspend performance of its obligations (namely the obligation to pay),
by relying on the exceptio until such time as full performance is made. The absolute
nature of the exceptio serves as the basis of the right to suspend which in turn,
serves to compel specific performance by a malperforming contractor who is before
the court as a plaintiff.289
In view of the fact that the exceptio is a temporary defence, an employer who
decides to withhold payment must (provided it is possible), afford the contractor an
opportunity to remedy or complete the defective or incomplete performance.290
An employer’s right to suspend based on exceptio is far reaching, with a negative
and often unfair impact on a defaulting contractor. In the typical case, the defective
work will by accessio, adhere to the immovable property of the employer, thus
resulting in the latter being enriched at the expense of the contractor.  The position
becomes even more problematic where the employer, although rightfully refusing
to make payment, is nevertheless using the defective or partially completed
works.291
In such instances, considerations of fairness require that the contractor who has
tendered incomplete or defective performance needs to be protected against the
harsh operation of the principle of reciprocity. The notion that the absolute nature
of exceptio (which precludes a contractual claim for counter performance by the
malperforming contractor) is in need of relaxation has elicited much controversy
288 Nienaber “Construction Contracts” LAWSA 9 para 77.
289 Van Huyssteen et al Contract: General Principles 376 say that the employer’s right to withhold
payment under a locatio conductio operis fulfils the same function as the right to withhold
retention money.
290 It is imperative that the contractor is afforded this right because if the locatio conductio operis
is upheld and the defective performance is rectified by the employer at the cost of the contractor
(without providing the contractor with an opportunity to rectify the defective performance), the
employer may find itself in breach of contract because it prevented contractor from discharging
its contractual obligations. See Van Huyssteen et al Contract: General Principles 377.
291 Finsen says “defects frequently occur in buildings, which may be unsightly, but which do not
really affect the utility of the building, and the cost of rectifying them may be out of proportion to
the small benefit to be gained from their correction. Architects and quantity surveyors dealing
with such situations have long been accustomed to negotiating an acceptable price reduction
to compensate an owner who has little choice but to accept such defects.” Finsen Building
Contract 14.
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and debate as to how this is to be achieved.292
4 2 3 1 1  Relaxation of the Reciprocity Principle and the Contractor’s Right
to Claim a Reduced Contract Sum
In a trilogy of cases namely Hauman v Nortje,293 Breslin v Hichens294  and Van
Rensburg v Straughan295 Innes JA, De Villiers CJ and Maasdorp JA attempted to
address the inequitable operation of the principle of reciprocity.
All the judgments in the trilogy accepted that a malperforming contractor was
disallowed from bringing a contractual claim due to the absolute nature of the
exceptio but that equitable considerations favoured a relaxation of the principle of
reciprocity so as to permit a claim for compensation notwithstanding an incomplete
performance by a contractor in appropriate circumstances.296 Because of the
complexity of the judgments, a reliance in them on a passage by Voet 19.2.40,
came to be taken to mean that the trilogy held that, although a contractual claim
was barred by the exceptio, a malperforming contractor was not without recourse
and would be entitled to an enrichment claim for a so-called quantum meruit.297
This understanding of the trilogy attracted severe criticism in academic and even
judicial circles,298 and resulted in the so-called doctrine of substantial performance
being put forward as a doctrinally acceptable solution.299  This was to the effect that
an employer would only be entitled to withhold payment if it was entitled to and did
292 Lubbe & Murray Farlam and Hathaway: Contract: Cases, Materials and Commentary 570.
293 1914 AD 293.
294 1914 AD 312.
295 1914 AD 317.
296 BK Tooling (Edms) Bpk v Scope Precision Engineering (Edms) Bpk 1979 (1) SA 391 (A) 420-
421.
297 Lubbe, Murray, Farlam & Hathway Contract Cases, Materials and Commentary 570. See also
Nienaber “Construction Contracts” LAWSA 9 para 79 where it was said: “In earlier times it was
thought, no doubt because it was it was prompted by equitable considerations to be an
enrichment claim”.
298 See BK Tooling (Edms) Bpk v Scope Precision Engineering (Edms) Bpk 1979 (1) SA 391 (A)
415 for an overview.
299 See the discussion in BK Tooling (Edms) Bpk v Scope Precision Engineering (Edms) Bpk 1979
(1) SA 391 (A) 428-431 where reference was made to JC de Wet "Die Sogenaamde Exceptio
non Adimpleti Contractus in die Praktyk van Vandag" (1945) THRHR 239 239; JC de Wet & AH
van Wyk Die Suid-Afrikaanse Kontraktreg en Handelsreg 4th ed (1978) 180 - 181; W de Vos
Verrykingsaanspreeklikheid in die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg 3rd ed (1987) 278-279; HJ Chanock
"The Doctrine of Substantial Performance" (1935) SA Law Times 162 162.
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actually reject the contractor’s defective performance.300  However, an employer’s
entitlement to reject performance tendered by the contractor only existed if the
performance tendered by the contractor was wholly inadequate and “if the breach
is such that the contract cannot be said to have been performed substantially”.301
Therefore, if substantial performance had taken place, the employer could not rely
on the exceptio to withhold performance but instead would be entitled to bring a
counterclaim for damages resultant from breach of contract - which claim would be
set off against the contractor’s claim for payment.302
In a progressive and ground-breaking judgment in BK Tooling (Edms) Bpk v Scope
Precision Engineering (Edms) Bpk,303 Jansen JA rejected the view that the
judgments in the trilogy advocated a common solution and pointed out that the
circumstances addressed in these cases were in fact dissimilar in nature.304
Based on his re-evaluation of the trilogy, Jansen JA insisted on a distinction being
made between instances where a contract is cancelled on account of a breach by
a contractor and those in which it is maintained. Enrichment liability, it was held, is
only appropriate in instances where the contract is cancelled.305
The approach in instances where a valid contract still exists despite the breach of
the contractor were dealt with in the judgments of Innes JA and De Villiers CJ in the
trilogy.306  Both of them favoured a relaxation of the principle of reciprocity so as to
allow the contractor to bring a contractual claim, albeit for a reduced amount to
accommodate the costs required to remedy the defective performance.307  This
300 Van Huyssteen et al Contract: General Principles 377.
301 Lubbe & Murray Farlam and Hathaway: Contract: Cases, Materials and Commentary 571.
302 Van Huyssteen et al Contract: General Principles 377. See also BK Tooling (Edms) Bpk v
Scope Precision Engineering (Edms) Bpk 1979 (1) SA 391 (A) 427 where Jansen JA referred
to Chesire & Fifoot Law of Contract, 9th edition at 561 where it was stated: “The present rule is
that ‘so long as there is substantial performance, the contractor is entitled to the stipulated price,
subject only to cross-action or counter-claim for the omissions or defects in execution.’”
303 1979 (1) SA 391 (A).
304 BK Tooling (Edms) Bpk v Scope Precision Engineering (Edms) Bpk 1979 (1) SA 391.
(A) 421; Lubbe & Murray, Farlam & Hathway Contract Cases, Materials and Commentary 570.
305 BK Tooling (Edms) Bpk v Scope Precision Engineering (Edms) Bpk 1979 (1) SA 391 (A) 424,
436. This was held to be the view held Maasdorp JA in Van Rensburg v Straughan 1914 AD
317; cf Lubbe & Murray, Farlam & Hathway Contract Cases, Materials and Commentary 570.
306 See Hauman v Nortje 1914 AD 293 296 and Breslin v Hichens 1914 AD 312 314 (De Villiers
CJ) and Hauman v Nortje 1914 AD 293 304-305 (Innes JA).
307 BK Tooling (Edms) Bpk v Scope Precision Engineering (Edms) Bpk 1979 (1) SA 391 (A) 422.
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meant, according to Jansen JA, that it would be more appropriate to describe the
claim by the contractor for payment as a claim for a “reduced contract price” and
not a claim for “quantum meruit” and to avoid “the language of liability for unjust
enrichment in respect of such a claim.”308
After a review of the differences between the approach of these judges, Jansen JA
ultimately accepted the approach of Innes JA as affording a more supple approach
best suited to give effect to the equitable considerations underlying the relaxation
of the principle of reciprocity in these cases.309  The preferred view is that a judicial
discretion to either relax or maintain the principle of reciprocity is activated310 as
soon as there is utilization by the employer of the defective performance.311
Provided that circumstances are established  which make it fair that the court
exercises its discretion in favour of the contractor,312 and the court does so, a
308 BK Tooling (Edms) Bpk v Scope Precision Engineering (Edms) Bpk 1979 (1) SA 391 (A) 423;
Ramsden Mckenzie’s Law of Building and Engineering Contracts and Arbitration 224.
309 BK Tooling (Edms) Bpk v Scope Precision Engineering (Edms) Bpk 1979 (1) SA 391 (A) 427.
 According to De Villiers CJ, a claim for a reduced contract price was invariably, without any
judicial discretion in the matter, available where the defective performance by the contractor
was being utilised by the employer to its advantage, and where the contractor genuinely
believed it had performed its obligations and had accordingly instituted its action in good faith,
(BK Tooling (Edms) Bpk v Scope Precision Engineering  (Edms) Bpk 1979 (1) SA 391 (A)
421).
310 See Hauman v Nortje 1914 AD 293 304 on Innes JA’s discretionary approach and the
discussion thereof in BK Tooling (Edms) Bpk v Scope Precision Engineering (Edms) Bpk 1979
(1) SA 391 (A) 421-422, 426 and 434-435.
311  It must therefore be established that the employer is utilising the defective or incomplete
performance to its own advantage. Retention of the performance or enrichment through
accessio (for example if the employer cannot help taking the benefit) would not be
sufficient to prove utilisation of the performance and see also BK Tooling (Edms) Bpk v
Scope Precision Engineering (Edms) Bpk 1979 (1) SA 391 (A) 422; Ramsden Mckenzie’s Law
of Building and Engineering Contracts and Arbitration 225; Van Huyssteen et al Contract:
General Principles 379.  The possibility of allowing a discretionary approach in cases where
the agreement is not cancelled, and the employer does utilise the defective performance,  was
left open in BK Tooling (Edms) Bpk v Scope Precision Engineering (Edms) Bpk 1979 (1)  SA
391 (A) at 436.
312 The seriousness or otherwise of the incomplete or defective performance and a bona fide belief
by the contractor at the time of handing over the works that it has tendered complete work
(Ramsden Mckenzie’s Law of Building and Engineering Contracts and Arbitration 225), while
relevant to the exercise of the discretion are not decisive of the matter. All relevant
circumstances, such as a willingness to remedy the defective work (Van  Huyssteen et al
Contract: General Principles 379; Kam v Udwin 1940 WLD 137) and conceivably also
considerations relevant to the exercise of a judicial discretion regarding an award for specific
performance, are also applicable to the exercise of judicial discretion in the context of a reduced
contract price.  The courts tend to exercise the equitable discretion in favour of the contractor
provided the employer will not be in a  worse off position than if the contract had been
completed and completed properly. Ramsden Mckenzie’s Law of Building and Engineering
Contracts and Arbitration 225.
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contractor is entitled to a claim for a reduced contract price.313 However, should a
court exercise its discretion against the contractor, the defence of exceptio would
stand and a contractor would have to cure its defective performance, i.e. perform
specifically, before being entitled to payment of the contract price.314
Although an employer has the right to suspend in instances where the contractor
tenders incomplete or defective performance, this entitlement is not without
qualification and is not an absolute remedy. The contractor may, in certain
circumstances, have the right to claim a reduced contract price should the contract
still stand.  It was confirmed in BK Tooling that a claim for a reduced contract price
has its origins in contract and not in unjustified enrichment. This is despite the fact
the parties have not contractually agreed that in an instance of defective
performance, the contractor is entitled to supplement its performance with
money.315 In such an instance, the employer “in effect would have received his full
contractual due, partly specie, partly in money, and consequently becomes liable in
return to perform his side of the bargain”.316
Of course, where the discretion is exercised against the contractor, the reliance on
the exceptio means that the contractor will have to perform specifically in order to
obtain the contract price.  A contractor may in any event not want to rely on the right
to a reduced contract price and will accordingly remedy or complete any outstanding
works - affecting specific performance, in order to be entitled to a claim for the full
contract sum. The explicit linking of the exceptio to the remedy of specific
313 The reduced contract price is generally calculated by deducting from the contract price the costs
required to bring the defective performance in line with the contract specifications See BK
Tooling (Edms) Bpk v Scope Precision Engineering (Edms) Bpk 1979 (1) SA 391 (A) 423 and
434-435; Ramsden Mckenzie’s Law of Building and Engineering Contracts and Arbitration 224;
Finsen Building Contract 14. The reduced contract price measure is inappropriate where the
defective performance cannot be rectified or completed.  See Thompson v Scholtz 1999 (1) SA
232 (SCA) on the approach in such instances. Should it not be possible to complete the works
in line with the contract specifications in the construction context, it is common for a court to
determine the reduced contract price by assessing the proportion of work that was completed
and applying that proportion to the contract price – see Ramsden Mckenzie’s Law of Building
and Engineering Contracts and Arbitration 226.
314 Lubbe & Murray, Farlam & Hathway Contract Cases, Materials and Commentary 571.
315 Van Huyssteen et al Contract: General Principles 379.
316 Thompson v Scholtz 1999 (1) SA 232 (SCA) 16.
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performance in BK Tooling317 therefore makes it into an effective self-help
mechanism to compel compliance with a contract by a defaulting contractor.
4 3  Suspension under UAE Law
UAE law does not directly address the right of a party to suspend its obligations. A
party to a construction contract does not have an express and clear right to suspend
and the Articles of the Civil Code governing muqawala do not contain specific
provisions for the suspension of obligations in the context of a construction contract.
Should no specific contractual provision exist in the construction contract, allowing
for example, a contractor to stop performing the work or, in the instance of an
employer, a right to refuse to make payment, the parties are in principle obliged to
comply with what they have contractually undertaken to do and the doctrine of pacta
sunt servanda will be given due regard by a court.318
However, exceptions to the above principle do exist and certain provisions in the
Civil Code may, subject to certain requirements, allow a contractant to refuse to
perform its own obligations, should the other party fail to perform its own
obligations319 - closely resembling a right to suspend. These provisions are of
general application320 and not specifically intended to be used only in the context of
construction contracts.321
317 This is also apparent from the rejection in BK Tooling (Edms) Bpk v Scope Precision
Engineering (Edms) Bpk 1979 (1) SA 391 (A) 434 of the doctrine of substantial performance
as contrary to the approach of our law regarding specific performance.
318 Abu Dhabi Court of Cassation 725/2010 dated 4 November 2010.
319 D Baiter “Time to Terminate” (20-06-2009) Construction Week Online
http://www.constructionweekonline.com/article-5589-time-to-terminate/ (accessed 28-08-
2017).
320 E Teo “Highlights of the Laws of the United Arab Emirates, the People’s Republic of China” (09-
2011) Al Tamimi Law Update http://www.tamimi.com/en/magazine/law-update/section-
7/august-september1/highlights-of-the-laws-of-the-united-arab-emirates-the-peoples-republic-
of-china-and-the-common-law.html (accessed 12-09-2017).
321 In particular, the law does not deal with the consequences of such “suspension”. It is, for
example, unlikely a contractor would be entitled to an extension of time and consequent costs
for the period of suspension when relying on Article 247. The contractor’s remedy would
therefore need to lie in a claim for damages for breach of contract. It is also unlikely, taking into
account the legislated principle of good faith, that the employer would be entitled to levy
liquidated damages for delays attributable to the suspension. See E Teo “Highlights of the Laws
of the United Arab Emirates, the People’s Republic of China” Al Tamimi Law Update.  It is also
highly unlikely that a prolonged suspension would (unlike under the FIDIC approach as
discussed below) result in the creation of a valid termination ground as the  Civil Code in Article
892 is very clear that a muqawala may only be terminated in three particular instances
(completion of the works, consensual cancellation and by court order) - see A MacCuish & N
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The relevant Articles of the Civil Code are Article 247322 and (to a lesser extent),
Article 414.323 Article 247324 says:
“In contracts binding upon both parties, if the mutual obligations are due for
performance, each of the parties may refuse to perform his obligation if the
other contracting party does not perform that which he is obliged to do.”
Article 414 of the Civil Code goes on to amplify Article 247:
“Any person who is obliged to perform a thing may refrain from doing so long
as the obligor has not discharged an obligation of his arising by reason of an
obligation of the obligee and connected with it.”
Article 247 empowers an innocent party to withhold and refuse to perform its own
reciprocal obligations should the other party default by failing to perform what it has
contractually undertaken to do.325
The UAE Civil Code and Ministry of Justice Commentary says:
“Thus, each of the two contracting parties has the right to withhold performance
of that which he is obliged to do until he is given that which he is entitled to,
and by relying on that right or defence he is doing no more than to suspend the
Newdigate “United Arab Emirates: Suspension Under the UAE Civil Code, FIDIC, and the
Roman law Maxim of Exceptio Non Adimpleti Contractus (ENAC*)” (15-12-2015)
http://www.mondaq.com/x/451986/Contract+Law/This+is+the+first+of+two+articles+which+lo
ok+at+various+selfhelp+remedies+available+for+the+unpaid+contractor Mondaq (Accessed
12-09-2017). See also Abu Dhabi Court of Cassation 647/2008 dated 26 February 2009 where
the court held: “…the contract shall not be deemed automatically cancelled in case of non-
performance of the obligations arising out of it unless the parties thereto expressly agreed to
that cancellation” and Abu Dhabi Court of Cassation 647 dated 28 February 2009 where the
court confirmed its earlier decision by stating “The rights of the withholding party in such a case
are restricted to a suspension of performance of the obligation and not a rescission of the
contract. The effect of Articles 271 and 274 of the Civil Code is that a contract will not be
deemed to be rescinded automatically through non-performance of the obligations arising out
of it, unless the parties have expressly so agreed.” See also Eltom The Emirates Law in Practice
29.
322 A provision almost identical to Article 247 can be found in the civil codes of Bahrain (Article
150), Kuwait (Article 219), Oman (Article 157) and Qatar (Article 191) – Grose Construction
Law in the United Arab Emirates and the Gulf 176.
323 E Teo “Highlights of the Laws of the United Arab Emirates, the People’s Republic of China” Al
Tamimi Law Update.
324 Note that Article 247 is not a mandatory provision and parties can waive or exclude the right to
suspend by agreement – See Grose Construction Law in the United Arab Emirates and the Gulf
177.
325 See Dubai Court of Cassation 6/2009 dated 22 March 2009 and Dubai Court of Cassation
111/2007 dated 1 October 2007 where it was held: “The effect of the provisions of Article 247
of the Civil Code is that in contracts binding on both sides, the performance of mutual obligations
is interlinked in the sense of a mutual exchange, and either of the contracting parties may
withhold performance of his obligation if the other contracting party has not performed his
counter obligation that is connected with it.”
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operation of the contract.”326
This refusal to perform is done with the intention of coaxing the other party into
performing its obligations under the contract; the remedy under Article 247 acts as
a means to compel specific performance by a defaulting party. This was confirmed
by the court in Abu Dhabi Court of Cassation 725 of 2010 where the court held that:
“Abstaining from the execution of the contract does not have a penal character,
but it is preventative procedure intended to guarantee the continuity of the time
contemporariness between the reciprocal obligations, which has been termed
the “exceptio non adimpleti contractus”, which is merely the right to distrain in
the scope of mutually binding contracts.”
Prior to invoking suspension under Article 247, it is essential that the innocent party
is actually entitled to rely on and make use of this provision. Should a party rely on
this article erroneously and in turn refuse to perform its own obligations under the
construction contract, it is arguable that that party is in breach of the construction
contract by failing, without any legal basis in law or otherwise, to timeously perform
its obligations as undertaken. The defaulting party could then seek to terminate the
contract for this breach.327
Because the basis for reliance on Article 247 is completely within the discretion of
the court, an innocent party should not rely lightly on Article 247:
“Under article 247 of the Civil Code, a contracting party may not refuse to
perform his contractual obligation without justification. The determination of the
question which of the two contracting parties has fallen short in the
performance of his obligation, or the negation of such shortcoming, and the
finding whether there is justification, are all matters of fact within the discretion
of the trial court.”328
A contractant wishing to rely on Article 247 should therefore endeavour to adhere
to the guiding principles or “requirements” contained in Article 247 to ensure that
the court exercises its discretion in its favour.
It is firstly clear that in order for Article 247 (as read with Article 414) to be applicable,
326 Whelan UAE Civil Code and Ministry of Justice Commentary 2:0269.
327 D Brand “Suspension of Works” (12-03-2009).
http://www.arabianbusiness.com/suspension-of-works-79255.html (accessed 03-09-2017).
328 Abu Dhabi Court of Cassation 34/Judicial Year 1 142-JY-1 and confirmed in in Abu Dhabi Court
of Cassation 1394/2009 28 February 2010. See also Grose Construction Law in the United
Arab Emirates and the Gulf 176.
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the obligations need to be mutual;329 it was held in Dubai Court of Cassation
25/2007 that:
“The essential matter in the regime of the right of withholding is that there must
be a connection between the two obligations.”
and in Abu Dhabi Court of Cassation 647 28 February 2009 that:
“It is also settled law that the provisions of article 247 of the Civil Code provide
that if one of the contracting parties has not performed his obligation, the other
party may withhold performance of his obligation…provided that the obligation
of each party is a counter obligation of the obligation of the other.”
Ultimately, the decision of whether obligations are mutual or not will lie within the
sole discretion of the court.330
In addition to the requirement that obligations are mutual, it is also imperative that,
the defaulting party has failed to tender its performance at the agreed time.331 Dubai
Court of Cassation 25/2007 held:
“It is thus open to either of the contracting parties to withhold performance of
his obligation if the other contracting party has not performed his corresponding
obligation connected with it at the agreed time.”
Further, the Official Commentary on the Civil Code on this particular point says:332
“The presumption here is that the mutual obligations are already due and
should be performed by the two parties simultaneously. If the contract obligates
either of the parties to perform his obligation before the other contracting party,
the former should not benefit from this defense, as he is supposed to perform
his part of the obligations before expecting the other party’s performance.”
Pausing here, it is necessary to note the sequence of performance of obligations in
329 Grose asserts that there is a school of thought which suggests that mutuality of obligations is
not the underlying rationale for suspension, instead the intention of the parties is the reason for
the inclusion of the right to suspend in all agreements and that this is reconcilable with Islamic
jurisprudence whereby contractual obligations are regarded as independent. Grose
Construction Law in the United Arab Emirates and the Gulf 176. Grose also makes reference
to Dubai Court of Cassation No. 170/1998 dated 3 January 1998, Dubai Court of Cassation No.
102/2007 dated 19 June 2007, Dubai Court of Cassation 149/2007 dated 7 October 2007 and
‘Remedies for Breach of Contract Under Islamic and Arab Laws’, Nabil Saleh, ALQ, Vol 4, Iss.
4, p283.
330 Grose Construction Law in the United Arab Emirates and the Gulf 176 and Eltom The Emirates
Law in Practice 29. See also Dubai Court of Cassation 124 of 2005 and Dubai Court of
Cassation 160 of 2005.
331 See Abu Dhabi Court of Cassation 725/2010 4 November 2010 where it was held: “neither party
may be obliged to perform its obligations before the other party performs what is due”.
332 Eltom The Emirates Law in Practice 29.
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the context of a muqawala contract. A contractor is only entitled to be paid once it
has fully completed the works. Article 885 of the Civil Code says:
“The employer shall be obliged to pay consideration upon delivery of the
property contracted for unless there is an agreement or a custom to the
contrary.”333
In Dubai Court of Cassation 25/2007, the court gave an example regarding the
timing of payment in the context of a sale and purchase agreement. The court held:
“In a sale, the buyer begins by paying the price, and then the seller delivers the
thing sold. The suspended obligation is the obligation of the seller to deliver the
thing sold, and he withholds it until the price is paid and not vice versa. If the
price is immediately payable, then the seller has the right to withhold the thing
sold pending payment of the price in full. The effect of that is that if parties
agree that payment of the balance of the price shall be at a specified date prior
to delivery of the thing sold to the seller, then the latter will not have the right to
rely on the right of withholding.”
The sequence of performance, as determined by the Civil Code, will therefore have
a fundamental bearing on whether a party will be entitled to rely on the provisions
of Article 247. This is founded on the argument that as the obligation of the employer
to pay the contractor, only falls due once the contractor has completed the works,
a contractor does not have the right to rely on Article 247 and, to accordingly
suspend its obligations.334
However, Article 885 includes two clear exceptions to the provision that the
employer’s obligation to pay the contractor only falls due on delivery of the works.
The first exception relates to in instances where parties have agreed to interim
payment provisions entitling the contractor to partial payments as the works
progress (“unless there is an agreement…to the contrary”).
The second clear exception is custom and “although the muqawala provisions of
the applicable civil codes offer no support for recognising interim payments,
evidence of custom in the construction industry should provide an alternative to
333 For purposes of comparison, see also Bahrain Civil Code Article 599, Kuwait Civil Code Article
676, Oman Civil Code, Article 639, Qatar Civil Code, Article 697.
334 This is a very similar position to that under South African law – the key difference being that
unlike under South African law, an interim payment is not an advance on the final sum.
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delivery as a basis for determining when payment falls due…”.335
In support of the argument that interim payments are customary, Grose336 makes
reference to the UAE Ministerial Decision 20/2000 at Article 88 where it is stated
that in instances of Federal Government projects, “interim payments shall be made
up to a maximum of ninety percent of the contract value.”337
As a result, these exceptions may provide for the creation of mutual338 obligations
which obligations fall due earlier than is anticipated by Article 885. As a result,
should a contractor fail to deliver or progress with a portion of the works timeously
or should the works be defective, the employer will, by virtue of Article 247,339 be
entitled to withhold payment for that particular portion of the works. On the
converse, should the employer fail to make timeous payment of an interim payment,
which has fallen due, the contractor, will be entitled to suspend performance of the
works.
In addition to the core requirements, i.e. that the obligations in question must be
both mutual and, that there must have been a failure by the defaulting party to
tender its performance at the agreed time, it is also imperative that the party wishing
335 Grose Construction Law in the United Arab Emirates and the Gulf 158.
336 158.
337 Grose further substantiates this by drawing reference to Article 64 of Dubai Law No. 6/1997
and Article 54 of the “Procurement, Tenders and Auctions Guidebook issued under Abu Dhabi
Law No.6 of 2008.
338 Within the sole discretion of the courts.
339 Provided that such obligations are regarded as “mutual” by the courts, which is highly likely.
Article 877 of the Civil Code requires that the contractor complete the works in accordance with
the conditions of the contract and should a contractor fail to do so, the employer, in certain
instances, may, terminate the contract. In addition to this right, the employer may also be able
to rely on the provisions of Article 247 and effectively “suspend” payment of the contract price
to the contractor until the contractor has completed the works in accordance with the “agreed
conditions” or rectified the defective work. Article 877 says: “The contractor must complete the
work in accordance with the conditions of the contract. If it appears that he is carrying out what
he has undertaken to do in a defective manner or in breach of the agreed conditions, the
employer may require that the contract be terminated immediately if it is impossible to make
good the work, but if it is possible to make good the work it shall be permissible for the employer
to require the contractor to abide by the conditions of the contract  and to repair the works within
a reasonable period. If such period expires without the reparation being performed, the
employer may apply to the judge for the cancellation of the contract or for leave to himself to
engage another contractor to complete the works at the expense of the first contractor”.
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to rely on Article 247 must be ready and willing to perform its “withheld” obligation.340
Furthermore, whilst it is not required that parties, prior to invoking reliance on Article
247, comply with particular and predetermined formalities contained in the Civil
Code or in practice,341 it is required that the party adheres to the legislated principle
of good faith contained in Article 246(1) of the Civil Code342 which is implied into all
contracts. This makes it essential that the suspension “must be reciprocal and
proportionate response to the default in question”343 making the de minimis
approach applicable; a party cannot withhold its obligations if the other party has
substantially discharged its obligations, leaving only a minor portion of its obligation
unperformed.344 It is also vital, that the party looking to suspend its obligations, to
avoid acting in bad faith, considers and addresses any reasons or potential
justifications as to why the defaulting party has failed to perform its obligations.345
Therefore, it is imperative that the party who wishes to rely on Article 247 to compel
specific performance by its counterpart only does so subject to sound justification,
after considering all associated risks and, by adhering to the guiding principles
340 Grose Construction Law in the United Arab Emirates and the Gulf 176 where reference is also
made to Dubai Court of Cassation No. 170/1998 dated 3 January 1998 and Dubai Court of
Cassation No. 102/2007 dated 19 June 2007.
341 Grose Construction Law in the United Arab Emirates and the Gulf 178 and see also Abu Dhabi
Court of Cassation 647/2008 26 February 2009 where it was held: “This implies that if any
contracting party fails to fulfil his obligation, the other party shall be entitled to refrain from
performing his obligations without warning or contract cancellation judgment…” See also Abu
Dhabi Court of Cassation 647 dated 28 February 2009.
342 Article 246(1) of the Civil Code says: “The contract must be performed in accordance with its
contents, and in a manner consistent with the requirements of good faith.”
343 C Leggett and M Raymont “Getting paid: remedies for non-payment in the UAE construction
industry” (27-04-2015) http://constructionblog.practicallaw.com/getting-paid-remedies-for-non-
payment-in-the-uae-construction-industry/ Practical Law (accessed 03-09-2017). The authors
go on to suggest that a party considering suspension should ask itself two questions: 1. “Does
the employer have legitimate reasons for withholding payment” and 2. But for the breach has
the employer otherwise substantially discharged its payment obligations?” See also A
MacCuish & N Newdigate “United Arab Emirates: Suspension Under the UAE Civil Code,
FIDIC, and the Roman law Maxim of Exceptio Non Adimpleti Contractus (ENAC*)” Mondaq.
344 E Teo “Highlights of the Laws of the United Arab Emirates, the People’s Republic of China”
Al Tamimi Law Update. According to Haydar Ministry of Justice Commentary 2:0269: “It is not
open to him to rely on it in order to withhold performance of his obligation, if the corresponding
obligation has been performed as to a large part thereof, and the part that remains unperformed
is minor to the extent that it does not justify taking such a step”. The same principle applies
under South African law.
345 E Teo “Highlights of the Laws of the United Arab Emirates, the People’s Republic of China” Al
Tamimi Law Update.
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contained in Article 247. However,
“the assessment of whether the obligations are mutual and binding on both
parties, and whether there is justification for a contracting party…[to withhold]
performance of his corresponding obligation, is [ultimately] a matter of fact
within the independent discretion of the trial court”.346
4 4 The Red Book
The Red Book contains express provisions allowing for suspension in clear and
defined instances by both the contractor and the employer and also prescribes the
consequences resulting therefrom.
Suspension under the Red Book is not founded exclusively on the reciprocity of
obligations under the construction contract: whilst an element of reciprocity is
relevant in some instances, the right to suspend goes beyond this basis in other
instances.  Provision is made for and a distinction is drawn between an elective
suspension of the works or a reduction of the rate of work by the contractor on
prescribed grounds and an instruction by the engineer (effectively the employer) to
the contractor to suspend work which in effect suspends the employer’s obligations.
Whereas the grounds for suspension of the contractor’s own performance are
restricted to a numerus clausus of listed instances premised on non-payment, the
grounds for suspension on behalf of the employer are broader and in fact may serve
purposes other than to enforce compliance by the contractor.
4 4 1 Suspension by the Contractor
Clause 16.1 of the Red Book governs suspension by the contractor. The first section
of clause 16.1 defines the grounds upon which a contractor can legitimately base
its suspension and provides the procedure for validly effecting such suspension.
The first section says the following:
“If the Engineer fails to certify in accordance with Sub-Clause 14.6 [Issue of
Interim Payment Certificates] or the Employer fails to comply with Sub-Clause
2.4 [Employer’s Financial Arrangements] or Sub-Clause 14.7 [Payment], the
Contractor may, after giving not less than 21 days’ notice to the Employer,
suspend work (or reduce the rate of work) unless and until the Contractor has
346 Abu Dhabi Court of Cassation 492 25 June 2009. Provided that the trial court basis its decision
on “sound reasons”, sufficient to support its own decision, the court of cassation will not review
the trial court’s decision in this regard.
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
83
received the Payment Certificate, reasonable evidence or payment, as the
case may be and as described in the notice.
If the Contractor subsequently receives such Payment Certificate, evidence or
payment (as described the relevant sub-clause and in the above notice) before
giving a notice of termination, the Contractor shall resume normal working as
soon as is reasonably practicable.”
It is clear that the three grounds347 for suspension by a contractor are failure by the
engineer to certify an interim payment certificate, failure by the employer to comply
with its financial arrangements and the failure by the employer to comply with its
payment obligations.
These grounds are, evidentially, premised on failure by the employer to comply with
its payment related obligations under the Red Book. However, before a contractor
surges ahead and suspends the works it must exercise caution and ensure that “the
allegations on which [it] is basing [its] decision to reduce the rate of work or even
suspend the work are absolutely correct, failing which the employer would be
entitled to terminate [it]self under Sub-Clause 15.2(b) or (c).”348
Furthermore, before the contractor is contractually entitled to suspend the works, it
is required to give the employer 21 days’ notice349 of his intention to do so and to
provide information of the circumstances giving rise to the suspension.350 This is a
pre-requisite to suspension and failure by the contractor to adhere to it may enable
the employer to argue that the suspension by the contractor was “unjustified” and
347 In the 2017 publication of the Red Book, there is a move in this direction and a welcome
improvement is the extension of contractor suspension grounds by also making failure by the
employer to comply with a binding agreement or determination under cl 3.7 or failure to comply
with a decision by the DAAB under cl 20.1.4 suspension grounds (in addition to the payment
grounds included in the 1999 publication).  Furthermore, in order for the grounds to constitute
valid suspension grounds, an additional requirement has been included namely, the employer
failure must constitute a material breach of the employer’s obligations. The advantages of this
additional requirement are questionable, as the definition of “material breach” is often uncertain
in practice, however, it also ensures that the contractor is not entitled to suspend for “trivial”
employer breaches. The new clause also requires that the notice of intention to suspend must
include reference to cl 16.1, thus ensuring the employer is aware that the notice is indeed a
suspension notice.
348 B Barr & L Grutters FIDIC Users’ Guide 3 ed (2006) 238.
349 See cl 1.3 of the Red Book “Communications”.
350 Barr & Grutters FIDIC Users’ Guide 239.
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amounts to a breach of contract by the contractor.
Clause 16.1 also clearly sets out that the justification (provided the contractor has
not yet given a notice of termination) for the suspension falls away when the
contractor has “received the Payment Certificate, reasonable evidence or
payment”.351 Should the justification for suspension fall away, the contractor is
obliged to resume work; should the contractor fail to do so, it will be in breach of
contract.352
Interestingly, this clause also provides a contractor with a right to reduce the rate of
work as opposed to completely suspending the works.
The provisions regarding the consequences of suspension greatly clarify the
position of the suspending contractor. The clause states as follows:
“The Contractor’s action shall not prejudice his entitlements to financing
charges under Sub-Clause 14.8 [Delayed Payment] and to termination under
Sub-Clause 16.2 [Termination by the Contractor]. If the Contractor suffers
delay and/or incurs Cost as a result of suspending work (or reducing the rate
of work) in accordance with this Sub-Clause, the Contractor shall give notice to
the Engineer and shall be entitled subject to Sub-Clause 20.1 [Contractor’s
Claims] to:
(a) An extension of time for any such delay, if completion is or will be delayed,
under Sub-Clause 8.4 [Extension of Time for Completion]; and
(b) Payment of any such Cost plus reasonable profit, which shall be included
in the Contract Price.
After receiving this notice, the Engineer shall proceed in accordance with Sub-
Clause 3.5 [Determinations] to agree or determine matters.”
This section of clause 16.1 expressly reserves and protects the contractor’s
entitlement to financing charges and to termination.353 It also very importantly
provides for a mechanism to extend the time for completion, to avoid time becoming
“at large” and, the contractor falling into culpable delay, for which the employer
351 Prolonged suspension is a ground for termination under the Red Book. See cl 16.2 (a) and (f)
says: “The Contractor shall be entitled to terminate the Contract if (a)the Contractor does not
receive the reasonable evidence within 42 days after giving notice under cl 16.1 [Contractor
Entitlement to Suspend Work] in respect of a failure to comply with cl 2.4 [Employer’s Financial
Arrangements]” and (f) “a prolonged suspension affects the whole of the Works as described
in cl 8.11 [Prolonged Suspension]”.
352 Barr & Grutters FIDIC User’s Guide 238.
353 See discussion on prolonged termination.
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would, in all likelihood, be entitled to levy liquidated damages.
Furthermore, this section of the clause deals with the cost implications of a
suspension (including any costs for the resumption of works) and, it is important to
note that the contractor is not only entitled to “Cost” as defined354 but also to
reasonable profit.355
The contractual right of the contractor to claim an extension of time for any delay
caused by the suspension, negating any remedy an employer would have to claim
liquidated damages for that particular period and, the contractual entitlement of the
contractor not only to cost, but to profit as well, heightens the pressure on the
employer to perform by linking the act of suspension by the contractor to remedies
for (employer’s) breach of contract. Any reasonable employer would, in all
likelihood, be compelled into timeous performance of its own obligations, by
adhering to the payment provisions and accordingly remedying its default, to avoid
incurring further costs and to ensure expeditious completion of the works.
4 4 2 Suspension by the Employer
The right of the employer to suspend is of a totally different nature to that of the
contractor and is not necessarily premised on a right to withhold a reciprocal
obligation. Clause 8.8 provides for suspension by the employer and says:
“The Engineer may at any time instruct the Contractor to suspend progress of
part or all of the Works. During such suspension, the Contractor shall protect,
store and secure such part or the Works against any deterioration, loss or
damage.
The Engineer may also notify the cause for the suspension. If and to the extent
that the cause is notified and is the responsibility of the Contractor, the following
Sub-Clauses 8.9, 8.10 and 8.11 shall not apply.”
Therefore, the employer, through an instruction issued by the engineer, can merely
instruct the contractor to suspend the performance of the works irrespective of the
354 “‘Cost’ means all expenditure reasonably incurred (or to be incurred) by the Contractor, whether
on or off the Site, including overhead and similar charges but does not include profit.”
355 Barr & Grutters FIDIC User’s Guide 238.
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cause of the suspension.
It is clear, from this clause, that the employer (through the engineer356) has broad
powers regarding suspension which powers may be exercised at “any time” and
which may be exercised in relation to all or a portion of the works. There are
accordingly “no restrictions on the reasons357 for or the time when an instruction to
suspend can be given.”358 During such suspension, the contractor is obliged to
ensure that the works are protected against “any deterioration, loss or damage” and
accordingly the risk of such remains with the contractor.359
Ultimately, this clause only allows for the suspension of the progress of the works
and, not the suspension of payments by the employer.360 Therefore, should an
employer be contractually obliged to make a payment under the contract, it will not
be able to rely on the suspension of the works as justification for failing to make that
356 “Engineer” is defined as “the person appointed by the Employer to act as the Engineer for the
purposes of the Contract” and it is the Engineer who is authorised, under the Red Book, to issue
instructions to the contractor – see cl 3.3 of the Red Book. Therefore, an employer should
request the Engineer to issue an instruction to suspend to a contractor and should not do so
itself. See E Baker, B Mellors, S Chalmers and A Lavers FIDIC Contracts Law and Practice
(2009) 5.65.
357 An employer could for example suspend for commercial reasons arising out of external factors
(such as political reasons), however often any third party lender that is funding the project may
limit an employer’s right to suspend – R Saunders “FIDIC: Suspension and termination under
Red, Yellow and Silver Books” http://uk.practicallaw.com/5-502-7110?q=suspension Practical
Law (Accessed 01 08 16).
358 However, the clause does not indicate any requisite time or notice period in which the contractor
is to comply with the instruction and effect suspension of the Works. This allows for a degree
of (essential) flexibility; should the instructed suspension be for safety reasons, it may be that
immediate suspension is required or, should the suspension be at the convenience of the
employer, a longer period before suspension takes effect may be more suitable - see Baker et
al FIDIC Contracts Law and Practice 5.65.
359 See cl 17.2 of the Red Book “Contractor’s Care of the Works” which says (in part): “The
Contractor shall take responsibility for the care of the Works and Goods from the
Commencement Date until the Taking-Over Certificate is issued…for the Works, when
responsibility for the care of the Works shall pass to the Employer.” Further to this, the
contractor under cl 18.1 will be obliged to keep the contract insurances in place. However, the
clause is not clear whether the contractor is permitted to demobilise, including the removal of
Contractor’s Equipment which is expressly prohibited, without consent - see Sub-cl 4.17.
Should this not be included in the Engineer’s instruction – a prudent contractor should request
further information - Baker et al FIDIC Contracts Law and Practice 5.69. In any event, should a
contractor be required to maintain the Site or to demobilise and consequently remobilise when
the suspension is lifted, it will be entitled to the associated Costs (and extensions of time
connected to remobilisation) provided the cause of the suspension is not the responsibility of
the contractor. Baker et al FIDIC Contracts Law and Practice 5.70.
360 Baker et al FIDIC Contracts Law and Practice 5.71 – 5.72.
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payment.
However, pursuant to most contracts, it is likely that progress (in comparison to
solely time) and the amount due to the contractor will be linked. Suspension can
therefore “have a significant impact on the contractor’s cash flow by delaying
payment of amounts to which, if the progress had not been suspended, he would
have been entitled earlier.”361 This, together with the associated cost, risks
regarding protection of the works and the threat of the imposition of liquidated
damages all serve as compelling factors to encourage specific performance by the
contractor.
As mentioned above, an employer can instruct suspension in two instances. The
first instance (where the cause of the suspension is not the contractor’s
responsibility) is, for the employer, a very costly option as clause 8.9,362 8.10 and
8.11 provides the contractor with certain entitlements consequent of the
suspension. Such clauses entitle the contractor to an extension of time for the delay,
cost, reasonable profit and, (potentially) payment of the value of plants and
materials which have not yet even been delivered to Site.
In instances where the cause of the suspension is attributable to the contractor,363
the contractor will not be entitled to rely on clauses 8.9 to 8.11 and will not have the
entitlements afforded by these clauses such as an extension of time to the time for
completion nor any costs associated with the suspension. This will encourage the
contractor (by placing pressure - financial and otherwise on the contractor) to
remove or negate the cause of the suspension in order to resume the Works and to
361 Baker et al FIDIC Contracts Law and Practice 5.82.
362 This clause closely mirrors cl 16.1.
363 Examples of “contractor caused suspension” include inter alia, unsafe working, breach of local
laws, failure to maintain insurances and failure to submit a revised programme. See Baker et
al FIDIC Contracts Law and Practice 5.75. Furthermore, the contractor’s duty to ensure
protection of the works is a further factor which would encourage specific performance by a
defaulting contractor in instances where the suspension is “contractor caused” as the contractor
will not have recourse against the employer in the event the works are destroyed or damaged
during this period of suspension.
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complete same timeously (avoiding the imposition of liquidated damages).364
It is also within the discretion of the engineer to decide whether to inform the
contractor of the reasons for the suspension; there is no obligation to do so and the
engineer may accordingly elect not to.365 However, should the cause for the
suspension be the responsibility of the contractor and, as the employer would (more
than likely) want to avoid compensating the contractor for the suspension,366 then
in such instances it will be obliged to notify the contractor.
Suspension of the progress of the works under the Red Book invariably impacts
negatively on the contractor’s cash flow.  This amounts to an effective mechanism
in the hands of the employer to compel performance by the contractor. Furthermore,
the Red Book helpfully addresses the ensuing consequences of a suspension by
governing any entitlements, termination in instances of prolonged suspension and,
where applicable, the resumption of work.
The Red Book is therefore clear and instructive on how a suspension is to occur,
how work is to resume and most helpfully, in providing express contractual
mechanisms which are well thought out and equipped to deal with the inevitable
and difficult consequences of a suspension.
4 5  Conclusion
Under South African law and the law of the UAE, a right to withhold performance
(and, in effect, the right of a party to suspend) is recognised as a means to compel
364 Conceptually it may be possible to argue that suspension by the employer is actually founded
in a version of reciprocity – the employer is entitled to refrain from performing its own reciprocal
obligations as the contractor has not performed its own obligations. However, the contractor
has not performed its obligations because of an (authorised) action by the employer - the
instruction by the employer is the underlying reason for the contractor’s duly authorised
suspension, which in turn, entitles the employer to suspend its own obligations under the
contract.
365 A reasonable Engineer would inform the contractor of the reason and potential extent of the
suspension so that the contractor is aware how to “meet his obligation to protect, store and
secure that part of the Works”. Barr & Grutters FIDIC User’s Guide 176.
366 And accordingly, for clauses 8.9, 8.10 and 8.11 not to be applicable. Baker et al FIDIC Contracts
Law and Practice 5.66. It is questionable whether in instances where the cause of the
suspension is attributable to the Contactor, but such cause only affects a portion of the Works,
yet the employer elects to suspend the whole Works, whether the contractor will be entitled to
claim the entitlements contained at clauses 8.9 – 8.11 for the suspension of the remainder of
the Works. See Baker et al FIDIC Contracts Law and Practice 5.73 and 5.75.
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performance by a defaulting party. Both systems recognise the concept of
reciprocity as the foundation of suspension and an aggrieved party is empowered
to withhold and refuse to perform its own obligations until proper and complete
performance has been tendered by the defaulting party. This is subject to the
aggrieved party being ready and willing to perform its “withheld” obligation.
Under South African law, there is a presumption that recognised contract types such
as a locatio conductio operis give rise to reciprocal obligations unless the contrary
is clear from the intention of the parties. Under UAE law, the determination of the
reciprocity of obligations lies within the sole discretion of the court – potentially
giving rise to uncertainty.
The sequence of performance under a contract is an important consideration under
both jurisdictions for determining whether a suspension is lawful: the obligor must
have failed to discharge the obligation at the agreed time for performance. Under
South African law, a contractor is obliged to perform in full before being entitled to
payment and, as held by the courts, interim payments are merely advances on the
final sum.  An argument accordingly exists that a contractor will not be entitled to
lawfully suspend premised on the non-payment of an interim payment. However,
the proposed draft CIDB Regulations make provision for suspension based on non-
payment of an interim provision.
Although the Civil Code also provides that an employer’s obligation to pay a
contractor only falls due on delivery of the works, this is subject to two exceptions,
namely the agreement of the parties and custom.  It is accepted that that
arrangements for interim payments fall under the latter exception. Therefore, under
the Civil Code, a contractor will be entitled to suspend its performance based on
the failure by the employer to make an interim payment.
In contrast to UAE law and South African law, the Red Book does not base lawful
suspension on reciprocity and the sequence of performance.  The Red Book instead
provides for the elective suspension of the works by the contractor on prescribed
grounds (premised on non-payment) and by the employer on an instruction by the
engineer to the contractor to suspend work. The employer is entitled to suspend on
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mere instruction – there need not be an underlying reason justifying such
suspension and, in fact, there is no obligation on the employer even to notify the
contractor of the cause of the suspension.
This approach contains merit, as there are many instances in which it is favourable
for a project to be suspended outside of the contractual grounds listed in the Red
Book and outside of the requirements recognised under South African law and the
Civil Code. Arguably, an entitlement to suspend based on elective instruction should
be given to both the contractor and the employer; provided the contract effectively
balances risk - affording suitable recourse to the aggrieved party.
Further, under the Red Book a contractor is, in addition to the right to suspend,
provided with the option to “reduce the rate” of work and in certain instances the
contractor may be able to rely on prolonged suspension to legitimately terminate
the contract. These are contractual creations and there is no equivalent entitlement
under South African or UAE law.  However, both are helpful tools and similar
provisions should be provided for in construction contracts in jurisdictions like South
Africa and the UAE.
Further advantages of the Red Book are that the consequences of suspension are
addressed: in the event of rightful suspension by a contractor, the contractor may
be entitled to an extension of time and payment of costs (plus reasonable profit).
This will avoid the imposition of liquidated damages and accordingly the
phenomenon of time from becoming “at large”. This is one of the most important
consequences, which the South African Common Law and the Civil Code fail to
make provision for. The Red Book also favourably provides for instances where the
obligations of the parties are resumed after suspension, the allocation of risk and,
very importantly addresses liability for the costs of suspension and the according
computation thereof.
Whilst suspension, as an effective remedy, is afforded due regard under South
African law and the Civil Code, provisions dealing with the consequences of
suspension are not clear nor readily available. It is advisable for parties to
incorporate provisions addressing these omissions when concluding a construction
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contract. The incorporation of some (or similar) suspension provisions such as
provided for in the Red Book in contracts that are subject to South African law or
the Civil Code will provide certainty and will most certainly be advantageous for both
parties.
Suspension as a means to compel performance by a defaulting party can prove to
be a very effective self-help remedy. However, as is apparent from the discussion
above, the application of this self-help remedy can be extremely complex, and the
innocent party must ensure that it is indeed entitled to rely on this remedy to avoid
being in breach of contract itself.
Furthermore, the ensuing consequences of suspension can be highly complicated
and unless provision for dealing with these circumstances are contained in the
contract as is the case under the Red Book, the innocent party may find the benefits
of utilising suspension as a self-help remedy are diminished.
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Chapter 5
Liens – A Self-Help Remedy for the Contractor
5 1       Introduction
A builder’s lien is a well-known remedy in the construction industry and entails a
“right to retain property lawfully belonging to another pending discharge or
settlement by its owner of debts or claims owed to the party in possession.”367  A
lien is therefore a deviation from the standard commitment of a contractor to, upon
completion of the works, vacate the site and submit possession of the works to the
employer.368
As a manifestation of the broader phenomenon of the possessory lien, a builder’s
lien, also known as a “mechanic’s” or “workman’s” lien, is a security mechanism,369
that can be exercised over the entire site or works or both, a portion of the site or
works, materials, plant and, in some instances, even documents and drawings.370
In some jurisdictions, a contractor may even, after an effluxion of time, be able to
dispose of and sell the property, with a right to use the proceeds to discharge the
secured debt.371  In particular circumstances, therefore, it serves as an effective
and powerful means for a building contractor to ensure payment.372
367 Anonymous “Contractual and Legal” Master Builders Association (2017)
https://www.masterbuilders.co.za/index.php/contractual-and-legal (accessed 25-09-2017).
See United Building Society v Smookler's Trustees and Golombick's Trustee 1906 TS 623,
Nienaber “Construction Contracts” LAWSA 9 para 53; TJ Scott “Liens” in WA Joubert & JA
Faris LAWSA 15(2) 2nd ed (2003) para 49; PC Loots Construction Law and Related Issues 417.
368 Nienaber “Construction Contracts” LAWSA 9 para 53.
369 Scott “Liens” LAWSA 15(2) para 50; Ramsden Mckenzie’s Law of Building and Engineering
Contracts and Arbitration 110.
370 Ramsden Mckenzie’s Law of Building and Engineering Contracts and Arbitration 116 notes this
is not the position regarding an architect’s drawings. In the usual course of events, ownership
of such documents will only pass on delivery. Rather than relying on a lien, an architect’s right
to retain documents is based on the exceptio non adimpleti contractus.
371 However, if there is a dispute surrounding the amount outstanding, a contractor cannot dispose
of the property until such dispute is settled - Ramsden Mckenzie’s Law of Building and
Engineering Contracts and Arbitration 110. See also Article 107 of the UAE Federal Law No.18
of 1993 (Commercial Transactions Law).
372 Under South African law, note that only a debtor creditor lien serves as a performance inducing
mechanism in a direct sense. An enrichment lien on the other hand serves as more of an
indirect performance inducing mechanism (particularly as recovery under an enrichment lien is
restricted to either lesser of either the owner’s enrichment or the contractor’s impoverishment
(see the discussion at 5.2.6.2) below)  but still may serve as a motivator to encourage an
employer to perform should an employer wish to, for example, sell the property free from
encumbrances  - see the discussion below at 5.2.5.
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The exercise of a lien can have a hugely detrimental effect on the progress of a
project by depriving a non-paying employer of the benefits of the property and work
performed. Any sensible employer would be moved to remedy its default so that the
project can continue, and it can enjoy the corresponding benefits. Consequently,
when exercised in the correct manner, a lien is most certainly a persuasive means
to compel compliance by a defaulting employer.
However, this mechanism should be resorted to with careful consideration - the
unlawful exercise of a lien is likely to have unintended negative consequences and,
in industry, the exercise of a lien can also give rise to many practical problems.373
The exercise of a lien as a means to obtain payment has often been regarded as a
“high risk endeavour”.374
5 2 South African Law
5 2 1 Background
In South African law, the possessory lien is an established and well-known
institution.  Under Roman law, retention (retentio) was recognised as type of
security based on the maxim minus est actionem habere quam rem. The holder
(retentor) of another party’s thing could, with reliance on the exceptio doli, defeat
the owner’s resort to the rei vindicatio until payment of a claim against the owner.375
This formed the basis for the further development of the Roman Dutch manifestation
of the institution under the influence of Germanic notions of pledge into the
sophisticated institution recognised in case law.376
373 For example; the contractor will need to secure the property it intends to retain and it may prove
costly to effectively secure uninterrupted possession of the works or site. Whilst such costs may
well be claimable as damages from the employer, the contractor will need to initially pay these
costs. It may also be regarded as a criminal offence (which may involve law enforcement such
as the police) to remain in possession of another’s property without permission. See Grose
Construction Law in the United Arab Emirates 195.
374 NR Brendal, AL Barrette and W El-Riachi “The Availability in the UAE of Liens to Secure
Payment under Construction Contracts” (2010) 24 Arab Law Quarterly 309 315.
375 M Wiese “The Legal Nature of a Lien in South African Law” (2014) 17 PER/PELJ 2526 2527-
2528.
376 See Scott “Liens” LAWSA 15(2) para 50 n4 where reference is made to Van der Merwe
Sakereg 712.
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5 2 2  Legal Nature
The legal nature of liens has attracted discussion and controversy as to whether it
is properly characterised as a right, a defence to the rei vindicatio raised by an
owner or a legally recognised power or capacity to withhold possession of a thing
from the owner.377  This theoretical debate is not relevant to the operation of liens
in the construction context and will not be entered into here.  For present purposes
it will be accepted that the contractor, as lienholder, is entitled to retain possession
of the employer’s thing and defeat a vindicatory action by the latter until the related
debt has been discharged.378
5 2 3  Two Types
South African law recognises two types of lien.  Classified by reference to the origin
of the debt which the lien is used to protect, a distinction is made between debtor
and creditor liens and enrichment liens.379  This distinction between the two types
of liens was well summarised by Bristowe J in United Building Society v Smookler’s
Trustee380 where it was held:
“The rule then seems to be that salvage and improvement liens prevail against
all the world, but, on the other hand, are limited to expenses which have
maintained or advanced the market price; while debtor and creditor liens (so
far, at all events, as they include expenses not limited by considerations of
market price) are restricted within the limits of contractual privity.”
A debtor and creditor lien accordingly, serves to secure payment of money
377 Wiese (2014) PER/PELJ 2529. Note also 2527, 2530 and 2537 - 2539 where reference is made
to JC Sonnekus and JL Neels Sakereg Vonnisbundel 2ed (1994) 125 - 126 who assert that a
lien is not a right but instead is a type of relationship to which certain consequences attach by
virtue of law and accordingly is a passive ability to withhold. See also J Du Plessis The South
African Law of Unjustified Enrichment (2012) 292 n160. This is in contrast to the view held by
Van der Merwe and Scott that a lien is, in fact, a defence to the rei vindicatio. See CG Van der
Merwe Sakereg 2 ed (1989) 712 and Scott “Liens” 15(2) para 50. Whether a possessory lien is
a “remedy” in the technical sense, has also been doubted: Ramsden Mckenzie’s Law of
Building and Engineering Contracts and Arbitration 110 is of the view that a lien is “security for
a debt and does not itself afford a right to execute against that security.” See also Grose
Construction Law in the United Arab Emirates and the Gulf 193.
378 Du Plessis The South African Law of Unjustified Enrichment 289. This chapter assumes an
“organised construction context” where a subcontractor is in contract with the contractor who
is, in turn, in contract with the employer as owner of the land.  This is not necessarily always
the case, however, e.g. where A, who is not owner, engages B to erect a building on land
belonging to C.
379 Debtor and creditor liens, also referred to as liens ex contractu are only enforceable between
the parties to the contract: Wiese (2014) PER/PELJ 2527. Note also that enrichment liens are
sometimes referred to as real liens or salvage and improvement liens.
380 1906 T.S. 623 630.
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expended by the lienholder on another’s property by virtue of a contractual duty to
do so.381  The principal debt need not necessarily arise ex contractu, however.  In
the case of the so-called enrichment lien, it consists of a debt based on unjustified
enrichment arising from the expenditure of money or work done on the property of
another in the absence of a contract to this effect.382
The significance of the distinction is twofold, the two categories differing both as
regards the scope and the extent of the protection afforded the lienholder.
5 2 4  The Scope of a Lien
Enrichment liens, for instance, are restricted to the recovery of necessariae
impensae, (expenses which are necessary to preserve the property) and utiles
impensae (expenses which even though not necessary, nevertheless improve the
market value of the property). Expenses which satisfy the desires of the owner but
which are not necessary and do not improve the market value of the property
(voluptuariae impensae), are not recoverable.383  The scope of debtor and creditor
liens on the other hand, is determined by the contract between the parties and may,
apart from payment for services rendered, extend even to compensation for
voluptuariae impensae.384
5 2 5  Extent of the Protection: Against Whom Does a Lien Operate?
As regards the extent of the protection, it is accepted that as debtor and creditor
liens “spring out of the soil of contract”, and are accordingly confined to within the
limits of contractual privity,385 they are available only against the other party to the
contract.386  Although such a lien is said to afford the creditor a personal right
only,387 and does not avail against a secured creditor such as a mortgagee, the
lienholder does enjoy a preference over the concurrent creditors of the insolvent
381 Du Plessis The South African Law of Unjustified Enrichment 289 n140.
382 Scott “Liens” LAWSA 15(2) para 50; Du Plessis The South African Law of Unjustified
Enrichment 289.
383 United Building Society v Smookler's Trustees and Golombick's Trustee 1906 TS 623 627, see
generally Du Plessis The South African Law of Unjustified Enrichment 277-279.
384 United Building Society v Smookler's Trustees and Golombick's Trustee 1906 TS 623 627 –
628. See also Scott “Liens” LAWSA 15(2) para 68.
385 United Building Society v Smookler's Trustees and Golombick's Trustee 1906 TS 623 at 628.
386 Scott “Liens” LAWSA 15(2) para 50; Nienaber “Construction Contracts” LAWSA 9 para 54.
387 Scott “Liens” LAWSA 15(2) para 50.
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owner.388
An enrichment lien, on the other hand, is thought to afford the lienholder a real right
of security, enforceable and effective against “against all comers”.389 As such, it can
be maintained not only against the owner, but also against its successors in title,
creditors of the owner seeking to attach the property, holders of mortgages over it
(even mortgages established prior to the lien) and, entitles the lienholder to a
preference in the insolvent estate of the owner.390  In this sense, an enrichment lien
will most certainly be a motivator for reimbursement should the employer wish to
sell the property free from encumbrances.391 An enrichment lien can therefore most
certainly be viewed as an indirect self-help enforcement mechanism available to an
innocent contractor.
388 See section 95(1) of the Insolvency Act 24 of 1936; Scott “Liens” LAWSA 15(2) para 83.  This
effect also helps to distinguish between a debtor and creditor lien and a reliance on the exceptio
by a contractor.  Although a debtor and creditor lien and the exceptio are both regarded as
“passive weapons” and are based on the reciprocity between the contractor’s duty to vacate
the premises on completion and the employer’s duty to pay the full contract price, the two
phenomena are regarded as distinct institutions in South African law (see for example Wiese
(2014) PER/PELJ 2540, 2542 n81, 2545-2546; Nienaber “Construction Contracts” LAWSA 9
para 53; Du Plessis The South African Law of Unjustified Enrichment 289 n140; cf G Pienaar
and A Stevens “Rights in Security” in R Zimmermann, D Visser & K Reid (eds) Mixed Legal
Systems in Comparative Perspective: Property and Obligation in Scotland and South Africa
(2004) 758 779-780). According to Wiese, a lien comes into play where the employer sues as
owner with the rei vindicatio against a claim for recovery under the contract where the exceptio
may be relied upon asserting, that “a lien is a form of the exceptio non adimpleti contractus, but
the exceptio non adimpleti contractus does not always give rise to a lien. It does so only when
the performance withheld is the return of a thing.” See M Wiese “South African perspective on
a lien as real security right in Scottish law” 2017 TSAR 89 100-101. But note that the protection
afforded by s 95(1) of the Insolvency Act will only apply in the case where a lien is relied on.
389 Nienaber “Construction Contracts” LAWSA 9 para 54; Scott “Liens” LAWSA 15(2)
para 50; but see Wiese (2014) PER/PELJ 2527 2526-2553 for a critical discussion.
390 Scott “Liens” LAWSA 15(2) para 82; Ramsden Mckenzie’s Law of Building and Engineering
Contracts and Arbitration 112, by way of example, refers Browns Asignees v Pote 4 EDC 50;
In re SA Loan, Mortgage and Mercantile Agency v Owens and Campbell 4 NLR 68; United
Building Society v Smookler’s Trustees  1906 TS 623 (lien against a mortgage holder),
Liquidators of Royal Hotel Co v Rutherford 16 CTR 179  (against the liquidators of an
insolvent employer company), Levy v Tyler 1933 CPD 377 (against a  purchaser who is
simultaneously a bondholder at a sale in execution), Oldham v Kerns 27 NLR 17 (lien
maintained against a purchaser under a judicial sale), Phillips and Gordon v Adams 1923 EDL
104 (lien against a third party who has taken over the employer’s property). See D Glaser &
Sons (Pty) Ltd v The Master and Another NO 1979 (4) SA 780 (C) 792 for the order of priority
between liens.
391 It is often a condition of sale and purchase contracts that a property is sold free from
encumbrances and liens.
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5 2 6  Requirements
5 2 6 1 Possession
The first requirement for the valid exercise of a lien is effective, actual, uninterrupted
and lawfully acquired392 possession - it logically stands that one cannot retain
something which is not in one’s possession.393 In order to satisfy the possession
requirement, two elements must be present, namely a subjective one relating to the
intention of the lienholder (animus possidendi) and an objective one relating to the
exercise of physical control (detentio) over the property.394
In order to meet the first element, the contractor must have the intention to hold and
exercise control over the property as security.395 There need not be an intention to
hold as an owner, however, the lienholder should hold with a view to secure some
benefit as against the owner – for example, to utilise the subject matter as a security
for a debt.396
In order to meet the second element, the contractor must remain in effective
physical control over the works or the site.397 Symbolic possession is not sufficient
and a contractor is required to prove that the site or the relevant portion of it is
occupied and under its control at “all material times”.398 This is achievable by, for
example, locking gates, barricading doors,399 employing security guards and even
392 Ramsden Mckenzie’s Law of Building and Engineering Contracts and Arbitration 113 – the initial
acquisition of possession must have legal justification.
393 Insolvent Estate of Israelson v Harris and Black 22 SC 135 (1905) 141. See also Scott “Liens”
LAWSA 15(2) para 51-53; Du Plessis The South African Law of Unjustified Enrichment 290-
291.
394 Ramsden Mckenzie’s Law of Building and Engineering Contracts and Arbitration 113. See also
Wightman t/a JW Construction v Headfour (Pty) Ltd and Another 2008 (3) SA 371 (SCA) and
Scott “Liens” LAWSA 15(2) para 52.
395 See Scholtz v Faifer 1910 TS 243 and Ploughall (Edms) Bpk v Rae 1971 (1) SA 887 (T) 891.
396 See also Ramsden Mckenzie’s Law of Building and Engineering Contracts and Arbitration 112.
397 Note that a lien can also be “exercised over part of a thing on which work has been done and
which is separately in the lienholder’s possession, in order to enforce an unseverable counter-
performance” - Ramsden Mckenzie’s Law of Building and Engineering Contracts and
Arbitration 114.
398 Nienaber “Construction Contracts” LAWSA 9 para 55. See also S Bester “Construction Law –
The Legal Principles underlying the Builder’s Lien” (12-06-2012) Markram
https://www.markraminc.co.za/knowledge/construction-law-the-legal-principles-underlying-
the-builder-s-lien (accessed 14-09-2017). Should the contractor allow an employer limited
access this will not necessarily result in possession being relinquished, provided that the
intention to hold and exercise possession does not cease to exist. See also Wightman t/a JW
Construction v Headfour (Pty) Ltd and Another 2008 (3) SA 371 (SCA).
399 Finsen Building Contract 67.
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merely holding the keys to a building.400 Possession is not be achieved by merely
displaying a sign threatening the prosecution of trespassers.401
It is common to have more than one direct contractor to a construction project and
even more likely to have a multiplicity of subcontractors. As possession is not
necessarily exclusive to one person,402 several independent contractors (and
indeed subcontractors) can individually exercise a lien over a part or the whole of
the works simultaneously if they are able to satisfy the requirements for the valid
exercise of a lien by asserting their rights against the employer.403 It is however
debatable whether a subcontractor is able to satisfy the requirements for the valid
exercise of a lien  and this point is expanded on in the discussion below.
As the contractor remains in possession of the works when relying on a lien, it flows
that the contractor carries the risk and, will remain responsible for loss or damage
to the site or works whilst in possession404 - this assumption of risk is therefore an
important consideration which should be taken into account by a contractor in
deciding to rely on a lien.
It is also important that possession must be continuously405 maintained because
once lost, it cannot be regained.  In instances where work is suspended, or
possession is voluntarily surrendered or abandoned, the lien will be lost.406 In
400 Possession will be lost if the owner lawfully acquires another set of keys. See Wightman t/a JW
Construction v Headfour (Pty) Ltd and Another 2008 (3) SA 371 (SCA) 381 and Ramsden
Mckenzie’s Law of Building and Engineering Contracts and Arbitration 114.
401 Ramsden Mckenzie’s Law of Building and Engineering Contracts and Arbitration 113. See also
Moss v Begg 1908 TH 1 where Wessels J. held that merely to erect a notice-board without
anything more is insufficient.
402 Nienaber “Construction Contracts” LAWSA 9 para 56.
403 Nienaber “Construction Contracts” LAWSA 9 para 56. See also Ramsden Mckenzie’s Law of
Building and Engineering Contracts and Arbitration 113, Loots Construction Law and Related
Issues 421, Nienaber v Stuckey 1946 AD 1049 1055 – 1056, Israelson’s Trustee v. Harris &
Black and Others 140 -141, confirmed in Beetge v Drenka Investments (Isando) (Pty) Ltd 1964
4 SA 62 (W) 68.
404 See Finsen The Building Contract 67 n45 and n74 above.
405 Nienaber “Construction Contracts” LAWSA 9 para 55 confirms that temporary absence (for
example at the end of a working day) does not result in possession being interrupted subject to
the contractor continuing to engage in its work and asserting possession over the site. See also
Ramsden Mckenzie’s Law of Building and Engineering Contracts and Arbitration 113.
406 Nienaber “Construction Contracts” LAWSA 9 para 55. Under English law, a contractor may
even lose possession through accessio (i.e. by affixing materials to the land): J Mackay J (ed)
Halsbury’s Laws of England 4 ed (2003) 854. But see s 47 of the Insolvency Act 24 of 1936 on
the position where on the insolvency of the owner, the lien holder hands over the property to
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Savory v Baldochi407 it was held:
“It is quite clear that a jus retentionis is a passive right, and that right, in a case
like the present, is to retain possession of the cart against all the world, until
the respondent's claim for the amount of the repairs done to it is satisfied. If he
for any reason gives up possession of the cart, and relinquishes his right to
hold it, the jus retentionis is absolutely gone.”
If a contractor subsequently regains possession, the lien will not automatically
revive, unless the contractor was deprived of such possession against its consent
and in instances of “force408 or fraud409 or by some clandestine act410 on the part of
the owner (or, it is submitted, by any wrongful act on the part of a third party)411 or
under urgent and irresistible judicial pressure.”412 In such instances, the contractor
may be able to apply to court for a spoliation order413 for restoration of possession.
This will restore control and possession to the contractor, usually without an
investigation into the merits.414 The following was held in Nino Bonino v De Lange:
“It is a fundamental principle that no man is allowed to take the law into his own
hands; no one is permitted to dispossess another forcibly or wrongfully and
against his consent of the possession of property, whether movable or
immovable. If he does so, the Court will summarily restore the status quo ante,
and will do that as a preliminary to any inquiry or investigation into the merits
of the dispute.”415
the curator or trustee of the insolvent estate. See generally on the continued existence of the
lien in such cases: Scott “Liens” LAWSA 15(2) para 82.
407 1907 TS 523 525. See also Morris v Taljaard 1952 (1) SA 49 (C).
408 Pretoria Racing Club v Van Pietersen 1907 TS 687.
409 Donaldson v Est Veleris 1938 TPD 269; Hamilton Paneelkloppers v Nkomo 1991 (2) SA 534
(O).
410 Sterner v Morom 20 SC 499; Ploughall (Edms) Bpk v Rae 1971 (1) SA 887 (T).
411 Re Carter; Carter and Carter (1885) LJ Ch230; Makhubedu and Another v Ebrahim 1947 (3)
SA 155 (T) 167.
412 Ramsden Mckenzie’s Law of Building and Engineering Contracts and Arbitration 114.
See also Builder’s Depot CC v Testa 2011 (4) SA 486 (GSJ) where it was found that should a
contractor lawfully be dispossessed by a bona fide third, the contractor may lose its right to
exercise a lien.
413 RD Claassen Dictionary of Legal Words and Phrases (1999) Mandament Van Spolie is defined
as “The possessor of an object is presumed to be the owner, if he is dispossessed against his
will or without his consent by illicit means such as violence, fraud or stealth he is entitled to get
a court’s order called a Mandament van Spolie which orders the dispossessor to restore the
object to the applicant. See also Meyer v Glendinning 1939 CPD 84 and Potgieter v Davel 1966
3 SA 559 (O).
414 D Boshoff “Understanding the Basic Principles of Property Law in South Africa” (30-08-2013)
https://cdn.ymaws.com/www.sacqsp.org.za/resource/collection/876D0B9A-72A3-4AA9-B6F8-
1BD0B2760F04/PSM_8__-_Basic_Principles_of_Property_Law_-_(CPD).pdf The South
African Council for the Quantity Surveying Profession (accessed 23-10-2018).
415 Nino Bonino v De Lange 1906 TS 120 122. See also Ploughall (Edms) Bpk v Rae 1971 (1) SA
887 (T) 891 where this principle was confirmed: “In Scholtz v. Faifer, 1910 T.P.D. 243, sê
INNES, H.R., te bl. 246: “It is settled law in this Court that a builder has a jus retentionis in
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The principles for spoliation are well established and directed at discouraging self-
help by an aggrieved party.416 Dispossession need only to be done “against the
consent of the person despoiled and illicitly”.417
Therefore, possession is the foundation to the exercise of a lien by a contractor and
by retaining possession, a contractor prevents an employer from the use and
enjoyment of the property or works.
5 2 6 2 Principal Obligation
The second requirement is that of a principal obligation: the party seeking to rely on
the lien must be a creditor of the owner of the property, either by way of contract (in
the context of a debtor creditor lien) or by way of enrichment (in instances of an
enrichment lien).418
A debtor and creditor lien, widely utilised in the construction context, presupposes
a principal obligation founded in contract.419 Simply put, it is the right of a contractor
to retain possession of the site and the works until paid for work done.  Reliance on
a debtor and creditor lien presupposes not only that the contractor is entitled to
payment, but also that the employer’s debt is due: such a lien cannot be exercised
in respect of a future debt.420
respect of the building erected by him, for his utiles impensae; that was decided in United
Building Society v. Smookler’s Trustees and Golombick’s Trustee, 1906 T.S. 623. . .That right
terminates with the loss of possession unless the possession is taken away by undue means.
Pietersen’s case, following upon Bonino’s, decided that. . .he is entitled to apply to Court for a
summary order of restitution. . .” INNES, H.R., sê vervolgens: Now a person who applies for
such an order must satisfy the Court upon two points; that he was in possession of the work at
the date of the alleged deprivation, and that he was illicitly ousted from such possession. . .the
possession which must be proved is not possession in the ordinary sense of the term—that is,
possession by a man who holds pro domino and to assert his rights as owner. It is enough if
the holding is with the intention of securing some benefit for himself as against the owner.” Note
that an employer will not be able to rely on the provisions of the Prevention of Illegal Eviction
from Unlawful Occupation of Land Act 19 of 1998 in such instances – see Andries van der
Schyff en Seuns (Pty) Ltd t/a Complete Construction v Webtrade Inv No 45 (Pty) Ltd and Others
2006 (5) SA 327 (W) and Ramsden Mckenzie’s Law of Building and Engineering Contracts and
Arbitration 114.
416 Anonymous “Builder’s Lien Triumphs, Owner not to take Law into Own Hands” (28-07-2015)
https://www.stbb.co.za/wp-content/uploads/stbb_plu28-2015_s2.pdf STBB (accessed 25-09-
2017).
417 See Nino Bonino v De Lange 1906 TS 120 122.
418 Wiese (2014) PER/PELJ 2547. See also Howes & Clover (Pty) Ltd v Ruskin & Others 1978 (1)
SA 99 (W).
419 Scott “Liens” LAWSA 15(2) para 69 and see above n379.
420 Finsen Building Contract 67. Ramsden Mckenzie’s Law of Building and Engineering Contracts
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The exercise of an enrichment lien is dependent upon whether the requirements for
the existence of an obligation on the basis of unjustified enrichment are met.421  This
will be the case where the estate of the owner is enriched and that of the contractor
impoverished, such enrichment was at the expense of the contractor, (it must be
causally related to the conduct of the contractor) and must be unjustified (sine
causa) in that there is no legal ground justifying the retention of the benefit by the
owner.422  The duty that arises for the owner – and which is secured by the lien – is
to restore the enrichment “up to the level of the [contractor’s] impoverishment” or,
as it is more customarily put, the quantum of the enrichment claim is the lesser of
either the owner’s enrichment or the contractor’s impoverishment.423
The general requirements of enrichment in this context are manifested in the
requirements developed in respect of what is nowadays styled “enrichment by
imposing”424 - actions traditionally recognised in the cases of enrichment resulting
from the expenditure of money, material or work (or all of these) by certain
categories of persons in respect of the property of others.425  On the traditional
approach, a building contractor who has not performed under a valid contract is
regarded as a lawful occupier, and dealt with on the same basis as a bona fide
and Arbitration 115. Therefore, a contractor will not have a right to exercise a lien in respect of
retention money that has not yet fallen due. See Conress (Pty) Ltd and Another v Gallic
Construction (Pty) Ltd 1981 (3) SA 73 (W) 76.
421 This was confirmed in Brooklyn House Furnishers (Pty) Ltd v Knoetze and Sons 1970 (3) SA
264 (A), where Botha JA held that “Waar daar geen verryking vir die eienaar saak is nie, kan
geen sodanige retensiereg tot stand kom nie”. The view enunciated here that the requirements
for enrichment in respect of a lien differ from that for a full-blown action, and that a lien could
be relied upon even where no action lay, was rejected in Buzzard Electrical (Pty) Ltd v 158 Jan
Smuts Avenue Investments (Pty) Ltd and Another 1996 (4) SA 19 (A).  See Du Plessis The
South African Law of Unjustified Enrichment 289-290; Pienaar & Stevens “Rights in Security”
in Mixed Legal Systems in Comparative Perspective: Property and Obligation in Scotland and
South Africa 782; Scott “Liens” LAWSA 15(2) para 55.
422 DP Visser “Enrichment” in WA Joubert & JA Faris LAWSA 17(3) 3rd ed, (2018) para 206, Du
Plessis The South African Law of Unjustified Enrichment 1.
423 Visser “Enrichment” LAWSA 17(3) para 206, Du Plessis The South African Law of Unjustified
Enrichment 380-381.
424 I.e. the imposition of a benefit on another without their consent. Visser “Enrichment” LAWSA
17(3) para 210.
425 Through the legal relationship between the parties and, the intention of the contractor,
distinction was historically drawn between the bona fide possessor, the bona fide occupier, the
lawful occupier, mala fide possessor and the mala fide occupier with this distinction dictating
the success or failure of the enrichment claim. Whilst the state of mind and according intention
is still important, this no longer serves as the main consideration in the outcome of the
enrichment claim and more emphasis is placed on nature of the expense incurred. Du Plessis
The South African Law of Unjustified Enrichment 277.
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possessor and occupier.426
The element of enrichment is established with reference to the nature of the
expenses incurred.  It was confirmed in FHP Management (Pty) Ltd v Theron and
Another,427 that an improver must prove the necessity or usefulness of the
improvements or that such improvements had sustained or increased the market
value of the property.428
Necessary expenses are regarded as enriching the owner on the theory that the
owner would have incurred the same expenses to preserve the property and the
owner’s estate is consequently enriched by being saved from the need to do so.429
Regarding the impoverishment of the improver, the recovery is limited to actual
expenditure and does not extend to profit for labour.430
According to Visser, the requirement that enrichment be sine cause or without legal
ground, is “not addressed directly” in cases of imposed enrichment: instead “the
carefully delineated parameters of each of the traditional remedies determine when
retention of a benefit that has been obtruded on someone is unjustified.”431 Du
Plessis indicates that it is “hardly self-evident” how the sine causa requirement is to
be applied in this context,432 but asserts that in principle the presence of a “typical
legal ground” for retaining the benefit should exclude an action.433  Therefore,
should expenditure be incurred pursuant to a valid contract, this will constitute a
typical ground,434 so that recovery will lie in contract and not on the basis of
unjustified enrichment.435  However, the mere fact that improvements are not
426 D Glaser & Sons (Pty) Ltd v The Master 1979 (4) SA 780 (C) 790; Du Plessis The South African
Law of Unjustified Enrichment 275; but see Scott “Liens” LAWSA 15(2) para 55.
427 2004 (3) SA 392 (C) 517; Du Plessis The South African Law of Unjustified Enrichment 277;
Visser “Enrichment” LAWSA 17(3) para 234; Scott “Liens” LAWSA 15(2) para 63.
428 See Du Plessis The South African Law of Unjustified Enrichment 269-270 on the valuation of
improvements.
429 Scott “Liens” LAWSA 15(2) para 63.  Recovery depends on the expenditure being effective:
see Visser “Enrichment” LAWSA 17(3) para 234.
430 Du Plessis The South African Law of Unjustified Enrichment 269-270.
431 Visser “Enrichment” LAWSA 17(3) para 228.
432   Du Plessis The South African Law of Unjustified Enrichment 270.
433 270 and generally at 53-54.
434   270 and 53-54 with reference to McCarthy Retail Ltd v Shortdistance Carriers 2001 (3) SA 482
SCA.
435 In such cases there is in fact no question of imposed or unauthorised enrichment at all: see Du
Plessis The South African Law of Unjustified Enrichment 270 n12.
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supported by such a typical ground, does not automatically let in an enrichment
claim and enrichment as a result of unauthorised improvements will only be
regarded as unjustified if further requirements embedded in the traditionally
recognised actions of the various categories of improvers are met.436
The requirement that enrichment should be at the expense of the plaintiff is
problematic in situations where someone effects improvements on another’s
property pursuant to an agreement with a third party.437  In such cases, claims have
been excluded on the basis that the enrichment of the owner does not result from
the activities and impoverishment of the contractor, but occurs at the expense of
the third party against whom the contractor has a contractual claim.438 Du Plessis,
however, criticises this view for failing to have regard to differences between the
various factual scenarios that might occur and also for taking too narrow a view of
the at the expense of requirement. Impoverishment is a factual or “economic”
matter, and not done away with by the mere existence of a contractual claim against
a third party.  Where the latter is unwilling or unable to pay the improver, the latter’s
impoverishment is real and the causal link with the enrichment of the owner
indubitable.439
What is required in these situations therefore, is a nuanced approach, with due
regard also to the fact that even if the impoverishment of the improver is in a
particular case directly related to the enrichment of the owner, the claim might still
be excluded because the existence of a contract constitutes a legal ground for the
retention of the benefit by the owner.440
436 Du Plessis The South African Law of Unjustified Enrichment 270 and 53-54.
437 Visser “Enrichment” LAWSA 17(3) para 228. See Du Plessis The South African Law of
Unjustified Enrichment 299-306 on various possible scenarios that might occur, often involving
variants on the sub-contracting situation.
438 See for example W de Vos Verrykingsaanspreeklikheid in die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg 3rd ed
(1987) 346 - 356; Gouws v Jester Pools (Pty) Ltd 1968 (3) SA 563 (T).
439 Du Plessis The South African Law of Unjustified Enrichment 300.
440 Du Plessis The South African Law of Unjustified Enrichment 300-306 and especially the
remarks at 302- 303 in respect of the so-called “subcontractor” cases.
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5 2 6 3 Land should not belong to the State
There is some authority for the view that no one may, in law, acquire a lien over
State owned land.441 Therefore, if this assertion is correct, in a construction context
where the State is the employer and owner of the land, the contractor may not enjoy
a lien. This rule is supported by many of the Roman-Dutch jurists such as Voet,
Matthaeus and Wissenbach and has been argued to form part of South African
law.442 References favouring the rule in the case law amount to obiter dicta,
however,443 and in the absence of recent judicial pronouncements, it is arguable
that the supposed exception has been abrogated by disuse.444
5 2 6 4 Circumstances which affect the existence of a lien
An employer may, against the tender of alternative security for payment of the
outstanding contract price, apply to the court for an order to restore possession of
the property445 and, the court is empowered with the discretion to order the
contractor to restore possession to the employer.446 In Wightman t/a JW
Construction v Headfour (Pty) Ltd and Another447 it was held:
“As the holder of a lien, the appellant’s right of possession is not absolute. The
441 Finsen Building Contract 67. For the definition of “organ of State” see section 239 of the
Constitution.
442 Y Raffie, J Whittle & E Pabian “Does a builder enjoy a lien over state owned property?” (16-
11-2017) https://www.cliffedekkerhofmeyr.com/en/news/publications/2016/dispute/dispute-
resolution-alert-16-november-does-a-builder-enjoy-a-lien-over-state-owned-property.html
CDH (accessed 13-09-2017).
443 Y Raffie, J Whittle & E Pabian “Does a builder enjoy a lien over state owned property?” CDH.
See also Hunter & Turpin v Standard Bank, Pietermaritzburg (1883) 4 NLR 49, The Colonial
Government v Smith, Lawrence & Mould and Others (1885 – 1886) 4 SC 194 and Provincial
Administration (O.F.S) v John Adams & Co 1929 OPD 29.
444 Y Raffie, J Whittle & E Pabian “Does a builder enjoy a lien over state owned property?” CDH.
In support of this statement, see Vuka-Uzenzele Plant Hire & Civils CC v Ho Hup Corporations
(SA) (Pty) Ltd [2010] ZAECPEHC 54 20 -21 where it was held: “Consequently the contention
by the first Respondent that the applicant did not have a right of lien over the properties because
such a right does not exist over state property…Even if I had to consider these arguments by
the First Respondent, I was not referred to any authority, and I could not find any, in support of
the submission that no right of lien exists over state property.” See also Scott “Liens” LAWSA
15(2) para 62 with reference to Land Bank v Mans 1933 CPD 625.
445 See Trustees of Smookler v Golombick 1905 TH 221 222 and Hasewinkel v Simoes 1966 (2)
SA 81 (W) 84 where it was held: “This Court seems to me to have inherent jurisdiction to come
to the assistance of the owner to prevent injustice and, in order to do justice as between man
and man, may order delivery to the owner against adequate security.”
446 Nienaber “Construction Contracts” LAWSA 9 para 55. See also Ramsden Mckenzie’s Law of
Building and Engineering Contracts and Arbitration 115 and Grafton House, Ltd. v White and
Co 1923 WLD 117 121 – 122 where the court indicated that in instances where an architect
has given a certificate where there is a large amount due to the contractor, and only a small
proportion of that amount is paid into court, it would be inequitable for the court to remove the
contractor and repossess the owner.
447 2008 (3) SA 371 381.
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owner can recover possession by putting up satisfactory security.”
A court will assess each case and make a decision based on the individual facts of
each case.448 The court will not make an order which in any way diminishes the
security afforded by the lien, by for example, requesting less security than the
amount of the contractor’s claim.449
In some circumstances, an owner may avoid liability by affording the lienholder a
right to remove the improvement. This right of removal (ius tollendi) is largely
determined by the nature of the expense;450 in the instance of necessary expenses,
as the employer would have in any event incurred the expenses, this right of
removal is not available. In the instance of useful expenses, the court may in
determining whether to allow for removal of the improvement or an enrichment claim
exercise discretion, taking into account a number of factors451 and, in the instance
of luxurious remedies, this right of removal may serve as the only remedy available
to the lienholder.452
5 2 6 5 Lien should not be contracted out of
As a lien is a remedy, it will always be available to an innocent contractor unless
the parties have agreed otherwise. It is therefore common in the industry for an
employer to request a contractor to waive its right to exercise a lien against the
provision of adequate security (usually in the form of a payment guarantee).453
448 See Spitz v Kesting 1923 WLD 45 where it was held: “Each case will depend on its own
particular facts, and the Court, in exercising its discretion, will have regard to what is equitable
under all the circumstances.”
449 Ramsden Mckenzie’s Law of Building and Engineering Contracts and Arbitration 115.
450 Du Plessis The South African Law of Unjustified Enrichment 294.
451 Severability and the according separation of the improvement are critical considerations, but
do not oblige a court to award an enrichment claim if separation is not feasible. The desires of
the owner (a willingness or unwillingness to pay for the improvements) and whether the owner
has the means to pay for the improvements are also taken into account by the court. See Du
Plessis The South African Law of Unjustified Enrichment 295.
452 Du Plessis The South African Law of Unjustified Enrichment 295.
453 Finsen Building Contract 67. A typical example is when finance for a building project is provided
to the employer through a financial institution. In such instances, it is likely that the financial
institution will require the employer to obtain a lien waiver from the contractor, so that, should
the employer default on its payments to the financial institution, the latter will be able to execute
against the property without any encumbrances. The waiver need not be a total one: it can be
selective. The waiver can be limited to the financial institution which will safeguard the financial
institution's interests while still preserving the contractor's right to exercise his lien against the
employer.  See also Sandton Square Finance (Pty) Ltd v Vigliotti 1997 (1) SA 826 (W) and
Pheiffer v Van Wyk [2015] JOL 33632 (SCA). An alternative form of security would be to couple
the waiver with a cession by the employer so that the mortgagee can directly pay the contractor
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5 2 7  Liens in the Construction Context
There is support for the view that both debtor and creditor and enrichment liens may
be relied upon by a building contractor.454  In United Building Society v. Smookler’s
Trustee,455 it was said that
“…Now a builder clearly has a debtor and creditor lien, and where (as in most
cases) the contract is between the builder and the employer or his concurrent
creditors there is no doubt that the lien goes to the full amount of his expenses”
but also that, at least in cases where a builder has acted in good faith,
“we fail to see why he has not as against third parties the general rights which
the law gives to anyone who spends money on the preservation or
improvement of another person's property”.
In D Glaser & Sons (Pty) Ltd v The Master456 also, it was confirmed that:
“While the performance of work pursuant to a building contract will result in a
debtor-creditor lien (United Building Society v Smookler’s Trustees and Ano.,
supra) which comes into existence when the builder takes possession of the
site … and endures until he is paid his contract price provided he retains
possession …, it does not follow that such work will result in only such a lien.
Should the builder have incurred useful expenses …  or necessary expenses
…  he will, in my opinion, have the appropriate real liens over the land and
structures upon which he has worked. These liens are “real” liens …. They are
real rights (… Brooklyn House Furnishers (Pty) Limited v Knoetze and Sons
(supra at 271C-D). They are not created by contract”.
The view held by these cases, that a contractor would apart from any debtor and
creditor lien also, to the extent that it effects necessary or useful improvements, be
entitled to rely on an enrichment lien, dramatically extends the protection afforded
to a contactor. Whilst an enrichment lien would not secure the contractor’s claim for
payment of the outstanding contract price, it would still serve to avail against all third
proceeds of the loan – see Anonymous “Contractual and Legal” Master Builders Association.
See also NBS Bank Bpk v Dirma BK en ‘n Andere 1998 (1) SA 556 (T).
454 Scott “Liens” LAWSA 15(2) para 50, 58, 69 and 70.  According to Nienaber “Construction
Contracts” LAWSA 9 para 54 “a debtor and creditor lien is “available to the contractor against
the employer only for payment of what remains due to it under the contract. It is designed to
buttress the contractor’s claim for payment, not as a cause of action in itself but as a means of
resistance should the employer demand repossession of the premises without tendering
payment for work done on it”. An enrichment lien is said to be available “Where the contractor’s
expenditure preserved the property or enhanced its market value the contractor has, to the
extent of the building owner’s enrichment, an enrichment lien valid against all comers, including
the employer.”
455 1906 TS 623 at 631 and 633.
456 1979 (4) SA 780 (C) 788.  See also Ramsden Mckenzie’s Law of Building and Engineering
Contracts and Arbitration 111.
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
107
parties (such as successors in title, creditors of the owner and (prior) mortgagors)
and, would entitle the contractor a preference in concursus creditorum.
Whether the view asserted in these cases is well founded, is questionable, however.
The reliance in both judgments on the equitable principle enunciated in Digesta
50.17.206 that “by the law of nature it is only fair that nobody should become
wealthier through the loss and injury of another”,457 cannot override the requirement
that the enrichment must be without legal ground.  In an organised construction
context, improvements would invariably be made pursuant to a construction
contract,458 which would constitute a legal ground for retention of the benefits of the
work by the employer. This would accordingly exclude an enrichment action by the
contractor.  In turn, an enrichment lien could therefore not be relied upon against
“all comers”.   The equation, in the Glaser case, of the position of a builder who
contracts with someone who is not the owner of the property and so enriches the
owner and that of a builder who contracts with the owner of the property, 459 is
unpersuasive for the same reason.
Whether a subcontractor would meet the requirements for the exercise a lien in
instances of non-payment by the contractor raises a number of questions.  For a
number of reasons it is likely that a subcontractor may be precluded from exercising
a lien against an owner to compel performance by a contractor.460 Arguably a
subcontractor would be unable to meet the possession requirement as in many
instances, it is not afforded possession of the works or site but is merely provided
with access.
In respect of the principal obligation requirement, a subcontractor would also have
difficulty meeting this requirement in the context of debtor-creditor liens; there is no
contractual nexus between the owner (as employer) and the subcontractor.
Accordingly, there is no privity of contract and no principal obligation and the
457 United Building Society v. Smookler’s Trustee 1906 TS 623627; D Glaser & Sons (Pty) Ltd v
The Master 1979 (4) SA 780 (C) 780.
458 See discussion above and Du Plessis The South African Law of Unjustified Enrichment 270.
459 D Glaser & Sons (Pty) Ltd v The Master 1979 (4) SA 780 (C) 789.
460 See Loots Construction Law and Related Issues 417 – 420 and The Colonial Government v
Smith, Lawrence & Mould, and Others (1885-1886) 4 SC 194. See also Jointshelf 117 CC and
Others v Close – By Security CC v Close by Security [2007] ZANWHC 55.
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existence of a debtor-creditor lien cannot be asserted.
In respect of enrichment liens, it is also questionable whether a subcontractor,
would be able to meet the principal obligation requirement and claim from an owner
on the basis of enrichment461 and it seems that the possibility of reliance by the
subcontractor on an enrichment lien against the owner seems slim.462 However, it
has been asserted that in exceptional circumstances, such as where the owner has
not paid the contractor or where the owner acted in bad faith, it may be equitable to
award an enrichment claim.463
Therefore, it seems that liens are generally not available to a subcontractor in an
“organised construction context” where a subcontractor is in contract with the
contractor who is, in turn, in contract with the employer as owner of the land. This
position may however differ in more unusual instances where, for example, a
contactor builds on land which does not belong to the employer.464
These conclusions are supported by Wynland Construction (Pty) Ltd v Ashley-
Smith and Others465 where it was held that to allow a subcontractor a lien is
problematic:
“It would lead to the absurd result that an owner could be held to ransom by a
subcontractor who refuses to give up possession despite the fact that the owner
461 If the owner has paid the contractor for the subcontract services performed, arguably the
owner’s estate has not been enriched. Furthermore, there is a legal ground for the enrichment
entering the owner’s estate through the contract between the owner and the contractor. See
Du Plessis The South African Law of Unjustified Enrichment 302 – 303. Du Plessis also
considers the argument that a judicial discretion should exist in such instances but highlights
that this may be practically problematic giving examples such as where the value of the
improvements (and according value claimed by the subcontractor) are more than what the
owner agreed to pay the contractor for the subcontract works. In instances where the contractor
is insolvent, the principle of paritas creditorum may be upset.  An owner would also not be
afforded the contractual defences against the subcontractor as against the contractor.
462 See Du Plessis The South African Law of Unjustified Enrichment 270 and Visser “Enrichment”
LAWSA 17(3) para 209; Howes & Clover (Pty) Ltd v Ruskin and Others 1978 (1) SA 99 (W);
Buzzard Electrical (Pty) Ltd v 158 Jan Smuts Avenue Investments (Pty) Ltd and Another 1996
(4) SA 19 (A). Scott “Liens” LAWSA 15(2) para 58 n4.
463 See Du Plessis The South African Law of Unjustified Enrichment 303. Du Plessis also gives
the example of bad faith to be instances where the owner knows that it will never be called upon
to pay the contractor. Another instance could be where the owner is aware that the contractor
intends not to pay the subcontractor upon receiving payment from the owner.
464 See Du Plessis The South African Law of Unjustified Enrichment 299 – 302.
465 1985 (1) SA 534 (C) 539. Also see Loots Construction Law and Related Issues 93 and The
Colonial Government v Smith, Lawrence and Mould (1886) 4 SC 194.
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is obliged to pay (and might already have paid) in terms of the building contract.
An owner might thus be compelled to pay twice in order to recover his property.
It strikes me as most inequitable. The claim of the unpaid subcontractor lies
against the contractor and not the innocent owner.”
It is therefore advisable that a subcontractor does not rely solely on the potential
right to exercise a lien and should also look to other remedies to protect against
non-payment by a contractor.466
Therefore, under the South African law in an organised construction context, a
contractor may have, through reliance on a debtor creditor lien, a direct
performance mechanism, to encourage performance from a defaulting employer.
5 3  UAE Law
The Civil Code recognises the concept of a possessory lien and, whilst not formally
titled as such, this remedy embodied in Articles 416467 and 879468 of the Civil Code,
closely resembles the concept of a lien as understood in South African law.469
However, possessory liens are scarcely utilised by contractors in the UAE. The
reasons for this are not clear but, may be largely attributable to practical problems
arising from the exercise of a lien, together with the vagueness of the provisions of
the Civil Code regarding the requirements for the existence of a lien and, in addition,
a lack of precedent elaborating these elements on a case by case basis.
Article 416470 is the starting point and is of general application to all innominate
contracts.471 Article 416 says:
“Any person who has incurred necessary or beneficial expense on property of
another in his possession may refuse to return such property until he recovers
466 Some standard form contracts attempt to provide some form of protection for subcontractor for
example, requiring that an architect is provided with proof that the subcontractor was indeed
paid by the contractor.
467 For similar provisions in Gulf jurisdictions see Bahrain Civil Code Article 240; Kuwait Civil Code
Article 318; Oman Civil Code Article 289 and Qatar Civil Code Article 280.
468 Oman Civil Code Article 633 contains an equivalent provision.
469 A MacCuish & N Newdigate “Liens and Priority Rights – ‘self-help’ remedies for the disgruntled
contractor under UAE Law?” (12-05-2016).
http://www.mondaq.com/x/490630/Building+Construction/Liens+and+Priority+Rights+selfhelp
+remedies+for+the+disgruntled+contractor+under+UAE+Law Mondaq (accessed 25-09-
2017).
470 This Article falls within Chapter 1, Section 3 (6) which is titled “Rights of Retention”.
471 Grose Construction Law in the United Arab Emirates 194.
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what is due to him at law, in the absence of an agreement or provision of law
to the contrary.”
Article 879(1) and (2), are specifically applicable to muqawala and go on to state
the following:
“If the work of the contractor produces (a beneficial) effect on the property in
question, he may retain it until the consideration due is paid. And if it is lost in
his hands prior to the payment of the consideration, he shall not be liable to the
loss, nor shall he be entitled to the consideration.
If his work produces no (beneficial) effect on the property, he shall not have the
right to retain it pending payment of the consideration, and if he does so and
the property is lost, he shall be liable in the same manner as if he had
misappropriated it.”
The general provisions governing rights of retention472 are arguably applicable to
and to be read in conjunction with the right of a contractor to exercise a possessory
lien under Article 879.473
Therefore, Article 416 read with Article 879 provides the remedy of a possessory
lien to “any [contractor] who has incurred necessary or beneficial expense on the
property of another in his possession”. This remedy has its origin in the Civil Code
and is available to contractors in instances when a construction contract has been
terminated.474
On a straightforward reading of this Article, it is clear that in order for an innocent
contractor to exercise such a remedy with the intention of exacting compliance from
a defaulting employer, certain requirements must be met.
First, the property must be in the possession of the person. Should such possession
be lost, the innocent party will lose the right to exercise the lien. Article 419(1) says:
“The right of retention will be extinguished if the thing passes out of the hands
of the person in possession or control in the absence of any provision of law to
the contrary.”
472 Article 414 – Article 419 of the Civil Code.
473 Grose Construction Law in the United Arab Emirates 195.
474 Grose Construction Law in the United Arab Emirates 193. It is also important to note that the
parties can agree that the contractor will not exercise its right of retention and that Article 879
is not categorised as a “mandatory” provision of the Civil Code.
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However, the contractor has a remedy and will be able to demand, within a specified
period, that the property is restored to him, provided that it passed out of his
possession without his knowledge or despite any objections made it.475
Secondly, the contractor must have incurred an expense which should have been
necessary or beneficial and “on the property of another”. This confirms the position
under Article 879, which requires that “the work of the contractor produces (a
beneficial) effect on the property”. The exact definition of “beneficial effect” is
unclear, but on a straightforward reading can be taken to refer to:
“an effect which created any increase in the value of, or in some way improves,
the property.”476
Consequently, in instances where no beneficial effect is created on the property,
retention of the possession of the property by the contractor would be unlawful – a
beneficial effect is necessary in order for the contractor to lawfully rely on Article
879.477 In amplification, Article 879 says that in such a case, if the property is lost,
the ensuing consequences would be similar to an instance where the contractor
had misappropriated it.478
Pausing here, it is necessary to compare this to instances where the contractor,
under Article 879(1) is lawfully retaining the property and the property is lost prior
to payment of the consideration. In such instances, the contractor will not be liable
for the loss, but will also not be entitled to the consideration. The position on risk
under Article 879 is amplified by Article 417(1) of the Civil Code, which requires that
the innocent party preserves the property in its possession.479
475 See Article 419(2) which says: “Nevertheless, it shall be permissible for a person who retains a
thing which passes out of his possession either without his knowledge or despite his objection
to require within thirty days from the time he learns of its having so passed and prior to the
expiration of one year of its having so passed that it be restored to him.”
476 In some instances, the existence of a beneficial effect will be obvious, but a beneficial effect will
be more difficult to identify in other instances, such as where the works are found to be defective
or incomplete. See A MacCuish & N Newdigate “Liens and Priority Rights – ‘self-help’ remedies
for the disgruntled contractor under UAE Law?” Mondaq.
477 A MacCuish & N Newdigate “Liens and Priority Rights – ‘self-help’ remedies for the disgruntled
contractor under UAE Law?” Mondaq.
478 An alternative translation for the Arabic word “تﻔﻠﺗ:” is “damaged”. Ultimately the purpose of this
clause is to allocate risk to the contractor.
479 Article 417(3) provides further that, with the leave of the court, an innocent party may sell the
property if it fears the property “may suffer loss or deterioration…and the right of retention of a
thing shall pass to the proceeds of the sale thereof.”
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It is likely that more than one contractor480 can exercise a lien over the same
property or portion of the same property, as the Civil Code does not call for exclusive
possession by a party for the valid exercise of a lien.481 However, it is important to
note that a lien cannot be exercised over property belonging to the State.482
It is necessary to briefly acknowledge Article 1527 of the Civil Code483 which also
categorises priority rights484 as liens485 with the title of Chapter 3 of the Civil Code
being “Priority Rights (Liens)”. This provision of the Civil Code is specific to
contractors and building engineers and says the following:
“(1)  Amounts due to contractors and building engineers who have
undertaken to construct buildings or other installations, or to
reconstruct, repair or maintain the same, shall have the status of a
priority right over such structures, but to the extent to which it exceeds
the value of the land at the time of sale, by reason of such works.
(2)  Such priority right must be registered and it shall rank as from the time
of registration.”
A priority right under this Article 1527 is not comparable to the commonly accepted
definition of a lien as a retention right, as it does not offer tangible security (through
possession) over the employer’s property; instead it guarantees the contractor
priority for any claim which has increased the value of the proceeds of the sale of
480 Note that the right to exercise a lien by a subcontractor against an employer is not available as
Article 891 of the Civil Code says that “a sub-contractor shall have no claim against the
employer for anything due to him from the first contractor…”
481 The ranking of such contractors will also prove problematic. Article 418 does not assist in
instances where there is more than one contractor exercising a lien and says that “any person
who retains a thing in the exercise of his right of retention thereof has a prior right over other
competing creditors for the satisfaction of his rights thereof.” See also Article 1527 where “a
contractor may protect its rights in a more conventional manner by registering a priority right
over buildings or other works in order to  secure payment for the improvements and work
performed on such buildings or works.” - Brendal et al (2010) 24 Arab Law Quarterly 315.
482 See Article 247(1)(i) of the Civil Procedure Law No. 11 of 1992, Article 103(2) of the Civil Code,
Dubai Law No. 3 of 1996 and Brendal et al (2010) 24 Arab Law Quarterly 309.
483 For similar provisions see Bahrain Civil Code Article 1053, Kuwait Civil Code Article 1081, Qatar
Civil Code Article 1185.
484 See Article 1504 of the Civil Code which defines a priority right as “a specific right over property
following (such property), conferring upon the obligee priority status in obtaining his right in
accordance with his bargain and as acknowledged by law."
485 Article 110(2) of the Civil Code defines a lien as a “consequential property right” as opposed to
an “original property right”. It is questionable if this definition is applicable to possessory liens
originating from Article 879 of the Civil Code as the title “Lien” is not attributed to the mechanism
contained in these clauses.
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the employer’s property.486
Furthermore, in order to be effective, this priority right will need to be registered and
whilst the mode of registration is not clear from the Civil Code, it can be assumed
that such registration will take place in a similar manner to the registrations of
pledges and mortgages in the land registry.487 Whilst in theory there is a slight
degree of comfort afforded by priority rights, the operation of such rights in practice
is uncertain and rarely utilised by contractors.488
There is little guidance and no precedent for contractors to follow when seeking to
exercise a lien under UAE law. This uncertainty coupled with perceived practical
difficulties, results in few contractors opting to utilise this remedy to compel specific
performance by a non-performing employer.
5 4 The Red Book
The Red Book does not make provision for, nor does it expressly prohibit the
exercise of a lien by the contractor.489 Therefore the governing law of the Red Book
in each and every instance will be of particular importance when determining
whether a contractor may lawfully exercise a possessory lien and, if so, the
procedure to do so.
Whilst the Red Book does not make express provision for the exercise of a
possessory lien, it may be contended that, through implication, Article 16.3 creates
a right for an unpaid contractor, on termination, to exercise a possessory lien under
the Red Book.490
 Article 16.3 provides:
“After a notice of termination has taken effect the Contractor shall cease all
486 Grose Construction Law in the United Arab Emirates 196.
487 Grose Construction Law in the United Arab Emirates 196. See also Article 9 of Law No. (7) of
2006 concerning Real Property Registration in the Emirate of Dubai.
488 Grose Construction Law in the United Arab Emirates 196 – 197.
489 The Red Book does however require at cl 7.7 that each item of plant and material becomes the
property of the Employer - free from liens and other encumbrances. A contractor would need
to ensure that a supplier has waived its right to a lien to prevent it finding itself in breach of the
main contract.
490 Grose Construction Law in the United Arab Emirates 362.
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further work, hand over Contractor’s Documents, Plant, Materials and other
work for which the Contractor has received payment and leave the Site”.
Ownership of Plant and Materials will be transferred to the employer, irrespective
of payment, upon delivery of such items to the site.491 However, despite such a
transfer of ownership a contractor is under clause 16.3 entitled to retain and need
not hand over work for which payment has not been received including documents,
Plant and Materials. This, in effect entitles the contractor to exercise a contractual
lien492 over such items.493 The exercise of such a lien, in all likelihood, will coax a
non-performing employer into complying with its payment obligation.
Liens have a tenuous and speculative presence in the Red Book. Whilst the reasons
for this are not clear, it can possibly be asserted that due to the divergence between
the legal systems, the differences in approach to liens could not be harmonised into
a single approach suitable to all legal systems.  The original drafting of the FIDIC
Suite of Contracts was largely based on English law494 and the treatment of liens
under this system differs from under Civilian systems.495
It can accordingly be speculated that this divergence was resolved by the provisions
of the Red Book remaining silent so as to allow the provisions of the governing
national legal system to rule the existence and, if applicable, the operation of a lien
491 See cl 7.7 of the Red Book.
492 It is important to note that the possessory lien after termination is limited, as cl 16.3 requires
the contractor to “leave the site”. Should a contractor fail to do so, remaining in possession of
the site, a contractor would arguably be in breach of the contract provisions. Therefore, it may
not be tenable to argue that a contractor has the right to a lien over the site based on this clause.
Further as Grose indicates “if such Plant and Material have been delivered into the custody and
control of the employer, for example to a laydown area controlled by the employer, the lien is
ordinarily extinguished.” Grose Construction Law in the United Arab Emirates 362. This will be
because the contractor will be unable to meet the requirement of possession. Therefore, it may
even be asserted that the contractor’s right to a exercise lien is limited to Plant and Materials
which are not in the vicinity of the site, making the operational scope of a lien after termination
of the contract very limited, especially as in some instances the provisions of the Red Book will
take precedence over the governing law; this may potentially result in conflict between the Red
Book and the governing law regarding the existence and operation of a lien.
493 Grose Construction Law in the United Arab Emirates 362.
494 The original form of the FIDIC Contract closely mirrored the 4th edition of the ICE Conditions of
contract. See N Gould “An Introduction to FIDIC, International Procurement and Development
Bank Procurement” (26-04-2016) ICE
https://www.ice.org.uk/ICEDevelopmentWebPortal/media/Documents/News/Membership/FIDI
C-paper-26-27-April-2016.pdf (accessed 03-07-2018). See also See C Wade “The FIDIC
Contracts and Current Trends” Society of Construction Law.
495 Despite English law recognising liens as a legal right to possess property until a claim is met,
the types of liens, classification and operation of such liens are largely divergent to those under
a civilian system. See Wiese 2017 TSAR 98.
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as a self-help remedy.496  Therefore, in instances prior to the termination, where an
unpaid contractor wishes to rely on a lien, the contractor will need to turn to the
provisions of the governing law.
Whilst this approach is suitable under legal systems where the existence and
operation of liens are sufficiently regulated (such as South Africa), difficulties
present themselves in jurisdictions where this concept is underdeveloped and lacks
legal certainty. This often results in misuse or disuse, depriving an innocent party
of a powerful self-help remedy.
5 5 Comparison
Whilst liens are not resorted to with the same frequency under South African law
and the Civil Code, parallels are identifiable between liens in both jurisdictions.
Fundamentally, in both systems, aggrieved parties will have a right of retention in
instances where the aggrieved party has incurred “necessary or beneficial” expense
on the property of another. Furthermore, the requirements for the valid exercise of
a lien are similar in both jurisdictions.
A requirement under the South African law is that the contractor must be a creditor
of the employer either by way of contract or through enrichment. This is in contrast
to the Civil Code where the requirement is not as sophisticated and does not
distinguish the underlying cause by which the contractor incurred a “beneficial
expense on the property of another” – this approach arguably telescopes liens
under South African law into a single institution. Notwithstanding this lack of
distinction, the nature of this requirement under both systems is comparable and it
is clear under both systems is that the expense must have been actually incurred
by the contractor.
Common to both systems is the requirement of possession. Continuous possession
is required, with both systems providing for recourse in instances where an
aggrieved party is unlawfully deprived of such possession. Under South African law
and UAE law, the aggrieved party must be dispossessed without its consent, but
under UAE law, reliance on this recourse is subject to express stand-alone time
496 In the 2017 edition of the Red Book, the existence of a lien remains as tenuous as under the
1999 edition.
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limitations and must be exercised within such time frames.
Under South African law, the concept of possession has been developed by the
recognition that apart from the element of physical control, the intention of the holder
is also relevant to determine whether an aggrieved contractor is effectively in
possession of the works. This elaboration is most certainly helpful when determining
whether, in view of the range of possibilities that might occur, a contractor can be
said to have met the requirement of possession.
Whilst in possession, the allocation of risk and ensuing consequences in respect of
loss or damage to the works or site differs. Under UAE law, whilst the contractor is
obliged to preserve the property in its possession, if the property is “lost”, the
contractor will not be liable for the loss but will not be entitled to consideration. This
is in contrast to South African law where the contractor carries the risk and, will
remain responsible for loss or damage to the site or works whilst in its possession.
As neither system calls for exclusive possession, it is likely that a multiplicity of
contractors may exercise a lien over the same property. However, under both
systems, the right to exercise a lien is likely not to be available to an aggrieved
subcontractor against a contractor. This is legislated against under UAE law at
Article 891 (advancing on the principle of privity of contract). Under South African
law, a subcontractor will also not be able to rely on a debtor-creditor lien due to lack
of a contractual nexus with the employer but may, in very rare instances, meet the
requirements for an enrichment lien.
The requirements for the exercise of a lien under South African law and the Civil
Code are largely similar. However, due to the binding nature of precedent under
South African law and, the regularity in which this self-help remedy is used by
aggrieved contractors, the nature of and, way in which a lien is exercised, has been
developed and refined with reference to practical situations. This is in contrast to
UAE law where, whilst previous judgments may certainly be persuasive, they are
not binding on lower courts. This, coupled with the seeming unpopularity of this self-
help remedy, has resulted in the possessory lien under the Civil Code remaining in
a state which could benefit from a comparison with the more established South
African institution.
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5 6  Conclusion
The lawful exercise of a lien is a powerful mechanism to compel performance by a
defaulting employer. A lien has the debilitating potential to bring an entire project to
a standstill, leaving an employer with no choice but to pay or reimburse the
contractor and it is no surprise that this remedy is used fairly regularly in South
Africa.  However, as indicated, whilst the remedy of a lien is legislated and available
under UAE law, it is scarcely used in that jurisdiction.
There may be many pitfalls when engaging with this remedy and it is therefore
essential that the concept of a lien is well developed and recognised in a legal
system. Should this not be the case, and this is a shortcoming of the Red Book, it
is imperative that the relevant construction contract includes clear contractual
provisions to ensure certainty and the effective utilisation of this self-help remedy -
a key tool and an effective self-help remedy for an unpaid contractor.
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Chapter 6
Liquidated Damages – A Self-Help Remedy for the Employer
6 1 Introduction
The contractual mechanism entitling an employer to levy a specified monetary
amount (liquidated damages)497 against a contractor under a construction contract
in the event of a breach of contract by the latter, is a powerful and effective means
to compel timeous and complete performance by a contractor.
The obligation to pay such a predetermined and agreed to sum of money is
imposed, by virtue of contract, on the contractor (usually) in instances where the
contractor does not complete the works by a fixed date or where the works fail to
meet pre-agreed performance criteria.
It is therefore recognised in the industry498 that the primary motivation for the
inclusion of liquidated damages clauses is to guarantee an innocent employer a set
sum in the instance of breach by the contractor. This relieves the employer of the
burden of proving before a court or arbitrator499 the requirements of a damages
claim flowing from a breach of the construction contract.500 This ease with which the
497 For the purpose of this chapter and for ease of terminology, the term “liquidated damages” (a
term commonly used, both correctly and incorrectly in industry) is used to collectively refer to
both “penalties”, i.e. an arbitrary amount specified to deter a breach and “liquidated and
ascertained damages” (LADs), i.e. an amount intended to reflect the loss likely to be suffered
as a result of a breach. The term liquidated damages, for the purposes of this chapter, should
not be associated with the definition resorted to in many common law jurisdictions where
“liquidated damages” is sometimes used interchangeably with LADs.
498 Ramsden Mckenzie’s Law of Building and Engineering Contracts and Arbitration 184; Finsen
Building Contract 143.
499 In most instances an employer will be contractually entitled to offset the liquidated damages
from the sums owed to the contractor, thereby assisting greatly with cash flow of the employer.
It may be highly detrimental for the business of an employer to wait for a decision by an
arbitrator or the court before being entitled to such amounts.
500 “These damages may even exceed those which would otherwise be legally recoverable…
[including] losses which would be irrecoverable due to the operation of… [legal] principles of
remoteness or mitigation” - M Bell “Liquidated Damages and The Doctrine of Penalties:
Rethinking the War on Terrorem” (26-05-2011) Society of Construction Law
https://www.scl.org.uk/papers/liquidated-damages-and-doctrine-penalties-rethinking-war-
terrorem (accessed 12 -10-2018). See also Finsen Building Contract 143 and Suisse Atlantique
Societe d'Armament SA v RNV Rotterdamsche Kolen Centrale [1967] AC 361; C Chern
“Remedies” in E Baker, B Mellors, S Chalmers & A Lavers (eds) FIDIC Contracts Law and
Practice (2013) 8.1 8.39. For example, under South African law, should a contract not contain
a liquidated damages clause, the innocent employer would be required to prove: a breach of
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employer is entitled to claim liquidated damages will, in turn, most certainly serve
as a compelling motivator for a contractor to perform.
In many instances, this contractually agreed remedy is attractive even to a
contractor; informing it “that its liability is limited to the maximum of the fixed sums
specified in the liquidated damages clause in the contract.”501 This enables a
contractor to make provision for its potential exposure and to plan its risks
accordingly,502 serving a “desirable commercial purpose in that it allows parties to
anticipate with maximal certainty the remedial consequences where the contract is
breached.”503 It is also likely that the parties themselves will be best placed to
quantify the prospective loss as opposed to a third party such as a court or an
arbitrator.504 However, even though a contractor is able to price this risk and plan
accordingly, it will in all likelihood still not want to find itself facing the imposition of
liquidated damages and will accordingly do its utmost to perform timeously.
It is important to distinguish between liquidated and ascertained damages (“LADs”)
as a “genuine pre-estimate” of the loss incurred and a so-called pure penalty
because in some jurisdictions, the latter is simply, unlawful and legally
unenforceable.505 In the construction industry, there are many conflicting opinions
on how to determine whether a predetermined amount constitutes a penalty or,
contract, a causal link between the breach and the loss suffered, the damage itself and that the
damage is a foreseeable consequence of the breach of contract.
501 A Blomfield “Amending FIDIC Provisions on Delay Liquidated Damages: a Case Note on J
Murphy & Sons Ltd v Beckton Energy Ltd [2016] EWHC 607 (TCC)” (03-06-2016) King &
Spalding https://www.kslaw.com/blog-posts/amending-fidic-provisions-delay-liquidated-
damages-case-note-j-murphy-sons-ltd-v-beckton-energy-ltd-2016-ewhc-607-tcc (accessed
16-10-17).
502 Chern “Remedies” in FIDIC Contracts Law and Practice 8.39. In some instances, a contractor
may even build potential liquidated damages into the contract price tendered.
503 M Bell “Liquidated Damages and The Doctrine of Penalties: Rethinking the War on Terrorem
Society of Construction Law. The author goes on to say that “it has been proposed that the
benefits of LADs extend beyond the parties, with economic efficiency being broadly promoted
through resources being out into up-front negotiation rather than litigation.”
504 Blomfield “Amending FIDIC Provisions on Delay Liquidated Damages: a Case Note on J
Murphy & Sons Ltd v Beckton Energy Ltd [2016] EWHC 607 (TCC)” King & Spalding. This
assertion may however be countered by the argument that as a court will determine the
damages retrospectively, the quantum reached will more closely reflect the actual damages
suffered.
505 The law governing of the construction contract is of extreme importance to ascertain whether
the application of penalty provisions is lawful.
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whether it constitutes a genuine predetermined estimate of the loss. In the matter
of Pearl Assurance Co Ltd v Union Government506 it was held:
“If the object of the forfeit is to compel performance by fear of the
consequences, it is a penalty; if it is genuinely to pre- estimate damages it is
not”.
Penalties (as opposed to LADs) will therefore serve as an even greater motivator
to compel specific performance by a contractor with “the primary purpose…[being]
to incentivise a contractor to complete on time by way of a punitive financial
consequence of failure.”507
Therefore, whilst viewed as contentious in some jurisdictions,508 liquidated
damages clauses are highly effective as a contractor is forewarned, at the
conclusion of the contract, of the potential consequences should it breach the
contract.
In practice, at the conclusion of the construction contract, parties will agree that, in
an instance of a failure to meet performance criteria or delayed completion or both,
the employer will be entitled to levy liquidated damages against the contractor.
Where liquidated damages provisions are applicable to delayed completion,
liquidated damages are usually levied for the period between the agreed date for
completion of the works and the actual date of completion of the works509 - in
summary:
“provided that if the contract works are not completed by a fixed date the
contractor shall be obliged to pay a certain sum to the employer as a forfeit,
such sum depending on the period which elapses between the date fixed for
completion and the date of actual completion.”510
506 1933 AD 277. Note also the leading decisions of the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom –
Cavendish Square Holding BV v El Makdessi [2015] UKSC 67 and Parking Eye Ltd v Beavis
[2015] UKSC 67.
507 Grose Construction Law in the United Arab Emirates and the Gulf 138. It is also asserted in
industry that “incentive payments” for early completion are more effective than liquidated
damages provisions. See A McCormack “Is there a better alternative to liquidated damages on
construction projects?” (06-05-2014) Corrs Chambers Westgarth
https://www.corrs.com.au/thinking/insights/is-there-a-better-alternative-to-liquidated-damages-
on-construction-projects/ (accessed 09-01-2019).
508 Grose Construction Law in the United Arab Emirates and the Gulf 138.
509 Ramsden Mckenzie’s Law of Building and Engineering Contracts and Arbitration 184.
510 184.
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A liquidated damages provision presupposes a breach by the contractor.
Therefore, however in instances where the breach or delay is not attributable to the
contractor and instead is attributable to the employer511 or is outside of the control
of both parties (for example where force majeure is the cause of the delay),512 the
employer will not be entitled to levy liquidated damages against the contractor.
Liquidated damages are generally applicable to the late completion of the works as
a whole. However, some contracts also make provision for the imposition of
liquidated damages to the late completion of pre-agreed sections or milestones and
non-compliance with such provisions will result in liquidated damages being
imposed for the particular section or milestone.513 Where a liquidated damages
provision relates to a failure to meet agreed performance criteria, parties usually
specify a measurable performance target with an agreed minimum level of
performance. Should the contractor fail to meet this minimum level of performance,
the employer will be entitled to levy liquidated damages.514
The liquidated damages amount will be pre-agreed and (usually) formulaically
determinable.515  It is also common for parties to agree on a contractual cap516
511 Commonly known as the “prevention principle” – the employer cannot benefit from its own
wrongdoing. See Hansen and Schrader v Deare (1883-1884) 3 EDC 36 46 where it was held:
“As it was the defendant's own act which prevented the completion of the contract by the time
stipulated, he cannot now take advantage of the penalty clause.” This was confirmed in Kelly
and Hingle's Trustees v Union Government (Minister of Public Works) 1928 TPD 272. See
Ramsden Mckenzie’s Law of Building and Engineering Contracts and Arbitration 181 and see
Ranch International Pipelines(Transvaal) (Pty) Ltd v LMG Construction (City) (Pty) Ltd 1984 (3)
SA 861 (W) and Van Huyssteen et al Contract: General Principles 358-359 on the notion of a
creditor’s breach (mora creditoris) and its relevance in this regard.
512 In such instances, some contracts may make provision that the contractor is entitled to an
extension of time but not cost. A discussion of “extension of time” is outside the scope of this
dissertation.
513 Some construction contracts may also make provision for the employer to “take over” portions
of the works prior to completion of the whole of the works.  In such instances it is likely that the
contract will include a provision that the amount of the liquidated damages is reduced pro rata.
Note that this is distinct from sectional completion. See for example cl 10.2 of the Red Book.
514 A El Tawil Liquidated Damages and Penalty in Construction Industry Comparative Study Islamic
University Gaza (2008) 4.
515 For example, x, amount per day or week. See Nienaber “Construction Contracts” LAWSA 9
para 49. Also see Grose Construction Law in the United Arab Emirates and the Gulf 138 who
says: “The level of financial liability is calculated by reference to a pre-agreed formula, in which
the principle variable is the duration of the delay.”
516 A MacCuish & N Newdigate “A Favourable Legislated Loophole for the Tardy Contractor” (20-
10-2015) Mondaq
http://www.mondaq.com/x/438786/Contract+Law/A+Favourable+Legislated+Loophole+For+T
he+Tardy+Contractor (accessed 16-10-2017).
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(usually in the region of 10% of the contract price)517 which such liquidated damages
may not exceed. There also cannot be cumulative recovery of this contractually
agreed amount and further damages suffered on account of the same breach and
a “liquidated damages clause in a contract covers all the damage for non-
completion or constitutes an exhaustive agreement as to the damages which are or
are not to be payable…”.518
Such provisions are triggered automatically upon breach of the relevant term by the
contractor and, it is common under many construction contracts that no further
juristic act519 is required by the employer before it will be entitled to impose
liquidated damages.
Liquidated damages provisions are therefore highly effective and commonly used.
This chapter will look at how such clauses are viewed under South African law, the
law of the UAE and the Red Book.
6 2 South African Law
Under South African law, the Conventional Penalties Act, 15 of 1962 recognises
the imposition of both LADs and penalties as lawful and regulates the application of
such clauses.520
Section 1 of Conventional Penalties Act says:
“A stipulation, hereinafter referred to as a penalty stipulation, whereby it is
provided that any person shall, in respect of an act or omission, in conflict with
a contractual obligation, be liable to pay a sum of money or to deliver or to
perform anything for the benefit of any other person, hereinafter referred to as
a creditor, either by way of penalty or as liquidated damages, shall subject to
the provisions of this Act, be capable of being enforced in any competent court.”
A penalty provision within the statutory definition may contain a purely punitive
element calculated to compel performance through fear. Prior to the enactment of
the Conventional Penalties Act, South African law, under the influence of the
517 See for example Dubai Court of Cassation 138/1994 dated 13 November 1994.
518 Ramsden Mckenzie’s Law of Building and Engineering Contracts and Arbitration 184.
519 A MacCuish & N Newdigate “A Favourable Legislated Loophole for the Tardy Contractor”
Mondaq.
520 The reference to “liquidated damages” in this discussion of South African law includes both
LADs and penalty stipulations: see n497.
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English Common Law, declined to enforce provisions that were purely in terrorem
of the debtor and recognised as enforceable only those where under the amount
stipulated was a genuine pre-estimate of the loss likely to follow on the breach.521
The promulgation of the Conventional Penalties Act saw this English Common Law
importation being abolished in South Africa. The restoration of the Roman Dutch
approach strictly speaking makes the distinction between penalties and LADs
unnecessary.522
Section 1 requires that the liability of the contractor to pay the liquidated damages523
must arise from a breach of a contractual obligation524 and the Act also regulates
the cumulation between the claim for the agreed upon amount and other remedies
for breach that might be available. Where an employer accepts or is obliged to
accept a defective or non-timeous performance, the stipulated amount will only be
recoverable if it was expressly stipulated for the particular defect or delay.525 In
respect of a breach which is the subject of the provision, an employer will not be
entitled to claim both liquidated damages and general damages.526  Some
construction contracts527 provide the employer with an election to choose, at the
conclusion of the contract, between penalties and damages. This is in accordance
with the proviso in the final sentence of sec 2(1) of the Act.528 Furthermore, an
employer, despite the completion or cancellation of a construction contract, will still
be entitled to levy and claim liquidated damages from the contractor529 provided
that the claim had already accrued to it. 530
521 See JC De Wet “Memorandum Insake Straf en Verbeurdingsbedinge” in JJ Gauntlett (ed)
Opuscula Miscellanea (1979) 63 and the essay on “Penalties and Liquidated Damages” in the
same publication at 203; cf Van Huyssteen et al Contract: General Principles 423.
522 Loots Construction Law and Related Issues 398.
523 In the construction context the penalty will usually not consist of an undertaking to “deliver or to
perform anything for the benefit of any other person”.
524 Otherwise the stipulation will not be classified as a penalty - Ramsden Mckenzie’s Law of
Building and Engineering Contracts and Arbitration 186.
525   Section 2(2) of the Conventional Penalties Act.
526 See Section 2(1) of the Conventional Penalties Act; cf Plumbago Financial Services (Pty) Ltd
t/a Toshiba Rentals v Janap Joseph t/a Project Finance 2008 (3) SA 47 (C) 23; See also Loots
Construction Law and Related Issues 399.
527 E.g. the JBCC Principal Building Agreement.
528 See Van Huyssteen et al Contract: General Principles 428.
529 426.
530 In Walker’s Fruit Farm Ltd v Sumner 1930 TPD 394, a general rule was established (and
confirmed in many subsequent cases), that certain claims accruing prior to contract cancellation
will survive, as independent causes of action, the cancellation of the contract, provided the
claim had accrued, was due and enforceable and, importantly that the contract or performance
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The employer’s right to liquidated damages is an automatic result of the contractor’s
breach531 and the employer will not need to perform any juristic act to exercise this
entitlement other than to establish the prescribed breach on part of the contractor.532
Whether liquidated damages may be levied and deducted from sums owed to the
contractor depends on the terms of the contract, and parties may agree that such
deductions may only be made at the end of the contract or during the progress of
the works.533 In Collins Submarine Pipelines Africa (Pty) Ltd v Durban City
Council534 it was held that “penalties could be deducted during the progress of the
work once the contractor had exceeded the time limit.”535
The right to levy liquidated damages is easily available and enforceable by an
employer and, is an effective means to encourage a defaulting contractor to perform
properly and timeously. However, the employer’s right is not completely unfettered.
The contractor is provided with legislative protection under section 3 of the
Conventional Penalties Act, which provides for a judicial discretion to reduce the
amount stipulated in appropriate circumstances.536  It is arguable that this approach
maintains a superior balance between the interests of the parties and better
respects the principle of freedom of contract than is the case in jurisdictions where
purely penal stipulations are simply unenforceable.537
itself was divisible. Cancellation of the contract therefore operates ex nunc as opposed to ex
tunc. See Van Huyssteen et al Contract: General Principles 392 – 393.
531 Finsen Building Contract 144.
532 Loots Construction Law and Related Issues 399.
533 The date of the prejudice is also not relevant – Loots Construction Law and Related Issues 399.
534 1968 (4) SA 763 (A).
535 Ramsden Mckenzie’s Law of Building and Engineering Contracts and Arbitration 187. See also
Nienaber “Construction Contracts” LAWSA 9 para 50.
536 Ramsden Mckenzie’s Law of Building and Engineering Contracts and Arbitration 186. The
courts will however, as far as possible, continue to respect and adhere to the maxim of pacta
sunt servanda. It is debatable if this “judicial discretion” extends to arbitrators – Binnington “The
Application of Penalties (but which end of the donkey gets the carrot?)” BCA.
537 See also Ramsden Mckenzie’s Law of Building and Engineering Contracts and Arbitration 185
and on the approach before the introduction of the Conventional Penalties Act, see Pearl
Assurance Co Ltd v Union Government 1933; Pearl Assurance Co Ltd v Union Government
1934 AD 560; Durban Corporation v McNeil 1940 AD 66, Tobacco Manufacturers Committee v
Green & Sons 1953 (3) SA 480 (A).  See also Kelly and Hingle's Trustees v Union Government
(Minister of Public Works) 1928 TPD 284 where Feetham J provided four guidelines to be
applied by a court when considering the application of liquidated damages clauses in
construction contracts. Whilst most helpful, it is not entirely clear if all of these guidelines have
survived the promulgation of the Conventional Penalties Act.
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Section 3 of the Conventional Penalties Act is to the effect that:
“If upon hearing of a claim for a penalty, it appears to the court that such penalty
is out of proportion to the prejudice suffered by the creditor by reason of the act
or omission in respect of which the penalty was stipulated, the court may
reduce the penalty to such an extent as it may consider equitable in the
circumstances: Provided that in determining the extent of such prejudice the
court shall take into consideration not only the creditor’s proprietary interest,
but every other rightful interest which may be affected by the act or omission in
question.”
When looking to apply section 3, a court will look to determine whether a liquidated
damages provision exists under the contract538 and, whether the liquidated
damages are disproportionate to the employer’s prejudice - justifying a reduction.539
The court will then assess the reduction.540 In Plumbago Financial Services (Pty)
Ltd t/a Toshiba Rentals v Janap Joseph t/a Project Finance 541 (“Plumbago Financial
Services”) it was held that:
“The best method of determining this is to compare what the plaintiff's position
would have been had the defendant not defaulted in the contract as opposed
to what the plaintiff's position would be should it obtain judgment in the full sum
sought.”
It should be noted, however, that the Conventional Penalties Act does not require
a comparison between the stipulated amount and the actual patrimonial loss
suffered by the employer: the focus is on the prejudice suffered by the latter. This
requires a regard to “every other rightful interest” of the employer and thus goes
much wider than an enquiry into the patrimonial loss occasioned by the breach.542
It was accordingly emphasised in Van Staden v Central South African Land and
Mines543 that the assessment must be subjective in nature, giving regard not only
to the pecuniary interests of the employer, but also to circumstances where there
538 Note again Section 1, which requires that liability of the contractor to pay the liquidated damage
must arise from breach of a contractual obligation.
539 Plumbago Financial Services (Pty) Ltd t/a Toshiba Rentals v Janap Joseph t/a Project Finance
2008 (3) SA 47 (C) 23.
540 Plumbago Financial Services (Pty) Ltd t/ Toshiba Rentals v Janap Joseph t/a Project Finance
2008 (3) SA 47 (C) 30.  Note the Conventional Penalties Act does not compare damages
suffered by the employer, but the prejudice suffered – this is much wider than damages. Loots
Construction Law and Related Issues 399. See also Binnington “The Application of Penalties
(but which end of the donkey gets the carrot?)” BCA.
541 2008 (3) SA 47 (C) 31.
542 Loots Construction Law and Related Issues 399. See also Binnington “The Application of
Penalties (but which end of the donkey gets the carrot?)” BCA.
543 1969 (4) SA 349 (W) 353. See also Van Huyssteen et al Contract: General Principles 427.
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has been no financial loss, but other legitimate and protectible interests of the
employer are at stake:
“Everything that can reasonably be considered to harm or hurt, or be calculated
to harm or hurt a creditor in his property his person, his reputation, his work,
his activities, his convenience, his mind, or in any way whatever interferes with
his rightful interests as a result of the act or omission of the debtor, must be
brought to the notice of the Court, be taken into account by the Court in deciding
whether the penalty is, in terms of section 3 of the Conventional Penalties Act,
15 of 1962, out of proportion to the prejudice suffered by the creditor as a result
of the act or omission of the debtor…The test as to all this is, in my view, a
subjective test of prejudice…No doubt in most cases the monetary aspect will
play an important role, indeed the paramount role in the consideration of the
matter by the Court, but one can conceive of circumstances where a seller may
sustain no pecuniary loss arising directly out of the breach, yet he may
nevertheless be seriously prejudiced... For example… It is very usual in
building contracts for penalty provisions to be stipulated for the timeous delivery
of a completed building, yet it may well be that the stipulator suffers no
monetary damage by a late delivery”
It is important to note that the burden of proof will lie with the contractor to prove
that the employer did not suffer any prejudice544  or “that the penalty is out of
proportion to the prejudice suffered by the [employer].”545 In Steinberg v Lazard546
it was held:
“There is absolutely no need for the creditor to allege prejudice in claiming a
penalty. The onus being on the debtor it is for the debtor to allege and prove its
absence…”
This was confirmed in Plumbago Financial Services547 and it was further held in this
judgment that, a court is empowered itself to raise and consider the excessiveness
of the liquidated damages, despite the issue not being raised in the pleadings:548
“There is some debate as to whether a court has the power to act of its own
accord in opposed proceedings in raising the question of whether an excessive
penalty has been claimed...[a] flexible approach was advocated in Courtis
Rutherford & Sons CC & others v Sasfin (Pty) Ltd, a Full Bench decision of this
Division. Van Zyl J observed that it is, and remains, the court's primary function
to ensure that justice is done on the basis of what is just, fair and reasonable
under all circumstances. By implication, he expressed approval of a court
544 Smit v Bester 1977 (4) SA 937 (A).
545 Ramsden Mckenzie’s Law of Building and Engineering Contracts and Arbitration 186.
546 2006 (5) SA 42 (SCA). See also Citibank NA, South Africa Branch v Paul NO and Another 2003
(4) SA 180 (T).
547 2008 (3) SA 47 (C). See also Ramsden Mckenzie’s Law of Building and Engineering Contracts
and Arbitration 187.
548 Plumbago Financial Services (Pty) Ltd t/a Toshiba Rentals v Janap Joseph t/a Project Finance
2008 (3) SA 47 (C) 52-53. See also Van Huyssteen et al Contract: General Principles 427. The
authors go on to say that the discretion of the court is in fact a power coupled with a duty.
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dealing with the question of an excessive penalty even where that was not
formally pleaded, subject to it being fully canvassed in evidence and argument.”
A defaulting contractor is therefore able to rely on section 3 of the Conventional
Penalties Act, even if not formally pleaded, with a court being authorised to raise
the question of excessive liquidated damages. Section 3 is therefore a significant
tool in avoiding unduly harsh punitive stipulations. This is, however, tempered by
the high burden of proof on the defaulting contractor in order for it to be successful
under this section,549 and the general reluctance by the courts to interfere with what
parties have agreed, continuing to respect and adhering to the maxim of pacta sunt
servanda.550
Liquidated damages stipulations are therefore recognised and respected under
South African law. The ease in which an innocent employer can impose liquidated
damages (especially in instances where such liquidated damages stipulations are
punitive), and the high threshold required by the contractor to reduce penalty
stipulations are key motivators for a defaulting contractor to perform not only
specifically but timeously as well. Therefore, it can be said that under South African
law, liquidated damages stipulations (especially those which contain a penal
element) are an effective motivator, available to an innocent employer, to compel
timeous specific performance by a defaulting contractor.551
6 3 UAE Law
The Civil Code, somewhat indirectly, recognises payment of a contractually agreed
compensation as a means to encourage specific performance by a defaulting
contractor. Article 386 of the Civil Code says:
549 There is only one reported judgment (Afriscan Construction (Pty) Ltd v Umkhanyakude District
Municipality & another [2005] JOL 14365 (D)) in which a contractor has been successful in the
reduction of a penalty under section 3 in a construction context. This indicates the difficulty
contractors may face when seeking to rely on this section. See Binnington “The Application of
Penalties (but which end of the donkey gets the carrot?)” BCA.
550 Finsen Building Contract 144.
551 See an industry example of this viewpoint in MJ Maritz & S Tshikila “The Extent of Enforcement
of The Penalty Clause on Public Sector Construction Contracts in South Africa”
http://www.irbnet.de/daten/iconda/CIB_DC24516.pdf University of Pretoria (accessed 14-10-
2018) where a study was performed which assessed the extent of enforcement of penalties by
Public Sector clients. In the study, one of the questions asked was whether it was believed that
penalty/LAD provisions are still relevant in construction contracts. An overwhelming majority
(just under 80%) indicated that penalty provision remain relevant and are “a useful tool to
dissuade the contractor from completing the works later than the approved date.”
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“If it is impossible for an obligor to give specific performance of an obligation,
he shall be ordered to pay compensation for non-performance of his
obligation…The same shall apply in the event that the obligor defaults in the
performance of his obligation.”
Should a contractor fail to perform, the employer will be entitled to claim damages
as a consequence of this non-performance. Article 390(1) goes on to provide that
contracting parties may fix this compensation in advance by agreement.552 This
Article says:
“The contracting parties may fix the amount of compensation in advance by
making a provision therefor in the contract or in a subsequent agreement,
subject to the provisions of the law.”
Therefore, in principle, Article 390(1) recognises the validity of “liquidated damages”
clauses,553 and these are common in many construction contracts.554 Courts
generally recognise such clauses with an entitlement to compensation being
dependent on the following:555
i. The breach of contract was committed by a party who agreed to be bound
by the liquidated damages clause;556
ii. Losses were actually incurred by the innocent employer endeavouring to rely
on the liquidated damage clause557  and, the innocent employer must be able
552 If the agreement is subsequently terminated, an employer will lose this contractual remedy.
553 See also Whelan UAE Civil Code and Ministry of Justice Commentary 2:0577 which says:
“Entitlement to compensation is a prerequisite for the application of this Article. If compensation
is not payable, the provisions of this Article do not come into operation. If compensation is due
and payable and the amount determined by the parties is compatible with the damage
sustained, then well and good.”
554 There is an indication that the application of liquidated damages in respect of “administrative
Contracts” (contracts that serve the public interest) may differ. This is because the purpose of
such contracts is to deliver “public or non-generating revenue works”. See Grose Construction
Law in the United Arab Emirates and the Gulf 143. Liquidated damages in the context of such
administrative contracts is outside the scope of this thesis and the discussion pertains only to
commercial entities.
555 N Bremer “Liquidated Damages under the Law of the United Arab Emirates and its
interpretation by the UAE Courts” (21-11-2015) Research Gate
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/284279837_Liquidated_Damages_under_the_Law_
of_the_United_Arab_Emirates_and_its_Interpretation_by_UAE_Courts (accessed 16-10-
2017) 206. See also F Attia “Liquidated Damages – The Bigger Picture” (05-03-2012) Law
Update http://www.tamimi.com/en/magazine/law-update/section-6/march-5/liquidated-
damages-the-bigger-picture.html (accessed 16-10-2017).
556 Bremer “Liquidated Damages under the Law of the United Arab Emirates and its interpretation
by the UAE Courts” Research Gate 206. See also Union Supreme Court No. 610 of JY 20 & 7
of JY 21.
557 Bremer “Liquidated Damages under the Law of the United Arab Emirates and its interpretation
by the UAE Courts” Research Gate 206. The author goes on to refer to a judgment given by
the Supreme Court Petition No. 26 of Judicial Year 24 dated 1 June 2004 where a main
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to prove damage was actually incurred;558
iii. A causative connection is present between the breach and the loss suffered
by the employer.559
However, arguments do exist that the recognition of liquidated damages clauses is
in contravention to Islamic law whereby compensation for damages should only
arguably be given where the damage is able to be quantified, sufficiently
substantiated and only in the amount suffered. A contractual obligation to
compensate the employer in an amount which is potentially in excess of the damage
suffered gives rise to uncertainty and may accordingly infringe on the principle of
gharar.560
As parties determine the amount of compensation payable at the commencement
of the muqawala, i.e. in advance and prior to damage being incurred, it is unlikely
that the agreed compensation will match the loss sustained, which may result in a
party receiving more than what was suffered. This uncertainty and the potential over
or under payment is in contravention of the principle of gharar.
contractor tried to impose liquidated damages on a subcontractor under a subcontract despite
the main contractor not having suffered any loss as a result of the subcontractor’s breach. This
was because the employer had not imposed liquidated damages on the main contractor under
the corresponding “main contract”. The court held that proving fault on the part of the
subcontractor was not sufficient - the main contractor had to have suffered loss as well. In the
context and discussion of subcontractors, see also Grose Construction Law in the United Arab
Emirates and the Gulf 141 who is of the opinion that this should not be a sufficient subcontractor
defence to the imposition of liquidated damages and that subcontractor liability should be
assessed independently to the main contractor’s liability under the main contract. See also
Union Supreme Court 103/Judicial Year 24 21 March 2004, Union Supreme Court 414/Judicial
Year 21 27 March 2001, M Marican The Effect of Article 390(2) of the UAE Civil Code on
Liquidated Damages Claims in the UAE Construction Industry MSc BUiD (2014) 21 and A
Ibrahim & J Mullen “Liquidated Damages under UAE and UK law: a comparison.” (09-10-2013)
Fenwick & Elliott Annual Review https://www.fenwickelliott.com/research-insight/annual-
review/2013/liquidated-damages-uae-uk-law-comparison (accessed 16-10-2017).
558 Bremer “Liquidated Damages under the Law of the United Arab Emirates and its interpretation
by the UAE Courts” Research Gate 205. Bremer notes that the employer need not be able to
quantify the loss (unless the employer is seeking to rely on Article 390(2).
559 Bremer “Liquidated Damages under the Law of the United Arab Emirates and its interpretation
by the UAE Courts” Research Gate 207. See also Union Supreme Court 218/Judicial Year 25
and Union Supreme Court 26/Judicial Year 24 dated 1 June 2004.
560 Bremer “Liquidated Damages under the Law of the United Arab Emirates and its interpretation
by the UAE Courts” Research Gate 200. The author continues at 204 to define the principle of
gharar: “The Islamic principle of gharar – frequently translated as ‘uncertainty’ or ‘deceptive
uncertainty’ – prohibits the conclusion of agreements that compromise the risk of one party
benefitting or sustains [sustaining] losses due to circumstances unknown at the time of the
conclusion of the agreement. This principle is commonly associated with the prohibition of
gambling and speculation has implications for liquidated damage clauses”.
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Nonetheless, the importance and commercial need for liquidated damages clauses,
especially in muqawala contracts, is widely acknowledged in the UAE.561 Article
390(2) of the Civil Code serves to alleviate this discrepancy by striking a
compromise between Islamic jurisprudence and market need.562
Under Article 390(2)563 of the Civil Code, the court is provided with a wide
discretionary power to vary such provisions.564 This is a mandatory provision in the
Civil Code so that parties may not agree that it is not applicable to their
agreement.565 Article 390(2) says:
“The judge may in all cases, upon the application of either of the party, vary
such agreement so as to make compensation equal to the loss and, any
agreement to the contrary shall be void.”
This was confirmed in a Federal Supreme Court decision566 where it was held:
“It is established that delay fines in construction contracts are a financial penalty
that project owners resort to when the contractor is in breach of its obligations
in executing the work on time. However, these penalties are subject to control
by law to protect a party from any unjustified actions and from any
contraventions of the law.”
For many, this provision infringes on the sanctity of contract,567 with a court being
entitled to vary what parties have agreed. However, this Article is justified by the
need to achieve a balance between industry demands and Islamic jurisprudence.
561 Bremer “Liquidated Damages under the Law of the United Arab Emirates and its interpretation
by the UAE Courts” Research Gate 201.
562 Bremer “Liquidated Damages under the Law of the United Arab Emirates and its interpretation
by the UAE Courts” Research Gate 201 - see further the discussion on page 204. See also
Whelan UAE Civil Code and Ministry of Justice Commentary 2:0577.
563 For similar provisions see Article 224 of the Egyptian Civil Code; Article 364 of the Jordanian
Civil Code; Article 266 of the Qatari Civil Code; Article 226 of the Bahrain Civil Code; Article
303 of the Kuwait Civil Code; Article 267 of the Oman Civil Code. It is also asserted that this
Article is also applicable to liability caps.
564 Under common law jurisdictions, a court will not be empowered to vary a stipulation which is
penal in nature to reflect the actual loss suffered, but only be empowered to declare such a
punitive stipulation void. Grose Construction Law in the United Arab Emirates and the Gulf 139.
Note also that this Article is not applicable in instances when the agreement has been
terminated or has come to an end and to tortious claims - see Marican The Effect of Article
390(2) of the UAE Civil Code 20; Whelan UAE Civil Code and Ministry of Justice Commentary
2:0577.
565 Grose Construction Law in the United Arab Emirates and the Gulf 139.  According to Article 31
of the Civil Code a mandatory provision of law will take precedence over a contractual provision.
566 595/18 dated 26 April 1998.
567 Bremer “Liquidated Damages under the Law of the United Arab Emirates and its interpretation
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It is important to note that Article 390(2) makes provision for “either party” to
approach the court for the adjustment of compensation.568 An innocent employer is
accordingly entitled to approach the courts for an upward adjustment of the
compensation originally agreed in the contract to reflect damages actually
sustained.569  This is a further incentive for a defaulting contractor to comply with
the contract.
 It is presumed that the liquidated damages clause reflects the actual amount of
damage suffered.570 Therefore, a party who wishes to challenge a liquidated
damages clause under Article 390(2) bears the burden of proving that the specified
amount does not reflect the true loss sustained.571 Once a party has discharged this
burden, a court will investigate and determine the damages actually incurred.572
This approach is supported by Article 48(1) of the Evidence Law, which on
interpretation only requires that in order to rebut an assumption, a party need not
by the UAE Courts” Research Gate 204. Article 126 of the Civil Code upholds the freedom to
contract.
568 Whether a court is entitled to raise and apply Article 390(2) without it being raised by a
party in the pleadings is uncertain. Some writers suggest that a court cannot intervene without
application by one of the parties. See H Al Mulla “Damages and Contract in the UAE” (12-03-
2010) The In House Lawyer http://www.inhouselawyer.co.uk/index.php/legal-
briefing/damages-and-contracts-in-the-uae/ (accessed 16-10-2017).  Whether an arbitrator is
entitled to invoke the provisions of Article 390(2) or whether such powers are limited to the
judiciary also awaits clarification.
569 Grose Construction Law in the United Arab Emirates and the Gulf 142. Furthermore, this strikes
at one of the key motivators as to why a contractor would agree to liquidated damages – namely
to protect the contractor from unliquidated damages. Ibrahim & Mullen “Liquidated Damages
under UAE and UK law: a comparison” Fenwick & Elliott Annual Review. In addition, some
writers assert that liquidated damages and general ‘compensatory damages’ are not viewed by
UAE law as mutually exclusive and an employer may be successful in bringing a claim for
liquidated damages together with a further claim for loss actually suffered. E Rankin “How the
law of liquidated damages can be applied in the local jurisdiction” (09-06-2007) Arabian
Business http://www.arabianbusiness.com/how-law-of-liquidated-damages-can-be-applied-in-
local-jurisdiction-143768.html (accessed 16-10-2017).
570 Bremer “Liquidated Damages under the Law of the United Arab Emirates and its interpretation
by the UAE Courts” Research Gate 209. See also F Attia “Liquidated Damages – The Bigger
Picture” Law Update.
571 Marican The Effect of Article 390(2) of the UAE Civil Code 25.
572 Bremer “Liquidated Damages under the Law of the United Arab Emirates and its interpretation
by the UAE Courts” Research Gate 210. Also see Grose Construction Law in the United Arab
Emirates and the Gulf 141: “A party seeking to recover delay damages in the Federal Supreme
Court must be prepared to adduce evidence not only of delay for which no entitlement to an
extension of time exists but also fault and amount of loss. Although the assessment of damages
for this purpose is a discretionary matter for the Court of Merits the judgment should set out the
computation of the damages, including the individual heads of loss.” See also Marican The
Effect of Article 390(2) of the UAE Civil Code 32.
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provide evidence which proves circumstances specific to the case at hand but will
need only to provide evidence contradicting the assumption.573
Once the burden is discharged, a court will be empowered to vary the compensation
as it deems fit and such determination is within its sole discretion. The Supreme
Court574 held:
“[t]he assessment of damage and the evaluation of the underlying
circumstances when assessing the compensation due are matters of fact within
the sole discretion of the trial court.”
Unfortunately, there is inconsistency in judicial decisions and in some instances,
the courts have allowed for damages, which were not equal to, or in excess of, the
loss actually incurred (even allowing, on occasion, for the inclusion of a punitive
element).575 However, this does not detract (in fact it may even further encourage)
a defaulting contractor to tender specific performance properly and timeously to
avoid the imposition of liquidated damages.
From a contractor’s perspective, Article 390(2), by allowing for the agreed amount
of compensation to be varied through judicial intervention, removes the limited
benefits of agreeing to liquidated damages clauses; any guarantee and
reassurance that liquidated damages are limited to a fixed amount falls away. Whilst
in some instances, Article 390(2) may provide legislative protection through judicial
intervention, it may also work against a defaulting contractor by enabling an
innocent employer to rely on this clause to increase the liquidated damages amount
to reflect the loss actually sustained. In order for this to happen, an employer needs
only to discharge the (relatively low) burden of proof, and a defaulting contractor
will then fall into the hands of the courts to determine the compensation amount.
573 Bremer “Liquidated Damages under the Law of the United Arab Emirates and its interpretation
by the UAE Courts” Research Gate 210.
574 36/Judicial Year 21.
575 Bremer “Liquidated Damages under the Law of the United Arab Emirates and its interpretation
by the UAE Courts” Research Gate 201. It must be borne in mind that the concept of binding
precedent does not exist under UAE law. See also Marican The Effect of Article 390(2) of the
UAE Civil Code 14 and M Heywood M & C Holmes “How Fixed are your Liquidated Damages”
(01-2015) InSite – Construction Issues for the Middle East Issue No. 1
https://www.pinsentmasons.com/PDF/Insite-Construction-Middle-East-Newsletter-Issue-1.pdf
 (accessed 16-10-2017) - “The literal translation of “liquidated damages” in Arabic is
“fines”…the UAE [Civil Code] allows parties to agree any level of future liquidated damages (or
“fines”), even if the amount is arbitrary or excessive”.
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The Abu Dhabi Court of Cassation576 held:
“Article 390 of the Civil Code shows…that a stipulation for a penalty clause
renders the assessment of harm a matter for the contracting parties, and the
obligee does not have to prove it. Rather, the obligor has the burden of proving
that it did not take place. There is a presumption that the assessment of
compensation agreed is commensurate with the harm suffered by the obligee,
and the judge must abide by that clause and give effect to it unless the obligor
proves that the agreed compensation is excessive or that the obligee did not
suffer any harm at all.”
Therefore, liquidated damages clauses are recognised by the judiciary in the UAE
and, any contractor would be well advised to properly and timeously tender specific
performance.
6 4 The Red Book
The Red Book does not make provision for the imposition of liquidated damages in
instances where the works fail to meet pre-agreed performance criteria. Should
parties wish to make liquidated damages applicable to performance criteria, they
would need to modify the conditions of contract. A failure by a contractor to comply
with the provisions of clause 8.2 of the Red Book regarding the Time for
Completion,577 however, entitles the employer to claim delay damages under clause
8.7,578 and albeit somewhat indirectly, this provides a recourse to liquidated
damages for this kind of breach.
Clause 8.7 of the Red Book says:
“If the Contractor fails to comply with Sub-Clause 8.2 [Time for Completion],
the Contractor shall subject to Sub-Clause 2.5 [Employer’s Claims] pay delay
damages to the Employer for this default. These delay damages shall be the
sum stated in the Appendix to Tender, which shall be paid for every day which
shall elapse between the relevant Time for Completion and the date stated in
the Taking-Over Certificate. However, the total amount due under this Sub-
576   941/2009 dated 29 September 2009 See also Union Supreme Court 370/Judicial Year 20 2
May 2000.
577 “The Contractor shall complete the whole of the Works, and each Section (if any) within the
Time for Completion for the Works or Section (as the case may be), including…”. Many authors
assert that the remedy of delay damages is also applicable to the breach of Cl 8.1 which
requires the contractor to proceed with “due expedition and without delay.” See Grose
Construction Law in the United Arab Emirates and the Gulf 328.
578 The contractor’s entitlement for adjustments for changes in cost under cl 13.8 is also
unfavourably impacted should the contractor fail to complete by the agreed time for completion.
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
134
Clause shall not exceed the maximum amount of delay damages (if any) stated
in the Appendix to Tender.
These delay damages shall be the only damages due from the Contractor for
such default, other than in the event of termination under Sub-Clause 15.2
[Termination by the Employer] prior to the completion of the Works. These
damages shall not relieve the Contractor from his obligation to complete the
Works, or from any other duties, obligations or responsibilities which he may
have under the Contract.”
The term “delay damages” is undefined in the definitions section of the Red Book
but, such delay damages are easily identifiable by the sum579 inserted by the parties
into the Appendix to Tender. The quantum of such an amount580 is a vital
consideration both under law and for contractor’s level of risk exposure.581 Given
the ordinary and generally accepted interpretation of the term “damages”, some
academics are of the view that the term “delay damages” in the Red Book should
mean that the reasonable estimate of the actual losses which may be incurred by
the employer should be reflected as the figure assigned for delay damages.582
Delay damages are levied daily from the contractually stipulated time for completion
until the date of actual completion and, parties are entitled to cap the maximum
amount of delay damages in the Appendix to the Tender. 583
Uncertainty exists whether an employer is simply entitled to deduct delay damages
from what is due to the contractor or whether an employer is obliged contractually
to follow the procedure set out in the Red Book for doing so.584 Many academics
579 This may also be a percentage of the contract price.
580 Chern “Remedies” in FIDIC Contracts Law and Practice 8.47 makes reference to the FIDIC
Guide which suggests that the governing law of the relevant contract may require this sum to
be a reasonable estimate of the employer’s losses, and that any quantification which is penal
in nature may be regarded as unlawful. This “reasonable estimate” may also include finance
charges, supervision and in some instances, an element of profit.
581 Chern “Remedies” in FIDIC Contracts Law and Practice 8.45.
582 Barr & Grutters FIDIC User’s Guide 176. In a previous version of the FIDIC Red Book (1987),
“liquidated damages” were particularly provided for. Where the governing law of the contract
allows for penalties and, should the parties wish to include penalty provisions in their contract,
parties should amend cl 8.7 to ensure that interpretation of the term “delay damages” does not
limit compensation to a pre-determined LAD amount and accordingly allows for penalties.
583 If the parties do not limit the maximum amount of delay damages, then there will be no cap and
the contractor will remain liable until it meets its obligations under cl 8.2. However, this liability
is not in excess of the overall limitation of liability which is set out in cl 17.6 - see Chern
“Remedies” in FIDIC Contracts Law and Practice 8.51.
584 Under cl 2.5 (Employers Claims), the employer is obliged to give notice to the contractor of its
intention to deduct delay damages from the contractor. The engineer will then make a
determination under cl 3.5 (Determinations) agreeing to or determining these amounts. Only
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maintain that an employer is obliged procedurally to comply with clause 2.5 and
3.5.585 In the UK case of J Murphy & Sons Ltd v Beckton Energy Ltd,586 however,
the court held:
“When interpreting a written contract, it was necessary to focus on the meaning
of the relevant words in their documentary, factual and commercial context.
Clause 8.7587 set out a self-contained regime for the trigger and payment of
delay damages but did not suggest that there was an additional regime, such
as that contained in cll.2.5 and 3.5, to be imported…Thus, on a proper
construction of the contract, the right to liquidated damages under cl.8.7 was
not subject to the mechanism set out in cl.2.5 and 3.5.”
It is also contended that the contractual requirement under clause 3.5 for the
engineer to determine the amount payable by the employer to the contractor
detracts from the principle that delay damages are a “pre- agreed amount”. To so
hold would also defeat the purpose of certainty regarding the quantum of the delay
damages and, as there is no fixed period for the engineer to make its determination,
there may be an unprecedented delay.588
There is slight uncertainty in the industry regarding the date on which the employer
is entitled to claim delay damages. This is because under the wording of clause 8.7
an argument exists that such delay damages are only claimable from the date on
which the taking over certificate589 was issued. However, a counter (and more
plausible) argument is that clause 8.7 indicates the time period over which delay
damages are to be calculated and is not intended to indicate the time when the
employer’s entitlement to claim payment of such delay damages arises.590 Given
the above uncertainty, it is advisable that parties (carefully) amend the terms of the
Red Book depending on their assessment of the circumstances.
once the engineer has given a determination in favour of the employer will the employer be
entitled to deduct these amounts.  Clarity surrounding the procedure has arguably been
included in the 2017 publication of the Red Book. See cl 8.8 [Delay Damages] and cl 20.2
[Claims for Payment and/or EoT] - particularly cl 20.2.7.
585 See Grose Construction Law in the United Arab Emirates and the Gulf 330 who contends that
the failure to do so might trigger the contractor’s right to suspend work under cl 16.1 or terminate
the contract under cl 16.2 [Termination by Contractor].
586 [2016] EWHC 607 1.
587 Note in this case, cl 8.7 had been slightly amended by the parties.
588 See Blomfield “Amending FIDIC Provisions on Delay Liquidated Damages: a Case Note on
J Murphy & Sons Ltd v Beckton Energy Ltd [2016] EWHC 607 (TCC)” King & Spalding.
589 Cl 10 – Employer’s Taking Over.
590 Chern “Remedies” in FIDIC Contracts Law and Practice 8.55.
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It is also important to note that, unless the employer terminates the contract,591
delay damages are the only damages592 due from the contractor to the employer
for this particular default.
The possibility to recover Delay Damages under clause 8.7 is an important remedy
to an innocent employer who wishes to compel (timeous) specific performance from
a defaulting contractor; in the first instance, it enables the employer to a set sum of
money without needing to prove the amount and, in instances where the amount
contains a punitive element, the contractor will be compelled to perform in terrorem.
However, the parties must give due regard to the governing law of the Red Book,593
and should the governing law prohibit the imposition of purely penal provisions, the
parties must be careful to ensure that the delay damage is a genuine pre-estimate
of the loss. Should they fail to do so, an employer may find its valuable remedy
thwarted and rendered void by the governing law.
6 5 Comparison
Liquidated damages clauses are afforded recognition under South African law
(section 1 of the Conventional Penalties Act) and the law of the UAE (Article 386
read with Article 390 of the Civil Code) and provided for in clause 8.7 of the Red
Book.
An entitlement to liquidated damages is founded in the breach of an obligation by
the contractor. In addition to this breach, under the Civil Code, courts only recognise
the validity of these clauses where the contractor is legally responsible for the
breach, loss was actually sustained by the employer and, there is a causal link
between the breach and the losses sustained. The consideration of these further
requirements, in addition to the agreement reached by the parties is arguably an
infringement of the right of freedom of contract. However, as UAE law is founded in
Sharia’ law, such liquidated damages clauses may be seen to infringe on the
591 See Grose Construction Law in the United Arab Emirates and the Gulf 328 where the different
interpretations of this section of cl 8.7 are discussed.
592 This restriction is only in relation to damages and not in relation to other remedies which may
be available to the contractor under law. Chern “Remedies” in FIDIC Contracts Law and
Practice 8.52.
593 Cl 1.4 “The Contract shall be governed by the law of the country (or other jurisdiction) stated in
the Appendix to Tender.
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principle of gharar. The inclusion of these requirements, in addition to Article 390(2)
of the Civil Code, serves as a compromise between market demands and Islamic
jurisprudence.
Article 390(2) of the Civil Code and section 3 of the Conventional Penalties Act are
comparable, providing the courts with the power to vary the liquidated damages
amount agreed to between the parties. This is a mandatory provision under UAE
law which may not be contracted out of by the parties and similar protections exist
under South African law.594
Under South African law a court can exercise this power on its own volition – this is
questionable under UAE law, with some academics maintaining the view that a
court may only exercise this power upon application by one of the parties. The ability
of a court to exercise this power without an application by one of the parties,
arguably serves to protect a contractor in instances where such protection is
necessary. However, in the alternative, it is arguable that such interference is too
paternalistic and by doing so, a court is acting ultra vires. It also remains subject to
debate, in both systems, whether an arbitrator is also afforded this power.
A key distinguishing feature between Article 390 of the Civil Code and Section 3 of
the Conventional Penalties Act is the power of the court, under UAE law, upon
application of the employer to vary the liquidated damages amount upwards, to
make the compensation equal to the loss. This is contrast to South African law
where a judge may only make an adjustment downwards, reducing the liquidated
damages amount to an amount the court considers equitable in the circumstances.
Whilst the ability to adjust liquidated damages upwards is viewed with scepticism,
there may be merit in affording both an employer and a contractor judicial protection
594 Under South African law, parties are precluded from contracting out of a protection in
anticipation of a breach which has not yet occurred. However, once the breach has occurred,
the parties may agree to exclude reliance on the protection and the Conventional Penalties Act
does not expressly prohibit the waiver of rights. See Portwig v Deputation Street Investments
(Pty) Ltd 1985 (1) SA 83 (D) where it was held that the aim of the Conventional Penalties Act to
ensure fairness would not be defeated nor would public policy be offended, in the absence of
duress, mistake, fraud or undue influence, if a party agreed after the breach, to waive its right
to claim protection under the Conventional Penalties Act.
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in this regard. In practice, parties may misjudge and inaccurately quantify potential
liquidated damages. Should the parties estimate the amount to be too high, a
contractor is provided with adequate protection to have the amount adjusted
downwards. There is no reason why this protection should not extend to an
employer where parties estimate the amount too low. In such instances, an
employer should be afforded equal protection under the law and, should have the
right to adjust the liquidated damages amount upwards.
Therefore, the advantage of pre-agreeing an amount which includes a penal
element exceeding prejudice actually suffered by the employer, may be ultimately
negated. This makes the burden of proof of utmost importance. The burden of proof
under UAE law lies with the party alleging that the liquidated damages amount does
not reflect the harm suffered. This is in contrast to South African law, where the
burden of proof will lie with the contractor to prove that the employer did not suffer
any prejudice.595
Parties under both UAE law and South African law, may agree the computation of
the liquidated damages amount and the Red Book makes provision at the
commencement of the construction contract for parties to agree (usually
formulaically) the amount of delay damages.596 This is usually also subject to an
agreed cap on the maximum amount of delay damages imposable. This
methodology and, especially an agreement on a capped amount, serves to control
and limit the exposure of the contractor. This may avoid allegations that the
liquidated damages amount is unreasonable or out of proportion to the prejudice
suffered, and accordingly there may be no need to trigger Article 390 of the Civil
Code or section 3 of the Conventional Penalties Act.
Under South African law, liquidated damages provisions are triggered automatically
upon the breach of the relevant term in the contract. Under the Civil Code, the
595 It may also be asserted that “prejudice” is broader than “harm”. As noted, under South African
law, “prejudice” goes beyond mere pecuniary loss and a court will consider all legitimate and
protectible interests of the employer. Under UAE law, it is arguable that in line with Islamic law,
damage should only be in the amount suffered.
596 Under the Red Book, the computation methodologies are restricted to the timing of
performance. Should parties wish to make liquidated damages applicable to performance
criteria, parties would need to modify the conditions of contract accordingly.
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amount will only fall due once the contractor has been notified unless there are
provisions to the contrary contained in the contract or under law.597 In this regard,
should the parties to the construction contract resort to the Red Book, conflicting
views exist and, it is a matter of debate whether an employer may simply deduct
damages or whether an employer is obliged to follow a prescribed procedure in the
Red Book before doing so. Arguably, this prescribed procedure is flawed in so far
as requiring a third (namely the engineer) to “determine” the liquidated damages
amount will defeat the purpose of a pre-agreed quantification by the parties, thereby
detracting from the identified benefits of liquidated damages provisions.
Whilst clause 8.7 of the Red Book most certainly is practical and effective, parties
may wish to modify its provisions to avoid any discrepancies. This is especially
relevant in jurisdictions such as South Africa and the UAE where it may be
permissible for liquidated damages to be punitive in nature. Parties must ensure
that the contract, on a proper interpretation thereof, does not restrict the provision
for a recovery of liquidated damages to a genuine pre-estimate of the loss. This is
especially prevalent under the Red Book where conflicting views exist over the true
interpretation of “delay damages”.
In many jurisdictions, provisions for liquidated damages which are punitive in nature
are unenforceable. Such an approach limits what parties may agree to and negates
the principle of contractual freedom and can be seen as restrictive. In contrast, in
jurisdictions such as South Africa and the UAE, liquidated damages provisions may
include a punitive element. Parties instead, are provided with legislated protection
provided for through judicial intervention. Whilst arguments exist that the judicial
intervention infringes on the principle of pacta sunt servanda and may give rise to
uncertainty, this approach is less paternalistic - parties are afforded the contractual
freedom to include penal stipulations, albeit subject to judicial discretion, and such
provisions are not automatically deemed unlawful. The Federal Supreme Court
held:
“It is established that delay fines in construction contracts are a financial penalty
that project owners resort to when the contractor is in breach of its obligations
in executing the work on time. However, these penalties are subject to control
597 Article 387 of the Civil Code.
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by law to protect a party from any unjustified actions and from any
contraventions of the law.” [my emphasis]598
Therefore, under both South African law and UAE law, courts recognise and uphold
liquidated damages provisions. Liquidated damages provisions serve as an
effective self-help remedy and a defaulting contractor is well advised to properly
tender specific performance and, to do so timeously.
6 6 Conclusion
Liquidated damages provisions may serve as effective self-help remedies and are
recognised under South African law, the law of the UAE and the Red Book.
Additionally, the courts are willing to respect agreements entered into by the parties
giving due regard to liquidated damages clauses.  Such clauses serve as self-help
remedies in a slightly subtler way than other self-help remedies such as liens, with
their primary purpose being the alleviation of the burden on the employer to prove
and quantify damages suffered as a consequence of delay. However, despite the
contractor’s ability to price for this risk, a contractor will still do its utmost to ensure
that the risk does not materialise; prompting timeous and proper performance.
Furthermore, in jurisdictions such as South Africa and the UAE where such clauses
may be punitive in nature, a contractor would be even further encouraged to
perform. Whilst judicial intervention as a protection mechanism remains available
to a contractor under both South African and UAE law, the utilisation of this
mechanism is dependent upon the discharge of a burden of proof by the contractor.
Even if the contractor is able to discharge this burden, there is no guarantee that a
court will find in its favour and, as noted, under UAE law, a court is entitled to even
make an upwards adjustment of the agreed compensation.
The ease in which liquidated damages clauses can be invoked by an innocent
employer and the potential disastrous consequences which may occur should a
liquidated damages clause be imposed to its full extent serve as key motivators in
encouraging a defaulting contractor to perform specifically and timeously.
598 Federal Supreme Court No. 595/18 dated 26 April 1998.
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Therefore, it can be concluded that the threat of the imposition of liquidated
damages serve as an effective self-help remedy for the innocent employer.
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Chapter 7
Conclusion
Under both South African and UAE law, the courts recognise the primacy of specific
performance and a party’s corresponding right to an order of that effect; this remedy
is theoretically also recognised in respect of construction contracts.599 Should an
aggrieved party to a construction contract be unable to compel a defaulting party to
comply with what it has undertaken to do, it will be stranded with a partially
completed project. This gives rise to a multiplicity of complications; primarily with
regard to time and cost. It should therefore come as no surprise that an aggrieved
party would want to compel specific performance as a primary remedy, as in most
instances damages will be more than unsatisfactory.
However, should an aggrieved party approach a court for specific performance,
there is no guarantee that the court will grant the aggrieved party what it has
requested. Under both South African and UAE law, the courts may, in certain
instances refuse to accede to a request for specific performance. This orientation,
coupled with a general and traditional reluctance by the courts to make an order for
specific performance in a construction setting, gives rise to uncertainty that an
innocent contractant may not be awarded what has been asked.
Therefore, in many instances it is more certain, also in view of time and cost
considerations, for an innocent party to resort to what has been styled “self-help”
remedies to compel a defaulting party to comply with its obligations under the
contract without judicial intervention. However, as a resort to self-help remedies is
viewed with scepticism in many jurisdictions, it is imperative that these remedies
are effectively regulated in order to achieve a balance between the interests of the
aggrieved party and the defaulting party and, to ensure that such remedies do not
undermine underlying considerations of principle and policy. 600
599 See Chapter 3 “Specific Performance”.
600 See Chapter 2 “The Construction Contract under UAE Law and South African Law in Context:
an Overview”.
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After an overview of the law regarding specific performance in South African law
and UAE law, this dissertation considered and focused on three self-help remedies
resorted to in the construction industry and investigated their availability to a
disgruntled and aggrieved party under South African law, UAE law, and the Red
Book.
The first self-help remedy considered, as a remedy available to both an employer
and a contractor, was that of a suspension of performance due under an agreement.
Whilst both South Africa and the UAE recognise suspension founded in reciprocity
and due performance, important guidance should also be drawn from the Red Book
with the approach of the Red Book extending beyond the grounds for suspension
under UAE law and South African law. The Red Book allows for elective suspension
by an employer and whilst there is arguably merit for extending this right to elective
suspension to the contractor as well,601 the Red Book still maintains a good balance
by setting out fairly extensive grounds (premised on non-payment) upon which a
contractor may suspend performance of its obligations.
Furthermore, the Red Book addresses the important consequences of suspension,
the according resultant cost of such suspension and, it balances the risk element
inherent to suspension. The Red Book also allows for instances where the
obligations of the parties are resumed or where the obligations of parties may be
terminated due to prolonged suspension.  Parties to a construction contract should
therefore take due regard of the suspension provisions contained in the Red Book,
and it is advisable for parties to incorporate similar provisions to the Red Book when
concluding a construction contract.
Despite the complexities of suspension, it is a very effective self-help remedy to
compel specific performance by a defaulting party despite the potential occurrence
of economic waste.602 This is evident through its regular and continued effective
use in industry.603
601 See n347 and Chapter 5 “Liens and Liquidated Damages”.
602 See Gergen (2009) B.U.L Rev. 1410 for further discussion on economic waste.
603 See Beletskaya Development of the Contractual Remedies 122.
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A lien, as a means to compel specific performance by a defaulting party, was the
second self-help remedy considered by this dissertation. Liens are recognised
under UAE law and South African law and whilst the requirements for the valid
exercise of a lien under both jurisdictions are largely similar, liens are scarcely used
under UAE Law. This is arguably largely due to the lack of binding precedent.
In contrast, the concept of liens is fairly advanced under South African law, and the
requirements for the exercise of a lien are well developed. As this concept under
South African Law is principally similar to UAE law, comparison between South
African Law and UAE Law can easily be made (and accordingly used) to advance
the development of liens as self-help remedies under UAE law.
It may be asserted that the Red Book makes provision for a possessory lien through
implication only. Arguably this may have been purposefully done by drafters, like
with liquidated damages, due to the difficulty in harmonising the divergent
approaches adopted by various legal systems604 regarding the existence and
operation of a lien. Therefore, should parties not wish the provisions of the
governing national legal system to apply, it is advised parties include special
conditions to clarify the position under the Red Book.
When exercised correctly, a lien serves as an effective means to compel specific
performance by a defaulting party and accordingly this self-help remedy should be
afforded better regard under UAE law.
The final remedy considered by this dissertation was liquidated damages.605 This
remedy is attractive primarily to an employer by guaranteeing it an election to
impose a set sum in the instance of breach by the contractor, and thereby relieving
the employer from the burden of proving damages requirements in instances where
a contractor fails to ensure that the executed works comply with pre-agreed
performance criteria or where a contractor fails to perform its obligations timeously.
604 See n25 and Chapter 5 “Liens and Liquidated Damages”.
605 See Chapter 5 “Liens and Liquidated Damages”.
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Therefore, even if a contractor is able to price this risk, it stands to reason that the
contractor will still wish to avoid the materialisation of such a risk and will do its
utmost to discharge its performance obligations – especially given the ease in which
the employer can impose such liquidated damages. Furthermore, the effectiveness
of liquidated damages provisions is amplified in instances where such provisions
contain a punitive element.
Liquidated damages provisions can be regarded as self-help remedies as they
firstly align with the definition of a “self-help remedy” namely legally permissible
conduct used to compel performance without the assistance of a judicial entity606
and secondly, as liquidated damages provisions are automatically triggered upon
contract breach, and an employer is afforded an election to not impose liquidated
damages; it may be said that the employer, by not exercising this election and
electing to impose liquidated damages, is inadvertently choosing to use a self-help
remedy.
Liquidated damages provisions are afforded recognition under UAE law and South
African law. Both jurisdictions allow for legislative protection through judicial
intervention in instances where a liquidated damages provision is out of proportion
to the loss suffered.
Under South African law, this legislated recourse is only available to the defaulting
party and liquidated damages provisions can only be adjusted downwards. This is
in contrast to UAE law where an aggrieved party is afforded the right, upon
application for such liquidated damages to be adjusted upwards. There is merit in
this approach and such entitlement should be extended to an innocent party under
South African law.
Apparently liquidated damages are titled “Delay Damages” under the Red Book to
align divergent approaches between jurisdictions which allow for a punitive element
and those which do not. The Red Book contains provisions regarding the
quantification of liquidated damages and an according maximum cap on such
606 See Gergen (2009) B.U.L Rev. 1398.
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liquidated damages. However, the requisite procedure for deducting liquidated
damages and the timing of such deductions has been subject to industry debate
and not fully covered by the standard provisions of the Red Book - accordingly this
is an area in which the Red Book could be improved.607
Self-help remedies such as suspension, liquidated damages and liens are effective
in compelling compliance with a contract by a defaulting party. This is especially
prevalent in construction contracts where there is a general reluctance by the courts
to make an order for specific performance despite an award for specific
performance being fundamental in these respective jurisdictions.
However, when resorting to such remedies, it is essential that a jurisdiction is
sufficiently sophisticated to reconcile underlying principles of policy and to ensure
that the delicate balance between the cornerstones of contract law (namely good
faith, consensuality, freedom, privity and sanctity of contract) and public policy and
principle is maintained.
Therefore, a resort by an aggrieved party to these self-help remedies in jurisdictions
where such remedies are effectually regulated, balancing the rights and interests
between the parties, and underlying considerations of policy and principle, is
justifiable. Accordingly, self-help remedies serve, in the context of construction
contracts, to effectively encourage specific performance by a defaulting party.
607 See n584.
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